Does Success Entail Ability?

This paper is about the principle that success entails ability, which I call Success. I argue the status of Success is highly puzzling: when we focus on past instances of actually successful action, Success is very compelling; but it is in tension with the idea that true ability claims require an action be in the agent's control. I make the above tension precise by considering the logic of ability. I argue Success is appealing because it is classically equivalent to two genuinely valid inferences, which I call Past Success and Can't-Entails-Won't; but also that Success itself has counterexamples. I show how to invalidate Success while validating Past Success and Can't-Entails-Won't by connecting the meaning of ‘can’ to facts about what is settled or open. I define an operator W with features attributed to ‘will’ in the literature on future contingents. I then give a conditional analysis of ability ascriptions stated with W-conditionals, where "S can A" says, roughly, there’s some action available to S such that if S does it, then W(S A). I show this semantics invalidates Success while still explaining its appeal

The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk

Provisional draft, pre-production copy of my book “The Modal Future” (forthcoming with Cambridge University Press)

A luz evanescente da contingência : operadores temporais, modalidades, e sensibilidade a contextos de avaliação

Orientador: Walter Alexandre CarnielliTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasResumo: O que queremos dizer quando falamos que algo vai acontecer amanhã, ou quando falamos que algo pode acontecer amanhã? Quais são as condições que precisam ser cumpridas para avaliarmos certas predições sobre nosso futuro, como dizendo (ou tendo dito) algo verdadeiro ou falso? Ou ainda, o que consideramos ter sido expressado por falantes, quando estes fazem afirmações sobre como o futuro irá se desdobrar, ou poderá se desdobrar? São a estas questões que esta tese se dedica. Em seu objetivo mais geral, pretendemos familiarizar o leitor com as ferramentas necessárias para se avaliar as diversas teorias envolvendo semânticas para uma linguagem temporal-modal, e como elas se saem com respeito ao problema dos futuros contingentes. Assim sendo, o Capítulo 1 inicia a tese apresentando o problema dos futuros contingentes, sendo então seguido por um levantamento das principais teorias semânticas para uma linguagem temporal-modal. No Capítulo 2, fornecemos as definições de teorias T×W, e preparamos o terreno para uma discussão aprofundada (a ser exposta no Capítulo 3) sobre a abordagem de MacFarlane a respeito do problema (2003, 2008, 2014), que toma 'futuros contingentes' como expressões cujo estatuto-de-verdade (se são verdadeiras, falsas, ou nem verdadeiras, nem falsas) é determinado não apenas pelo contexto de uso da sentença, mas também pelo contexto de avaliação de onde se avalia este uso. No capítulo final (4), apresentamos finalmente nossa meta particular: o objetivo desta seção é o de investigar o que seria necessário para um modal (de possibilidade) se comportar como sendo sensível a contextos de avaliação. Sugerimos que um modal com este comportamento torna-se saliente no discurso ordinário, especialmente quando ele se encontra em modo indicativo: opondo-se assim usos contendo "pode", de locuções semelhantes utilizando "poderia", quando o modal se encontra em modo subjuntivo. Nós acreditamos que esta sugestão se torna sensivelmente persuasiva através de impasses envolvendo asserções contendo o primeiro modal, porém inexistentes com afirmações semelhantes envolvendo o modal em modo subjuntivo. Essencialmente, argumentamos que ao se tomar a abordagem de MacFarlane sobre asserções - entendendo que quando alguém assere um conteúdo p, ele implica se comprometer em defender sua afirmação de qualquer contexto de avaliação (caso seja contestado) -, e se igualmente supomos que um falante assere um conteúdo cuja forma lógica é '????', se segue então que este falante acaba se representando como comprometido em defender uma alegação que não pode em princípio ser avaliada como verdadeira. Por outro lado, como se mostra, o mesmo não ocorre com afirmações envolvendo o modal subjuntivo (poderia ser,), já que ele não é sensível a contextos de avaliação, e portanto a conjunção pode em princípio ser avaliada como verdadeiraAbstract: What do we mean when we say that something will happen tomorrow, or when we say that something can happen tomorrow? What are the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to make us evaluate a prediction about our future as saying (or having said) something true or false? Or else, what do we take speakers to have imparted when they make claims involving how the future will unfold, or how the future may unfold? It is to these questions that this dissertation is devoted. Within its most general goal, it intends to acquaint the reader with the tools required to assess the many distinct theories involving the semantics of temporal-modal languages, and how they square with the problem of future contingents. Thus accordingly, Chapter 1 sets out by framing the problem of future contingents, which is then followed by a detailed survey of distinct theories regarding the semantics of a temporal-modal language: we provide the relevant definitions, and assess their merits and downfalls. In Chapter 2, we provide the definitions of T×W theories of time, and set the stage for a thorough discussion (to be carried out in Chapter 3 ) about John MacFarlane's distinctive take on the problem (2003, 2008, 2014), which views 'future contingents' as expressions whose truth-status (whether they are true, false, or neither) depends not only on a context of use of the sentence, but also on a context of assessment from which one evaluates this use. The final chapter (4) will then embody our particular goal: the gist of this section is to investigate what it would take for a possibility-like modal to be sensitive to contexts of assessment. We suggest that a modal behaving as such becomes more salient in ordinary discourse when the modal is phrased in the indicative mood: thus opposing uses of 'can' from similar locutions using 'could', with the modal phrased in the subjunctive mood. The suggestion, we believe, becomes sensibly compelling in light of a puzzle involving defectiveness of assertions embedding such modals, as opposed to non-defectiveness of similar assertions involving 'could'. Essentially, it is argued that if we take MacFarlane's view of assertions - by understanding that whenever one flat out asserts a content p, one imparts being committed in defending his claim from any context of assessment (if challenged) -, and further suppose that a speaker asserts a content taking the logical form of '???? ' - where '?' is a future contingent and '?' is the assessment-sensitive modal -, then the defectiveness springs from the fact that the speaker is representing himself as committed in defending a claim that cannot be expected to ever have grounds to be assessed as true. On the other hand, as we show, the same does not occur with similar assertions involving 'could', since the modal is not assessment-sensitive, and thus the whole conjunction can be expected to be assessed as trueDoutoradoFilosofiaDoutor em Filosofia142478/2010-5CNP

The semantics of the future

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 142-144).Natural languages use a number of different methods to refer to future eventualities: among them are futurates, as in (la), and futures, as in (lb) and (c). (1) a. The Red Sox (are) play(ing) the Yankees tomorrow. b. We'll change your oil in Madera. c. We're going to change your oil in Madera. This dissertation uses evidence primarily from English, with additional data from Turkish and Indonesian, to argue that these methods all involve universal quantification over subsets of metaphysically accessible futures. One factor in determining which worlds a modal quantifies over is the temporal argument of the modal's accessibility relation. It is well-known that a higher tense affects the accessibility relation of modals. What is not well-known is that there are aspectual operators high enough to affect the accessibility relation of modals. New data presented in this dissertation reveal the presence of aspectual operators located between TP and the future modal projection. The effects of these operators on truth and assertability conditions provide substantial information about the correct characterization of future modality, and indeed of modality in general. Furthermore, the very existence of such aspectual operators raises questions about how aspect is represented in the semantics, if (as is generally assumed) aspectual operators take event arguments, which do not occur outside of the verb phrase.by Bridget Lynn Copley.Ph.D

Creationism and evolution

In Tower of Babel, Robert Pennock wrote that “defenders of evolution would help their case immeasurably if they would reassure their audience that morality, purpose, and meaning are not lost by accepting the truth of evolution.” We first consider the thesis that the creationists’ movement exploits moral concerns to spread its ideas against the theory of evolution. We analyze their arguments and possible reasons why they are easily accepted. Creationists usually employ two contradictive strategies to expose the purported moral degradation that comes with accepting the theory of evolution. On the one hand they claim that evolutionary theory is immoral. On the other hand creationists think of evolutionary theory as amoral. Both objections come naturally in a monotheistic view. But we can find similar conclusions about the supposed moral aspects of evolution in non-religiously inspired discussions. Meanwhile, the creationism-evolution debate mainly focuses — understandably — on what constitutes good science. We consider the need for moral reassurance and analyze reassuring arguments from philosophers. Philosophers may stress that science does not prescribe and is therefore not immoral, but this reaction opens the door for the objection of amorality that evolution — as a naturalistic world view at least — supposedly endorses. We consider that the topic of morality and its relation to the acceptance of evolution may need more empirical research

Relativism, metasemantics, and the future

Contemporary relativists often see their view as contributing to a semantic/post-semantic account of linguistic data about disagreement and retraction. I offer an independently motivated metasemantic account of the same data, that also handles a number of cases and empirical results that are problematic for the relativist. The key idea is that the content of assertions and beliefs is determined in part by facts about other times, including times after the assertion is made or the belief is formed. On this temporal externalist view, speaker behaviours such as retraction of previous assertions play a role in making it the case that a past utterance has a given meaning.PostprintPeer reviewe

The Truth About the Future

There is a long-standing disagreement among Branching-Time theorists. Even though they all believe that the branching representation accurately grasps the idea that the future, contrary to the past, is open, they argue whether this representation is compatible with the claim that one among many possible futures is distinguished - the single future that will come to be. This disagreement is paralleled in an argument about the bivalence of future contingents. The single, privileged future is often called the Thin Red Line. I reconstruct the history of the arguments for and against this idea. Then, I propose my own version of the Thin Red Line theory which is immune to the major objections found in the literature. I argue that the semantic disagreement is grounded in distinct metaphysical presuppositions. My solution is expressed in a conceptual framework proposed by John MacFarlane, who distinguishes semantics from postsemantics. I extend his distinction and introduce a new notion of presemantics to elucidate my idea