9,371 research outputs found

    A Bayesian Network Approach to Making Inferences in Causal Maps

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    The main goal of this paper is to describe a new graphical structure called "Bayesian causal maps" to represent and analyze domain knowledge of experts. A Bayesian causal map is a causal map, i.e., a network-based representation of an expert's cognition. It is also a Bayesian network, i.e., a graphical representation of an expert's knowledge based on probability theory. Bayesian causal maps enhance the capabilities of causal maps in many ways. We describe how the textual analysis procedure for constructing causal maps can be modi®ed to construct Bayesian causal maps, and we illustrate it using a causal map of a marketing expert in the context of a product development decision.The research was supported by two University of Kansas School of Business PhD Summer Research Fund grants to both authors and by one Kansas University General Research Fund grant to Prakash P. Shenoy

    Advancing functional connectivity research from association to causation

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    Cognition and behavior emerge from brain network interactions, such that investigating causal interactions should be central to the study of brain function. Approaches that characterize statistical associations among neural time series-functional connectivity (FC) methods-are likely a good starting point for estimating brain network interactions. Yet only a subset of FC methods ('effective connectivity') is explicitly designed to infer causal interactions from statistical associations. Here we incorporate best practices from diverse areas of FC research to illustrate how FC methods can be refined to improve inferences about neural mechanisms, with properties of causal neural interactions as a common ontology to facilitate cumulative progress across FC approaches. We further demonstrate how the most common FC measures (correlation and coherence) reduce the set of likely causal models, facilitating causal inferences despite major limitations. Alternative FC measures are suggested to immediately start improving causal inferences beyond these common FC measures

    A problem-structuring model for analyzing transportation–environment relationships

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    This is the post-print version of the final paper published in European Journal of Operational Research. The published article is available from the link below. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. Copyright @ 2009 Elsevier B.V.This study discusses a decision support framework that guides policy makers in their strategic transportation related decisions by using multi-methodology. For this purpose, a methodology for analyzing the effects of transportation policies on environment, society, economy, and energy is proposed. In the proposed methodology, a three-stage problem structuring model is developed. Initially, experts’ opinions are structured by using a cognitive map to determine the relationships between transportation and environmental concepts. Then a structural equation model (SEM) is constructed, based on the cognitive map, to quantify the relations among external transportation and environmental factors. Finally the results of the SEM model are used to evaluate the consequences of possible policies via scenario analysis. In this paper a pilot study that covers only one module of the whole framework, namely transportation–environment interaction module, is conducted to present the applicability and usefulness of the methodology. This pilot study also reveals the impacts of transportation policies on the environment. To achieve a sustainable transportation system, the extent of the relationships between transportation and the environment must be considered. The World Development Indicators developed by the World Bank are used for this purpose

    What does semantic tiling of the cortex tell us about semantics?

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    Recent use of voxel-wise modeling in cognitive neuroscience suggests that semantic maps tile the cortex. Although this impressive research establishes distributed cortical areas active during the conceptual processing that underlies semantics, it tells us little about the nature of this processing. While mapping concepts between Marr's computational and implementation levels to support neural encoding and decoding, this approach ignores Marr's algorithmic level, central for understanding the mechanisms that implement cognition, in general, and conceptual processing, in particular. Following decades of research in cognitive science and neuroscience, what do we know so far about the representation and processing mechanisms that implement conceptual abilities? Most basically, much is known about the mechanisms associated with: (1) features and frame representations, (2) grounded, abstract, and linguistic representations, (3) knowledge-based inference, (4) concept composition, and (5) conceptual flexibility. Rather than explaining these fundamental representation and processing mechanisms, semantic tiles simply provide a trace of their activity over a relatively short time period within a specific learning context. Establishing the mechanisms that implement conceptual processing in the brain will require more than mapping it to cortical (and sub-cortical) activity, with process models from cognitive science likely to play central roles in specifying the intervening mechanisms. More generally, neuroscience will not achieve its basic goals until it establishes algorithmic-level mechanisms that contribute essential explanations to how the brain works, going beyond simply establishing the brain areas that respond to various task conditions

    Literal Perceptual Inference

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    In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module
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