Aiming for the stomach and hitting the heart: dissociable triggers and sources for disgust reactions.

Disgust reactions can be elicited using stimuli that engender orogastric rejection (e.g., pus and vomit; core disgust stimuli) but also using images of bloody injuries or medical procedures (e.g., surgeries; blood [body] boundary violation [B-BV] disgust stimuli). These two types of disgust reaction are presumed to be connected by a common evolutionary function of avoiding either food- or blood-borne contaminants. However, reactions to bloody injuries are typically conflated with reactions to the potential pain being experienced by the victim. This may explain why the two forms of "disgust", although similarly communicated (through self-report and facial expressions), evince different patterns of physiological reactivity. Therefore, we tested whether the communicative similarities and physiological dissimilarities would hold when markers of potential contamination in the latter category are removed, leaving only painful injuries that lack blood or explicit body-envelope violations. Participants viewed films that depicted imagery associated with (a) core disgust, (b) painful injuries, or (c) neutral scenes while we measured facial, cardiovascular, and gastric reactivity. Whereas communicative measures (self-report and facial muscles) suggested that participants experienced increased disgust for core disgust and painful injuries, peripheral physiology dissociated the two: core disgust decreased normal gastric activity and painful-injury disgust decelerated heart rate and increased heart rate variability. These findings suggest that expressions of disgust toward bodily injuries may reflect a fundamentally different affective response than those evoked by core disgust and that this (cardiovascularly mediated) response may in fact be more closely tied to pain perceptions (or empathy) rather than contaminant-laden stimuli

Disgust as embodied moral judgment.

How, and for whom, does disgust influence moral judgment? In four experiments participants made moral judgments while experiencing extraneous feelings of disgust. Disgust was induced in Experiment 1 by exposure to a bad smell, in Experiment 2 by working in a disgusting room, in Experiment 3 by recalling a physically disgusting experience, and in Experiment 4 through a video induction. In each case, the results showed that disgust can increase the severity of moral judgments relative to controls. Experiment 4 found that disgust had a different effect on moral judgment than did sadness. In addition, Experiments 2-4 showed that the role of disgust in severity of moral judgments depends on participants' sensitivity to their own bodily sensations. Taken together, these data indicate the importance-and specificity-of gut feelings in moral judgments

Neural responses to facial and vocal expressions of fear and disgust

Neuropsychological studies report more impaired responses to facial expressions of fear than disgust in people with amygdala lesions, and vice versa in people with Huntington's disease. Experiments using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have confirmed the role of the amygdala in the response to fearful faces and have implicated the anterior insula in the response to facial expressions of disgust. We used fMRI to extend these studies to the perception of fear and disgust from both facial and vocal expressions. Consistent with neuropsychological findings, both types of fearful stimuli activated the amygdala. Facial expressions of disgust activated the anterior insula and the caudate-putamen; vocal expressions of disgust did not significantly activate either of these regions. All four types of stimuli activated the superior temporal gyrus. Our findings therefore (i) support the differential localization of the neural substrates of fear and disgust; (ii) confirm the involvement of the amygdala in the emotion of fear, whether evoked by facial or vocal expressions; (iii) confirm the involvement of the anterior insula and the striatum in reactions to facial expressions of disgust; and (iv) suggest a possible general role for the perception of emotional expressions for the superior temporal gyrus

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the co-activation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, while disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation

Disgust implicated in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Psychiatric classificatory systems consider obsessions and compulsions as forms of anxiety disorder. However, the neurology of diseases associated with obsessive-compulsive symptoms suggests the involvement of fronto-striatal regions likely to be involved in the mediation of the emotion of disgust, suggesting that dysfunctions of disgust should be considered alongside anxiety in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive behaviours. We therefore tested recognition of facial expressions of basic emotions (including disgust) by groups of participants with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and with Gilles de la Tourette's syndrome (GTS) with and without co-present obsessive-compulsive behaviours (GTS with OCB; GTS without OCB). A group of people suffering from panic disorder and generalized anxiety were also included in the study. Both groups with obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCD; GTS with OCB) showed impaired recognition of facial expressions of disgust. Such problems were not evident in participants with panic disorder and generalized anxiety, or for participants with GTS without obsessions or compulsions, indicating that the deficit is closely related to the presence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Participants with OCD were able to assign words to emotion categories without difficulty, showing that their problem with disgust is linked to a failure to recognize this emotion in others and not a comprehension or response criterion effect. Impaired recognition of disgust is consistent with the neurology of OCD and with the idea that abnormal experience of disgust may be involved in the genesis of obsessions and compulsions

Deontological morality can be experimentally enhanced by increasing disgust. A transcranial direct current stimulation study

Previous studies empirically support the existence of a distinctive association between deontological (but not altruistic) guilt and both disgust and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms. Given that the neural substrate underlying deontological guilt comprises brain regions strictly implicated in the emotion of disgust (i.e. the insula), the present study aimed to test the hypothesis that indirect stimulation of the insula via transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) would enhance disgust and morality in the deontological domain. A randomized, sham-controlled, within-subject design was used. Thirty-seven healthy individuals (25 women) underwent 15-min anodal and sham tDCS over T3 in two different days, while their heart rate (HR) was recorded to derive measures of parasympathetic nervous system activity (HR variability; HRV). After the first 10-min of sham or active tDCS stimulation, participants were asked to 1) complete a series of 6-item words that could be completed with either a disgust-related word (cleaning/dirtiness) or neutral alternatives; 2) rate how much a series of vignettes, each depicting a behavior that violated a specific moral foundation, were morally wrong. Levels of trait anxiety, depression, disgust sensitivity, scrupulosity, and altruism as well as pre- and post- stimulation momentary emotional states were assessed. Compared to the sham condition, after active stimulation of T3 a) HRV significantly increased and participants b) completed more words in terms of cleaning/dirtiness and c) reported greater subjective levels of disgust, all suggesting the elicitation of the emotion of disgust. Although the results are only marginally significant, they point to the absence of difference between the two experimental conditions for moral vignettes in the altruistic domain (i.e., animal care, emotional and physical human care), but not in the deontological domain (i.e., authority, fairness, liberty, and sacrality), where vignettes were judged as more morally wrong in the active compared to the sham condition. Moreover, scores on the OCI-R correlated with how much vignettes were evaluated as morally wrong in the deontological domain only. Results preliminarily support the association between disgust and morality in the deontological domain, with important implications for OC disorder (OCD). Future studies should explore the possibility of decreasing both disgust and morality in patients with OCD by the use of non-invasive brain stimulation techniques

The Limits of Appealing to Disgust

The rhetoric of disgust is common in moral discourse and political propaganda. Some believe it's pernicious, for it convinces without evidence. But scientific research now suggests that disgust is typically an effect, not a cause, of moral judgment. At best the emotion on its own only sometimes slightly amplifies a moral belief one already has. Appeals to disgust are thus dialectically unhelpful in discourse that seeks to convince. When opponents of abortion use repulsive images to make their case, they convince few, even if they rally their base. When champions of animal rights show graphic depictions of the torturous conditions of animals in factory farms, they convince only those previously ignorant of the severity of such conditions. Ultimately, disgust may be less pernicious than it is useless

Aberrant Disgust Responses and Immune Reactivity in Cocaine-Dependent Men

Background: Infectious diseases are the most common and cost-intensive health complications associated with drug addiction. There is wide belief that drug-dependent individuals expose themselves more regularly to disease-related pathogens through risky behaviors such as sharing pipes and needles, thereby increasing their risk for contracting an infectious disease. However, evidence is emerging indicating that not only lifestyle but also the immunomodulatory effects of addictive drugs, such as cocaine, may account for their high infection risk. As feelings of disgust are thought to be an important psychological mechanism in avoiding the exposure to pathogens, we sought to investigate behavioral, physiological, and immune responses to disgust-evoking cues in both cocaine-dependent and healthy men. Methods: All participants (N = 61) were exposed to neutral and disgust-evoking photographs depicting food and nonfood images while response accuracy, latency, and skin conductivity were recorded. Saliva samples were collected before and after exposure to neutral and disgusting images, respectively. Attitudes toward disgust and hygiene behaviors were assessed using questionnaire measures. Results: Response times to disgust-evoking photographs were prolonged in all participants, and specifically in cocaine-dependent individuals. While viewing the disgusting images, cocaine-dependent individuals exhibited aberrant skin conductivity and increased the secretion of the salivary cytokine interleukin-6 relative to control participants. Conclusion: Our data provide evidence of a hypersensitivity to disgusting stimuli in cocaine-dependent individuals, possibly reflecting conditioned responses to noningestive sources of infection. Coupled with a lack of interoception of bodily signals, aberrant disgust responses might lead to increased infection susceptibility in affected individuals

A Behavioral Test of Contamination Fear in Excessive Health Anxiety

Hypochondriasis and health anxiety are characterized by preoccupation with the fear of currently having a serious physical illness. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders conceptualization of hypochondriasis does not include consideration of the fear of acquiring an illness; however, many individuals with severe health anxiety report concern about contamination, suggesting that the current conceptualization of hypochondriasis may be incomplete. The present study utilized behavior approach tasks (BATs) to examine the degree to which contamination fear is present in severe health anxiety. Additionally, perceived vulnerability to disease (PVD) and disgust were tested as potential mechanisms in health anxiety and contamination fear. Results showed that health anxious individuals were similarly avoidant of sources of contamination, and reported similar anxiety and disgust in response to the BATs. Regression analyses showed that PVD, but not disgust, potentiated the effect of both health anxiety and contamination fear in the prediction of disgust experienced during the BATs. The theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed

Disgust Promotes Disposal: Souring the Status Quo

Humans naturally dispose of objects that disgust them. Is this phenomenon so deeply embedded that even incidental disgust--i.e., where the source of disgust is unrelated to a possessed object--triggers disposal? Two experiments were designed to answer this question. Two film clips served as disgust and neutral primes; the objects were routine commodities (boxes of office supplies). Results revealed that the incidental disgust condition powerfully increased the frequency with which decision makers traded away a commodity they owned for a new commodity (more than doubling the probability in each condition), thereby countering otherwise robust status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). Decision makers were unaware of disgust's impact. Even when warned to correct for it, they failed to do so. These studies presented real choices with tangible rewards. Their findings thus have implications not only for theories of affect and choice, but also for practical improvements in everyday decisions.