Designing friends

Embodied Conversational Agents are virtual humans that can interact with humans using verbal and non-verbal forms of communication. In most cases, they have been designed for short interactions. This paper asks the question how one would start to design synthetic characters that can become your friends. We look at insights from social psychology and propose a methodology for designing friends

Conversational Agents, Humorous Act Construction, and Social Intelligence

Humans use humour to ease communication problems in human-human interaction and \ud in a similar way humour can be used to solve communication problems that arise\ud with human-computer interaction. We discuss the role of embodied conversational\ud agents in human-computer interaction and we have observations on the generation\ud of humorous acts and on the appropriateness of displaying them by embodied\ud conversational agents in order to smoothen, when necessary, their interactions\ud with a human partner. The humorous acts we consider are generated spontaneously.\ud They are the product of an appraisal of the conversational situation and the\ud possibility to generate a humorous act from the elements that make up this\ud conversational situation, in particular the interaction history of the\ud conversational partners

Dynamic facial expressions of emotion transmit an evolving hierarchy of signals over time

Designed by biological and social evolutionary pressures, facial expressions of emotion comprise specific facial movements to support a near-optimal system of signaling and decoding. Although highly dynamical, little is known about the form and function of facial expression temporal dynamics. Do facial expressions transmit diagnostic signals simultaneously to optimize categorization of the six classic emotions, or sequentially to support a more complex communication system of successive categorizations over time? Our data support the latter. Using a combination of perceptual expectation modeling, information theory, and Bayesian classifiers, we show that dynamic facial expressions of emotion transmit an evolving hierarchy of “biologically basic to socially specific” information over time. Early in the signaling dynamics, facial expressions systematically transmit few, biologically rooted face signals supporting the categorization of fewer elementary categories (e.g., approach/avoidance). Later transmissions comprise more complex signals that support categorization of a larger number of socially specific categories (i.e., the six classic emotions). Here, we show that dynamic facial expressions of emotion provide a sophisticated signaling system, questioning the widely accepted notion that emotion communication is comprised of six basic (i.e., psychologically irreducible) categories, and instead suggesting four

Reasoning about Instrumental and Communicative Agency in Human Infancy

Theoretical rationality and practical rationality are, respectively, properties of an individual's belief system and decision system. While reasoning about instrumental actions complies with practical rationality, understanding communicative actions complies with the principle of relevance. Section 2 reviews the evidence showing that young infants can reason about an agent's instrumental action by representing her subjective motivations and the episodic contents of her epistemic states (including false beliefs).demonstration as a communicative, not an instrumental, action. Section 4 reviews the evidence for natural pedagogy, a species-unique social communicative learning mechanism that exploits human infants' receptivity to ostensive-communicative signals and enables infants to acquire kind-wide generalizations from the nonverbal demonstrations of communicative agents. We argue that the essentialist bias that has been shown to be involved in children's concepts of natural kinds also applies to infants' concepts of artifacts. We further examine how natural pedagogy may also boost inductive learning in human infancy. Section 3 reviews the evidence showing special sensitivity in young human infants to some ostensive behavioral signals encoding an agent's communicative intention. We also address the puzzle of imitative learning of novel means actions by 1-year olds and argue that it can be resolved only by assuming that the infant construes the model'