Sequential Circuit Design for Embedded Cryptographic Applications Resilient to Adversarial Faults

In the relatively young field of fault-tolerant cryptography, the main research effort has focused exclusively on the protection of the data path of cryptographic circuits. To date, however, we have not found any work that aims at protecting the control logic of these circuits against fault attacks, which thus remains the proverbial Achilles’ heel. Motivated by a hypothetical yet realistic fault analysis attack that, in principle, could be mounted against any modular exponentiation engine, even one with appropriate data path protection, we set out to close this remaining gap. In this paper, we present guidelines for the design of multifault-resilient sequential control logic based on standard Error-Detecting Codes (EDCs) with large minimum distance. We introduce a metric that measures the effectiveness of the error detection technique in terms of the effort the attacker has to make in relation to the area overhead spent in implementing the EDC. Our comparison shows that the proposed EDC-based technique provides superior performance when compared against regular N-modular redundancy techniques. Furthermore, our technique scales well and does not affect the critical path delay

Fault tolerance in super-scalar and VLIW processors

In this paper, we present a method for utilizing the spare capacity in super-scalar and very long instruction word (VLIW) processors to tolerate functional unit failures. Unlike previous work that was primarily interested in detection of transient faults, we are concerned with more permanent and/or intermittent faults which necessitate processor reconfiguration. Our method utilizes the VLIW compiler or the superscalar scheduler to insert redundant operations whenever idle functional units exist. The results of these redundant operations are used to detect and diagnose functional unit failures. For super-scalar processors, the scheduler can then utilize this information to ensure that operations are performed only on non-faulty units. In VLIW processors, this is equivalent to recompiling the code to run on the remaining non-faulty functional units. Since in certain applications, recompilation may not be possible, we consider two alternative reconfiguration strategies for VLIW processors. These strategies sacrifice storage space and execution time, respectively, in order to reconfigure without recompiling. We present Markov models that describe the behavior of processors using these different approaches and we evaluate their reliabilities. The results show that, while super-scalar and VLIW with recompilation provide the highest reliability, all proposed strategies significantly increase reliability over that of an unprotected processor

Measurements, Models, Systems and Design

531 s.

Advancing Hardware Security Using Polymorphic and Stochastic Spin-Hall Effect Devices

Protecting intellectual property (IP) in electronic circuits has become a serious challenge in recent years. Logic locking/encryption and layout camouflaging are two prominent techniques for IP protection. Most existing approaches, however, particularly those focused on CMOS integration, incur excessive design overheads resulting from their need for additional circuit structures or device-level modifications. This work leverages the innate polymorphism of an emerging spin-based device, called the giant spin-Hall effect (GSHE) switch, to simultaneously enable locking and camouflaging within a single instance. Using the GSHE switch, we propose a powerful primitive that enables cloaking all the 16 Boolean functions possible for two inputs. We conduct a comprehensive study using state-of-the-art Boolean satisfiability (SAT) attacks to demonstrate the superior resilience of the proposed primitive in comparison to several others in the literature. While we tailor the primitive for deterministic computation, it can readily support stochastic computation; we argue that stochastic behavior can break most, if not all, existing SAT attacks. Finally, we discuss the resilience of the primitive against various side-channel attacks as well as invasive monitoring at runtime, which are arguably even more concerning threats than SAT attacks.Comment: Published in Proc. Design, Automation and Test in Europe (DATE) 201

On-line diagnosis of sequential systems, 2

The theory and techniques applicable to the on-line diagnosis of sequential systems, were investigated. A complete model for the study of on-line diagnosis is developed. First an appropriate class of system models is formulated which can serve as a basis for a theoretical study of on-line diagnosis. Then notions of realization, fault, fault-tolerance and diagnosability are formalized which have meaningful interpretations in the the context of on-line diagnosis. The diagnosis of systems which are structurally decomposed and are represented as a network of smaller systems is studied. The fault set considered is the set of faults which only affect one component system is the network. A characterization of those networks which can be diagnosed using a purely combinational detector is achieved. A technique is given which can be used to realize any network by a network which is diagnosable in the above sense. Limits are found on the amount of redundancy involved in any such technique

Transparent code authentication at the processor level

The authors present a lightweight authentication mechanism that verifies the authenticity of code and thereby addresses the virus and malicious code problems at the hardware level eliminating the need for trusted extensions in the operating system. The technique proposed tightly integrates the authentication mechanism into the processor core. The authentication latency is hidden behind the memory access latency, thereby allowing seamless on-the-fly authentication of instructions. In addition, the proposed authentication method supports seamless encryption of code (and static data). Consequently, while providing the software users with assurance for authenticity of programs executing on their hardware, the proposed technique also protects the software manufacturers’ intellectual property through encryption. The performance analysis shows that, under mild assumptions, the presented technique introduces negligible overhead for even moderate cache sizes