Possibility and permissibility

We generalize permissibility (Brandenburger, 1992) to allow for any suitably defined model of preference and definition of possibility. We also prove that the generalized solution concept characterizes rationality, caution, and “common belief" of rationality and caution.

Machines of possibility

In the course of this talk, I want to try and address one main question: what is architecture? Implicit within this are also some reflections on what or who is an architectural historian or commentator? And what is an architecture school

Conceivability and Possibility

Some people might be tempted by modal ontological arguments from the possibility that God exists to the conclusion that God in fact exists. They might also be tempted to support the claim that possibly God exists by appealing to the conceivability of God’s existence. In this chapter, I introduce three constraints on an adequate theory of philosophical conceivability. I then consider and develop both imagination-based accounts of conceivability and conceptual coherence-based accounts of conceivability. Finally, I return to the modal ontological argument and consider whether the premise that possibly God exists can be supported by some conceiving

Possibility of Turbulent Crystals

The possibility for the occurrence in crystals of a phenomenon, resembling turbulence, is discussed. This phenomenon, called {\it heterophase turbulence}, is manifested by the fluctuational appearance inside a crystalline sample of disordered regions randomly distributed in space. The averaged picture for such a turbulent solid is exemplified by an exactly solvable lattice-gas model. The origin of heterophase turbulence is connected with stochastic instability of quasi-isolated systems.Comment: Latex file, 20 pages, no figure

Metaphysical and absolute possibility

It is widely alleged that metaphysical possibility is “absolute” possibility Conceivability and possibility, Clarendon, Oxford, 2002, p 16; Stalnaker, in: Stalnaker Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 201–215; Williamson in Can J Philos 46:453–492, 2016). Kripke calls metaphysical necessity “necessity in the highest degree”. Van Inwagen claims that if P is metaphysically possible, then it is possible “tout court. Possible simpliciter. Possible period…. possib without qualification.” And Stalnaker writes, “we can agree with Frank Jackson, David Chalmers, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, and most others who allow themselves to talk about possible worlds at all, that metaphysical necessity is necessity in the widest sense.” What exactly does the thesis that metaphysical possibility is absolute amount to? Is it true? In this article, I argue that, assuming that the thesis is not merely terminological, and lacking in any metaphysical interest, it is an article of faith. I conclude with the suggestion that metaphysical possibility may lack the metaphysical significance that is widely attributed to it

Machiavelli’s Possibility Hypothesis

This paper discusses the thesis that in Arrow’s Possibility Theorem the dictator (merely) serves as a solution to the logical problem of aggregating preference while Machiavelli’s dictator, the Prince, has the historical function to bring order into a world of chaos and thus make society ready for the implementation of a republican structure.Dictator, aggregation of preferences, republic, democracy

On the Possibility of Hallucinations

Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A corollary upshot of the article is that whether hallucinations are possible or not is still an open empirical question