Information technology and military performance

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 2011.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 519-544).Militaries have long been eager to adopt the latest technology (IT) in a quest to improve knowledge of and control over the battlefield. At the same time, uncertainty and confusion have remained prominent in actual experience of war. IT usage sometimes improves knowledge, but it sometimes contributes to tactical blunders and misplaced hubris. As militaries invest intensively in IT, they also tend to develop larger headquarters staffs, depend more heavily on planning and intelligence, and employ a larger percentage of personnel in knowledge work rather than physical combat. Both optimists and pessimists about the so-called "revolution in military affairs" have tended to overlook the ways in which IT is profoundly and ambiguously embedded in everyday organizational life. Technocrats embrace IT to "lift the fog of war," but IT often becomes a source of breakdowns, misperception, and politicization. To describe the conditions under which IT usage improves or degrades organizational performance, this dissertation develops the notion of information friction, an aggregate measure of the intensity of organizational struggle to coordinate IT with the operational environment. It articulates hypotheses about how the structure of the external battlefield, internal bureaucratic politics, and patterns of human-computer interaction can either exacerbate or relieve friction, which thus degrades or improves performance. Technological determinism alone cannot account for the increasing complexity and variable performances of information phenomena. Information friction theory is empirically grounded in a participant-observation study of U.S. special operations in Iraq from 2007 to 2008. To test the external validity of insights gained through fieldwork in Iraq, an historical study of the 1940 Battle of Britain examines IT usage in a totally different structural, organizational, and technological context.(cont.) These paired cases show that high information friction, and thus degraded performance, can arise with sophisticated IT, while lower friction and impressive performance can occur with far less sophisticated networks. The social context, not just the quality of technology, makes all the difference. Many shorter examples from recent military history are included to illustrate concepts. This project should be of broad interest to students of organizational knowledge, IT, and military effectiveness.by Jon Randall Lindsay.Ph.D

Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems Technologies and Operations

As the quarter-century mark in the 21st Century nears, new aviation-related equipment has come to the forefront, both to help us and to haunt us. (Coutu, 2020) This is particularly the case with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These vehicles have grown in popularity and accessible to everyone. Of different shapes and sizes, they are widely available for purchase at relatively low prices. They have moved from the backyard recreation status to important tools for the military, intelligence agencies, and corporate organizations. New practical applications such as military equipment and weaponry are announced on a regular basis – globally. (Coutu, 2020) Every country seems to be announcing steps forward in this bludgeoning field. In our successful 2nd edition of Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the Cyber Domain: Protecting USA’s Advanced Air Assets (Nichols, et al., 2019), the authors addressed three factors influencing UAS phenomena. First, unmanned aircraft technology has seen an economic explosion in production, sales, testing, specialized designs, and friendly / hostile usages of deployed UAS / UAVs / Drones. There is a huge global growing market and entrepreneurs know it. Second, hostile use of UAS is on the forefront of DoD defense and offensive planners. They are especially concerned with SWARM behavior. Movies like “Angel has Fallen,” where drones in a SWARM use facial recognition technology to kill USSS agents protecting POTUS, have built the lore of UAS and brought the problem forefront to DHS. Third, UAS technology was exploding. UAS and Counter- UAS developments in navigation, weapons, surveillance, data transfer, fuel cells, stealth, weight distribution, tactics, GPS / GNSS elements, SCADA protections, privacy invasions, terrorist uses, specialized software, and security protocols has exploded. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Our team has followed / tracked joint ventures between military and corporate entities and specialized labs to build UAS countermeasures. As authors, we felt compelled to address at least the edge of some of the new C-UAS developments. It was clear that we would be lucky if we could cover a few of – the more interesting and priority technology updates – all in the UNCLASSIFIED and OPEN sphere. Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Technologies and Operations is the companion textbook to our 2nd edition. The civilian market is interesting and entrepreneurial, but the military and intelligence markets are of concern because the US does NOT lead the pack in C-UAS technologies. China does. China continues to execute its UAS proliferation along the New Silk Road Sea / Land routes (NSRL). It has maintained a 7% growth in military spending each year to support its buildup. (Nichols, et al., 2019) [Chapter 21]. They continue to innovate and have recently improved a solution for UAS flight endurance issues with the development of advanced hydrogen fuel cell. (Nichols, et al., 2019) Reed and Trubetskoy presented a terrifying map of countries in the Middle East with armed drones and their manufacturing origin. Guess who? China. (A.B. Tabriski & Justin, 2018, December) Our C-UAS textbook has as its primary mission to educate and train resources who will enter the UAS / C-UAS field and trust it will act as a call to arms for military and DHS planners.https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1031/thumbnail.jp

STRATEGIC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: AN APPROACH TO ENGAGING SECURITY THREATS TO AMERICAN SECURITY

The US Intelligence Community has shown a lack of understanding and appreciation of counterintelligence and its capabilities as a strategic tool. Historically, US adversaries have used the famed Double-Cross System to engage in counterintelligence and counter-espionage operations that have effectively neutralized US foreign intelligence operations. This research reviews and answers the question of “Strategic Counterintelligence; What Is It and What Should We Do About it?” Strategic counterintelligence is the analysis of foreign intelligence or security service entity acting on behalf of state or non-state actor. The operational aspect is aimed at exploiting the state or non-state actor’s clandestine collection channel to manage the actor’s objectives. My deception research revealed that state and non-state actors are still susceptible to deception, and that technology is increasing this vulnerability in the US. Through researched historical examples, it was found that strategic counterintelligence operations are a method of imposing costs on a state or non-state actor, specifically through the controlled release of technology. Lastly, Double-Cross-like operations are viable in cyberspace through the use of decoy and real network systems. The US has the ability to effectively employ strategic counterintelligence operations, deliberately and reactively, against a state or non-state actor, to drive the actor’s moves and countermoves

Complex Terrain

This edited volume, composed by military professionals in the Gray Scholars Program at Marine Corps University, describes the changing character of urban operations. The pattern of human settlement and interaction is changing and the future is urban. Because the majority of the world’s population lives within cities, the future of strategic competition and conflict reside there as well. The density and connectivity of urban environments create a new type of complex terrain. Interests change from neighborhood to neighborhood, often intersecting global, political, and economic networks. Each city block sees shifting allegiances that often seem unclear from the outside. The cityscape compresses time and space while increasing uncertainty and complicating the conduct of military operations

Small states and the strategic utility of cyber capabilities

The information revolution has profoundly influenced the interaction between states in the twenty-first century. Networked computers have supported the operations of the global financial system, industrial services, and even the conduct of military operations. Due to this revolution, the level of dependence on networked technologies has risen exponentially following the evolution of the Internet. However, networked technologies have also exposed vulnerabilities that have been exploited by hostile actors to disrupt systems, infiltrate networks, and aggravate conflicts. While the academic literature on cybersecurity has substantially increased in the past decade, most scholars have focused their attention on the capabilities of great powers and strategic behaviour in cyberspace. Despite the cyber incidents involving Estonia and Georgia, as well as the proliferation of cyber capabilities among states, scholars have continued to overlook the relevance of small states in cyber interactions. The significance of this research gap is more prominent in the studies on the Asia-Pacific Region where a substantial amount of studies have focused on the foreign and security strategies of small states but very few have focused on the cyber dimension. This research gap is addressed by the study by exploring the strategic utility of cyber capabilities for small states in the region. More specifically, it addresses the puzzle: Why have small states developed cyber capabilities despite its obscure strategic value? On this, three additional questions are considered: What factors influence the development of cyber capabilities? What are the advantages and limitations of developing cyber capabilities? What are the implications of cyber capabilities on the foreign and security policies of small states? The primary objective of the study is to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the strategic utility of cyber capabilities as foreign policy instruments for small states. It hypothesises that two necessary conditions influence the development of cyber capabilities in small states: the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific (primary condition) and strategic culture (secondary condition). The interplay between these two conditions provides a stronger explanation regarding why small states develop cyber capabilities regardless of the ambiguity surrounding the strategic utility of cyber capabilities. Based this hypothesis, it draws on neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework to account for the interaction between systemic and the domestic variables. The study also pursues three secondary objectives. First, it aims to determine the constraints and incentives that affect the development of cyber capabilities. Second, the study evaluates the functionality of these cyber capabilities for small states. Lastly, it assesses the implications of cyber capabilities on the military strategies and foreign policies of selected small states

On Counterinsurgency: Firepower, Biopower, and the Collateralization of Milliatry Violence

This dissertation investigates the most recent cycle of North Atlantic expeditionary warfare by addressing the resuscitation of counterinsurgency warfare with a specific focus on the war in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2014. The project interrogates the lasting aesthetic, epistemological, philosophical, and territorial implications of counterinsurgency, which should be understood as part of wider transformations in military affairs in relation to discourses of adaptation, complexity, and systemic design, and to the repertoire of global contingency and stability operations. Afghanistan served as a counterinsurgency laboratory, and the experiments will shape the conduct of future wars, domestic security practices, and the increasingly indistinct boundary between them. Using work from Michel Foucault and liberal war studies, the project undertakes a genealogy of contemporary population-centred counterinsurgency and interrogates how its conduct is constituted by and as a mixture firepower and biopower. Insofar as this mix employs force with different speeds, doses, and intensities, the dissertation argues that counterinsurgency unrestricts and collateralizes violence, which is emblematic of liberal war that kills selectively to secure and make life live in ways amenable to local and global imperatives of liberal rule. Contemporary military counterinsurgents, in conducting operations on the edges of liberal rule's jurisdiction and in recursively influencing the domestic spaces of North Atlantic states, fashion biopoweras custodial power to conduct the conduct of lifeto shape different interventions into the everyday lives of target populations. The 'lesser evil' logic of counterinsurgency is used to frame counterinsurgency as a type of warfare that is comparatively low-intensity and less harmful, and this justification actually lowers the threshold for violence by making increasingly indiscriminate the ways in which its employment damages and envelops populations and communities, thereby allowing counterinsurgents to speculate on the practice of expeditionary warfare and efforts to sustain occupations. Thus, the dissertation argues that counterinsurgency is a communicative process, better understood as mobile military media with an atmospheric-environmental register blending acute and ambient measures that are always-already kinetic. The counterinsurgent gaze enframes a world picture where everything can be a force amplifier and everywhere is a possible theatre of operations

Advances in Crowdfunding: Research and Practice

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