A Framework for Defining Logics

The Edinburgh Logical Framework (LF) provides a means to define (or present) logics. It is based on a general treatment of syntax, rules, and proofs by means of a typed λ-calculus with dependent types. Syntax is treated in a style similar to, but more general than, Martin-Löf’s system of arities. The treatment of rules and proofs focuses on his notion of a judgement. Logics are represented in LF via a new principle, the judgements as types principle, whereby each judgement is identified with the type of its proofs. This allows for a smooth treatment of discharge and variable occurrence conditions and leads to a uniform treatment of rules and proofs whereby rules are viewed as proofs of higher-order judgements and proof checking is reduced to type checking. The practical benefit of our treatment of formal systems is that logic-independent tools such as proof editors and proof checkers can be constructed

Belief Revision, Minimal Change and Relaxation: A General Framework based on Satisfaction Systems, and Applications to Description Logics

Belief revision of knowledge bases represented by a set of sentences in a given logic has been extensively studied but for specific logics, mainly propositional, and also recently Horn and description logics. Here, we propose to generalize this operation from a model-theoretic point of view, by defining revision in an abstract model theory known under the name of satisfaction systems. In this framework, we generalize to any satisfaction systems the characterization of the well known AGM postulates given by Katsuno and Mendelzon for propositional logic in terms of minimal change among interpretations. Moreover, we study how to define revision, satisfying the AGM postulates, from relaxation notions that have been first introduced in description logics to define dissimilarity measures between concepts, and the consequence of which is to relax the set of models of the old belief until it becomes consistent with the new pieces of knowledge. We show how the proposed general framework can be instantiated in different logics such as propositional, first-order, description and Horn logics. In particular for description logics, we introduce several concrete relaxation operators tailored for the description logic \ALC{} and its fragments \EL{} and \ELext{}, discuss their properties and provide some illustrative examples

Modal logics for reasoning about object-based component composition

Component-oriented development of software supports the adaptability and maintainability of large systems, in particular if requirements change over time and parts of a system have to be modified or replaced. The software architecture in such systems can be described by components and their composition. In order to describe larger architectures, the composition concept becomes crucial. We will present a formal framework for component composition for object-based software development. The deployment of modal logics for defining components and component composition will allow us to reason about and prove properties of components and compositions

Metainferential Paraconsistency

In this article, our aim is to take a step towards a full understanding of the notion of paraconsistency in the context of metainferential logics. Following the work initiated by Barrio et al. [2018], we will consider a metainferential logic to be paraconsistent whenever the metainferential version of Explosion (or meta-Explosion) is invalid. However, our contribution consists in modifying the definition of meta-Explosion by extending the standard framework and introducing a negation for inferences and metainferences. From this new perspective, Tarskian paraconsistent logics such as LP will not turn out to be metainferentially paraconsistent, in contrast to, for instance, non-transitive logics like ST. Finally, we will end up by defining a logic which is metainferentially paraconsistent at every level, and discussing whether this logic is uniform through translations

A flexible framework for defeasible logics

Logics for knowledge representation suffer from over-specialization: while each logic may provide an ideal representation formalism for some problems, it is less than optimal for others. A solution to this problem is to choose from several logics and, when necessary, combine the representations. In general, such an approach results in a very difficult problem of combination. However, if we can choose the logics from a uniform framework then the problem of combining them is greatly simplified. In this paper, we develop such a framework for defeasible logics. It supports all defeasible logics that satisfy a strong negation principle. We use logic meta-programs as the basis for the framework.Comment: Proceedings of 8th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning, April 9-11, 2000, Breckenridge, Colorad

Analyzing Individual Proofs as the Basis of Interoperability between Proof Systems

We describe the first results of a project of analyzing in which theories formal proofs can be ex- pressed. We use this analysis as the basis of interoperability between proof systems.Comment: In Proceedings PxTP 2017, arXiv:1712.0089

Polyteam semantics

Team semantics is the mathematical framework of modern logics of dependence and independence in which formulae are interpreted by sets of assignments (teams) instead of single assignments as in first-order logic. In order to deepen the fruitful interplay between team semantics and database dependency theory, we define Polyteam Semantics in which formulae are evaluated over a family of teams. We begin by defining a novel polyteam variant of dependence atoms and give a finite axiomatization for the associated implication problem. We relate polyteam semantics to team semantics and investigate in which cases logics over the former can be simulated by logics over the latter. We also characterize the expressive power of poly-dependence logic by properties of polyteams that are downwards closed and definable in existential second-order logic (ESO). The analogous result is shown to hold for poly-independence logic and all ESO-definable properties. We also relate poly-inclusion logic to greatest fixed point logic.Peer reviewe