Reflexive insensitive modal logics

We analyze a class of modal logics rendered insensitive to reflexivity by way of a modification to the semantic definition of the modal operator. We explore the extent to which these logics can be characterized, and prove a general completeness theorem on the basis of a translation between normal modal logics and their reflexive-insensitive counterparts. Lastly, we provide a sufficient semantic condition describing when a similarly general soundness result is also available

The Boxdot Conjecture and the Language of Essence and Accident

We show the Boxdot Conjecture holds for a limited but familiar range of Lemmon-Scott axioms. We re-introduce the language of essence and accident, first introduced by J. Marcos, and show how it aids our strategy

Neighborhood Semantics for Logics of Unknown Truths and False Beliefs

This article outlines a semantic approach to the logics of unknown truths, and the logic of false beliefs, using neighborhood structures, giving results on soundness, completeness, and expressivity. Relational semantics for the logics of unknown truths are also addressed, specically the conditions under which sound axiomatizations of these logics might be obtained from their normal counterparts, and the relationship between refexive insensitive logics (RI-logics) and logics containing the provability operator as the primary modal operator

Reflexive-insensitive Modal Logics

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)We analyze a class of modal logics rendered insensitive to reflexivity by way of a modification to the semantic definition of the modal operator. We explore the extent to which these logics can be characterized, and prove a general completeness theorem on the basis of a translation between normal modal logics and their reflexive-insensitive counterparts. Lastly, we provide a sufficient semantic condition describing when a similarly general soundness result is also available.9167180CAPES (Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel) in BrazilFAPESP (Sao Paulo Research Foundation) [2013/25095-4]Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP

Neighbourhood contingency bisimulation

We introduce a notion of bisimulation for contingency logic interpreted on neighbourhood structures, characterise this logic as bisimulation-invariant fragment of modal logic and of first-order logic, and compare it with existing notions in the literature

S5-Style Non-Standard Modalities in a Hypersequent Framework

The aim of the paper is to present some non-standard modalities (such as non-contingency, contingency, essence and accident) based on S5-models in a framework of cut-free hypersequent calculi. We also study negated modalities, i.e. negated necessity and negated possibility, which produce paraconsistent and paracomplete negations respectively. As a basis for our calculi, we use Restall's cut-free hypersequent calculus for S5. We modify its rules for the above-mentioned modalities and prove strong soundness and completeness theorems by a Hintikka-style argument. As a consequence, we obtain a cut admissibility theorem. Finally, we present a constructive syntactic proof of cut elimination theorem

A Logical Modeling of Severe Ignorance

In the logical context, ignorance is traditionally defined recurring to epistemic logic. In particular, ignorance is essentially interpreted as “lack of knowledge”. This received view has - as we point out - some problems, in particular we will highlight how it does not allow to express a type of content-theoretic ignorance, i.e. an ignorance of φ that stems from an unfamiliarity with its meaning. Contrarily to this trend, in this paper, we introduce and investigate a modal logic having a primitive epistemic operator I, modeling ignorance. Our modal logic is essentially constructed on the modal logics based on weak Kleene three-valued logic introduced by Segerberg (Theoria, 33(1):53–71, 1997). Such non-classical propositional basis allows to define a Kripke-style semantics with the following, very intuitive, interpretation: a formula φ is ignored by an agent if φ is neither true nor false in every world accessible to the agent. As a consequence of this choice, we obtain a type of content-theoretic notion of ignorance, which is essentially different from the traditional approach. We dub it severe ignorance. We axiomatize, prove completeness and decidability for the logic of reflexive (three-valued) Kripke frames, which we find the most suitable candidate for our novel proposal and, finally, compare our approach with the most traditional one