1,150 research outputs found
An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
Electronic version of an article published as International Game Theory Review, Vol. 21, Issue 1, 1940001, 2019, p. 1-24. DOI: 10.1142/S0219198919400012] © World Scientific Publishing Company https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S0219198919400012The aim of this work is to give a characterization of the ShapleyâShubik and the Banzhaf power indices for (3,2)-simple games. We generalize to the set of (3,2)-simple games the classical axioms for power indices on simple games: transfer, anonymity, null player property and efficiency. However, these four axioms are not enough to uniquely characterize the ShapleyâShubik index for (3,2)-simple games. Thus, we introduce a new axiom to prove the uniqueness of the extension of the ShapleyâShubik power index in this context. Moreover, we provide an analogous characterization for the Banzhaf index for (3,2)-simple games, generalizing the four axioms for simple games and adding another property.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
- SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES REVISITED.
We provide a new axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf power indices in thedomain of simple superadditive games by means of transparent axioms. Only anonymity isshared with the former characterizations in the literature. The rest of the axioms are substitutedby more transparent ones in terms of power in collective decision-making procedures. Inparticular, a clear restatement and a compelling alternative for the transfer axiom are proposed.Only one axiom differentiates the characterization of either index, and these differentiatingaxioms provide a new point of comparison. In a first step both indices are characterized up to azero and a unit of scale. Then both indices are singled out by simple normalizing axioms.Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, simple games
Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output is binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhafâs index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a power index should be a pair of real numbers, since this better highlights the power of a voter in two different cases, i.e., her being crucial when switching from being in favor to abstain, and from abstain to be contrary. We also provide an axiomatization for both indices, and from this a characterization as well of the standard Banzhaf index (the sum of the former two) is obtained. Some examples are provided to show how the indices behave.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Power indices taking into account agents' preferences
A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into account agentsâ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given
Average Weights and Power in Weighted Voting Games
We investigate a class of weighted voting games for which weights are
randomly distributed over the standard probability simplex. We provide
close-formed formulae for the expectation and density of the distribution of
weight of the -th largest player under the uniform distribution. We analyze
the average voting power of the -th largest player and its dependence on the
quota, obtaining analytical and numerical results for small values of and a
general theorem about the functional form of the relation between the average
Penrose--Banzhaf power index and the quota for the uniform measure on the
simplex. We also analyze the power of a collectivity to act (Coleman efficiency
index) of random weighted voting games, obtaining analytical upper bounds
therefor.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figure
Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
We introduce bisemivalues for bicooperative games and we also provide an interesting characterization of this kind of values by means of weighting coefficients in a similar way as it was given for semivalues in the context of cooperative games. Moreover, the notion of induced bisemivalues on lower cardinalities also makes sense and an adaptation of Draganâs recurrence formula is obtained. For the particular case of (p, q)-bisemivalues, a computational procedure in terms of the multilinear extension of the game is given.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
The Prediction value
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational
importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and
a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player 's prediction
value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of when
cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member
of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a
consistency property. Every -player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV
for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV
can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some
semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be
interpreted in terms of informational importance.Comment: 26 pages, 2 table
Power indices taking into account agents' preferences
A set of new power indices is introduced extending Banzhaf power index and allowing to take into account agentsâ preferences to coalesce. An axiomatic characterization of intensity functions representing a desire of agents to coalesce is given. A set of axioms for new power indices is presented and discussed. An example of use of these indices for Russian parliament is given.
Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games
A path scheme for a simple game is composed of a path, i.e., a sequence of coalitions that is formed during the coalition formation process and a scheme, i.e., a payoff vector for each coalition in the path.A path scheme is called population monotonic if a player's payoff does not decrease as the path coalition grows.In this study, we focus on Shapley path schemes of simple games in which for every path coalition the Shapley value of the associated subgame provides the allocation at hand.We show that a simple game allows for population monotonic Shapley path schemes if and only if the game is balanced.Moreover, the Shapley path scheme of a specific path is population monotonic if and only if the first winning coalition that is formed along the path contains every minimal winning coalition.Extensions of these results to other probabilistic values are discussed.cooperative games;simple games;population monotonic path schemes;coalition formation;probabilistic values
- POWER INDICES AND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
We provide an axiomatic foundation of the expected utility preferences over lotteries on roles in simple superadditive games represented by the two main power indices, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, when they are interpreted as von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. Our axioms admit meaningful interpretations in the setting proposed by Roth in terms of different attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective decision procedures under the veil of ignorance. In particular, an illuminating interpretation of ''efficiency'', up to now missing in this set up, as well as of the corresponding axiom for the Banzhaf index, is provided.Power indices, voting power, collective decision-making, lotteries
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