5,996 research outputs found
Efficient computation of updated lower expectations for imprecise continuous-time hidden Markov chains
We consider the problem of performing inference with imprecise
continuous-time hidden Markov chains, that is, imprecise continuous-time Markov
chains that are augmented with random output variables whose distribution
depends on the hidden state of the chain. The prefix `imprecise' refers to the
fact that we do not consider a classical continuous-time Markov chain, but
replace it with a robust extension that allows us to represent various types of
model uncertainty, using the theory of imprecise probabilities. The inference
problem amounts to computing lower expectations of functions on the state-space
of the chain, given observations of the output variables. We develop and
investigate this problem with very few assumptions on the output variables; in
particular, they can be chosen to be either discrete or continuous random
variables. Our main result is a polynomial runtime algorithm to compute the
lower expectation of functions on the state-space at any given time-point,
given a collection of observations of the output variables
Another Approach to Consensus and Maximally Informed Opinions with Increasing Evidence
Merging of opinions results underwrite Bayesian rejoinders to complaints about the subjective nature of personal probability. Such results establish that sufficiently similar priors achieve consensus in the long run when fed the same increasing stream of evidence. Initial subjectivity, the line goes, is of mere transient significance, giving way to intersubjective agreement eventually. Here, we establish a merging result for sets of probability measures that are updated by Jeffrey conditioning. This generalizes a number of different merging results in the literature. We also show that such sets converge to a shared, maximally informed opinion. Convergence to a maximally informed opinion is a (weak) Jeffrey conditioning analogue of Bayesian “convergence to the truth” for conditional probabilities. Finally, we demonstrate the philosophical significance of our study by detailing applications to the topics of dynamic coherence, imprecise probabilities, and probabilistic opinion pooling
Limits of Learning about a Categorical Latent Variable under Prior Near-Ignorance
In this paper, we consider the coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty of
Walley, in which beliefs are represented through sets of probability
distributions, and we focus on the problem of modeling prior ignorance about a
categorical random variable. In this setting, it is a known result that a state
of prior ignorance is not compatible with learning. To overcome this problem,
another state of beliefs, called \emph{near-ignorance}, has been proposed.
Near-ignorance resembles ignorance very closely, by satisfying some principles
that can arguably be regarded as necessary in a state of ignorance, and allows
learning to take place. What this paper does, is to provide new and substantial
evidence that also near-ignorance cannot be really regarded as a way out of the
problem of starting statistical inference in conditions of very weak beliefs.
The key to this result is focusing on a setting characterized by a variable of
interest that is \emph{latent}. We argue that such a setting is by far the most
common case in practice, and we provide, for the case of categorical latent
variables (and general \emph{manifest} variables) a condition that, if
satisfied, prevents learning to take place under prior near-ignorance. This
condition is shown to be easily satisfied even in the most common statistical
problems. We regard these results as a strong form of evidence against the
possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real statistical
problems.Comment: 27 LaTeX page
Imprecise probability models for inference in exponential families
When considering sampling models described by a distribution from an exponential family, it is possible to create two types of imprecise probability models. One is based on the corresponding conjugate distribution and the other on the corresponding predictive distribution. In this paper, we show how these types of models can be constructed for any (regular, linear, canonical) exponential family, such as the centered normal distribution.
To illustrate the possible use of such models, we take a look at credal classification. We show that they are very natural and potentially promising candidates for describing the attributes of a credal classifier, also in the case of continuous attributes
Credal Networks under Epistemic Irrelevance
A credal network under epistemic irrelevance is a generalised type of
Bayesian network that relaxes its two main building blocks. On the one hand,
the local probabilities are allowed to be partially specified. On the other
hand, the assessments of independence do not have to hold exactly.
Conceptually, these two features turn credal networks under epistemic
irrelevance into a powerful alternative to Bayesian networks, offering a more
flexible approach to graph-based multivariate uncertainty modelling. However,
in practice, they have long been perceived as very hard to work with, both
theoretically and computationally.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that this perception is no longer
justified. We provide a general introduction to credal networks under epistemic
irrelevance, give an overview of the state of the art, and present several new
theoretical results. Most importantly, we explain how these results can be
combined to allow for the design of recursive inference methods. We provide
numerous concrete examples of how this can be achieved, and use these to
demonstrate that computing with credal networks under epistemic irrelevance is
most definitely feasible, and in some cases even highly efficient. We also
discuss several philosophical aspects, including the lack of symmetry, how to
deal with probability zero, the interpretation of lower expectations, the
axiomatic status of graphoid properties, and the difference between updating
and conditioning
Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: the case of imprecise Markov trees
We focus on credal nets, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian
nets to imprecise probability. We replace the notion of strong independence
commonly used in credal nets with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance,
which is arguably more suited for a behavioural theory of probability. Focusing
on directed trees, we show how to combine the given local uncertainty models in
the nodes of the graph into a global model, and we use this to construct and
justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a
variable in the tree. The algorithm, which is linear in the number of nodes, is
formulated entirely in terms of coherent lower previsions, and is shown to
satisfy a number of rationality requirements. We supply examples of the
algorithm's operation, and report an application to on-line character
recognition that illustrates the advantages of our approach for prediction. We
comment on the perspectives, opened by the availability, for the first time, of
a truly efficient algorithm based on epistemic irrelevance.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, 1 tabl
A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity
We study the question of auction design in an IPV setting characterized by ambiguity. We assume that the preferences of agents exhibit ambiguity aversion; in particular, they are represented by the epsilon-contamination model. We show that a simple variation of a discrete Dutch auction can extract almost all surplus. This contrasts with optimal auctions under IPV without ambiguity as well as with optimal static auctions with ambiguity—in all of these, types other than the lowest participating type obtain a positive surplus. An important point of departure is that the modified Dutch mechanism is dynamic rather than static, establishing that under ambiguity aversion—even when the setting is IPV in all other respects—a dynamic mechanism can have additional bite over its static counterparts. A further general insight is that the standard revelation principle does not automatically extend to environments not characterized by subjective expected utility
- …