Connected Coordination: Network Structure and Group Coordination

Networks can affect a group’s ability to solve a coordination problem. We utilize laboratory experiments to study the conditions under which groups of subjects can solve coordination games. We investigate a variety of different network structures, and we also investigate coordination games with symmetric and asymmetric payoffs. Our results show that network connections facilitate coordination in both symmetric and asymmetric games. Most significantly, we find that increases in the number of network connections encourage coordination even when payoffs are highly asymmetric. These results shed light on the conditions that may facilitate coordination in real-world networks

Towards Coordination-Intensive Visualization Software

Most coordination realizations in current visualization systems are ''last-minute'' ad-hoc and rely on the richness of the chosen implementation language. Moreover, very few visualization models implicitly consider coordination. If coordination is contemplated from the design point of view, it is usually only regarded as part of the communication protocol and is generally dealt with within that restricted domain. Coordinated multiple views are beneficial and a flexible model for coordination will ensure easy embedding of coordination in such exploratory environments. This paper compares different approaches to coordination in exploratory visualization (EV). We recognize the need for a coordination model and for that we formalize aspects of coordination in EV. Furthermore, our work draws on the findings of the interdisciplinary study of coordination by various researchers

Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games

Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players

Zero Error Coordination

In this paper, we consider a zero error coordination problem wherein the nodes of a network exchange messages to be able to perfectly coordinate their actions with the individual observations of each other. While previous works on coordination commonly assume an asymptotically vanishing error, we assume exact, zero error coordination. Furthermore, unlike previous works that employ the empirical or strong notions of coordination, we define and use a notion of set coordination. This notion of coordination bears similarities with the empirical notion of coordination. We observe that set coordination, in its special case of two nodes with a one-way communication link is equivalent with the "Hide and Seek" source coding problem of McEliece and Posner. The Hide and Seek problem has known intimate connections with graph entropy, rate distortion theory, Renyi mutual information and even error exponents. Other special cases of the set coordination problem relate to Witsenhausen's zero error rate and the distributed computation problem. These connections motivate a better understanding of set coordination, its connections with empirical coordination, and its study in more general setups. This paper takes a first step in this direction by proving new results for two node networks

Coordination cycles

Players repeatedly face a coordination problem in a dynamic global game. By choosing a risky action (invest) instead of waiting, players risk instantaneous losses as well as a loss of payoffs from future stages, in which they cannot participate if they go bankrupt. Thus, the total strategic risk associated with investment in a particular stage depends on the expected continuation payoff. High continuation payoff makes investment today more risky and therefore harder to coordinate on, which decreases today’s payoff. Thus, expectation of successful coordination tomorrow undermines successful coordination today, which leads to fluctuations of equilibrium behavior even if the underlying economic fundamentals happen to be the same across the rounds. The dynamic game inherits the equilibrium uniqueness of the underlying static global game

Value-Oriented Design of Service Coordination Processes: Correctness and Trust

The rapid growth of service coordination languages creates a need for methodological support for coordination design. Coordination design differs from workflow design because a coordination process connects different businesses that can each make design decisions independently from the others, and no business is interested in supporting the business processes of others. In multi-business cooperative design, design decisions are only supported by all businesses if they contribute to the profitability of each participating business. So in order to make coordination design decisions supported by all participating businesses, requirements for a coordination process should be derived from the business model that makes the coordination profitable for each participating business. We claim that this business model is essentially a model of intended value exchanges. We model the intended value exchanges of a business model as e3 -value value models and coordination processes as UML activity diagrams. The contribution of the paper is then to propose and discuss a criterion according to which a service coordination process must be correct with respect to a value exchange model. This correctness is necessary to gain business support for the process. Finally, we discuss methodological consequences of this approach for service coordination process design

Images of coordination : how implementing organizations perceive coordination arrangements

A crucial challenge for the coordination of horizontal policy programs those designed to tackle crosscutting issues is how to motivate government organizations to contribute to such programs. Hence, it is crucial to study how practitioners in implementing organizations view and appreciate the coordination of such programs. Assisted by Q-methodology, this inductive study reveals three significantly different "images" centralframe setting, networking via boundary spanners, and coordination beyond window dressing Most surprisingly, different images show up among respondents within the same organizations and horizontal programs. The authors find that the images reflect elements of the literature: the resistance to hierarchical central control, the need for local differentiation and increased incentives, and a collaboration-oriented culture. Most importantly, practitioners of implementing organizations perceive top-dawn mechanisms as ineffective to achieve coordination and ask for adaptive arrangements, involvement, and deliberative processes when designing coordination arrangements and during the collaboration

Coordination approaches and systems - part II : an operational perspective

This is the second of two papers surveying research in coordination approaches and systems. This paper is concerned with operational coordination, which is aimed at coordinating activities such that the design process can be performed in a near optimal manner with respect to time, and the allocation and utilisation of resources. Aspects of coordination categorised as operational include resource management, scheduling and planning. The first of these two papers presents a review of coordination from a strategic perspective, which is concerned with the decision management aspects of coordination. Greater emphasis is now being placed on the significance of organising the design process as this affects time to market, product quality, cost, and consequently product success. The aim of this paper is to present a fundamental review of operational coordination approaches and systems. The 1990s has seen much progress being made towards a greater understanding and appreciation of coordination in various disciplines through the development of a wide range of approaches and systems. However, there remains a requirement to formally identify the key issues involved in coordination such that a widely accepted representation can be agreed upon. Consequently, research should continue to be supported in the exploration for a unified approach to coordination which will permit a broader and greater understanding of those aspects involved