Epistemic Schmagency?

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection

A Dilemma for Mathematical Constructivism

In this paper I argue that constructivism in mathematics faces a dilemma. In particular, I maintain that constructivism is unable to explain (i) the application of mathematics to nature and (ii) the intersubjectivity of mathematics unless (iii) it is conjoined with two theses that reduce it to a form of mathematical Platonism. The paper is divided into five sections. In the first section of the paper, I explain the difference between mathematical constructivism and mathematical Platonism and I outline my argument. In the second, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics applies to nature for a constructivist is a thesis I call Copernicanism. In the third, I argue that the best explanation of how mathematics can be intersubjective for a constructivist is a thesis I call Ideality. In the fourth, I argue that once constructivism is conjoined with these two theses, it collapses into a form of mathematical Platonism. In the fifth, I confront some objections

A Presuppositional Critique of Constructivism

Educational theories have roots. They have roots in broader philosophies, conceptions of the nature of reality, and the theories utilized in classrooms to teach have implications for broader society. The author takes a presuppostitional view and shows that all systems have most basic beliefs that are un-provable. So at the heart of any form of interpretive schema or paradigm is faith in that schema. The author discusses the role of theories of truth, how fact-constructivism embraces a relativist position that is self-refuting, and ultimately is untenable absent a suspension of laws of logic. The author argues in favor of revelation from God as axiomatic and demonstrates how logic can exist on that basis, whereas on a secular basis, philosophy cannot generate any True facts whatsoever. The author then looks at the educational theory of constructivism and examines the theory and practices it endorses it in light of the presuppositional critique and concludes that the relativistic nature of constructivism precludes it from being a philosophically acceptable approach for the Christian

Are Emotions Psychological Constructions?

According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not similarly encumbered. Recognizing this has two implications: biological mechanisms are more central to emotion than constructivism allows, and the conclusion that emotions aren’t natural kinds is premature

Logic Programming as Constructivism

The features of logic programming that seem unconventional from the viewpoint of classical logic can be explained in terms of constructivistic logic. We motivate and propose a constructivistic proof theory of non-Horn logic programming. Then, we apply this formalization for establishing results of practical interest. First, we show that 'stratification can be motivated in a simple and intuitive way. Relying on similar motivations, we introduce the larger classes of 'loosely stratified' and 'constructively consistent' programs. Second, we give a formal basis for introducing quantifiers into queries and logic programs by defining 'constructively domain independent* formulas. Third, we extend the Generalized Magic Sets procedure to loosely stratified and constructively consistent programs, by relying on a 'conditional fixpoini procedure

Constructivism and the Problem of Normative Indeterminacy

I describe a new problem for metaethical constructivism. The problem arises when agents make conflicting judgments, so that the constructivist is implausibly committed to denying they have any reason for any of the available options. The problem is illustrated primarily with reference to Sharon Street’s version of constructivism. Several possible solutions to the problem are explained and rejected

Teaching teachers in effectual entrepreneurship

Entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship education is seen by all kind of people to be important for economic growth. Teaching entrepreneurship needs another approach. Active learning and the constructivism is mostly seen as essential. Other elements that are influencing the teaching process are the competences, the culture and the teacher. So the teacher must be capable of using other methods and theory as he is used to. Effectuation, constructivism and andragogy are the key elements for the training of entrepreneurial teachers. From that perspective there has been made an education program that will start in September 2013 for teachers at universities of applied science. Until that time there are being held some minor experiments on parts of the program

Constructivism, Intersubjectivity, Provability, and Triviality

Sharon Street defines her constructivism about practical reasons as the view that whether something is a reason to do a certain thing for a given agent depends on that agent’s normative point of view. However, Street has also maintained that there is a judgment about practical reasons which is true relative to every possible normative point of view, namely constructivism itself. I show that the latter thesis is inconsistent with Street’s own constructivism about epistemic reasons and discuss some consequences of this incompatibility

DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL VALUES AND CONSTRUCTIVISM THROUGH THE BILINGUAL LEARNING MODEL WITH A BCCT APPROACH (BEYOND CENTER AND CIRCLE TIME) IN EARLYCHILDHOOD EDUCATION IN SEMARANG 1

This research aims to develop moral values and constructivism through a bilingual learning model with a BCCT approach. The theory of an English learning model through a BCCT approach can be used byteachers of early childhood education not only to improve the communication skills of students but also tounleash all the potentials of children by promoting freedom of choice, stimulation of creativity and charactergrowth. The study begins with a preliminary study to map out the implementation of bilingual learningwith a BCCT approach based on moral values and constructivism in early childhood education whichconsists of two phases, namely, the study of literature and field studies. It is followed by the stage ofplanning based on the analysis of needs so as to make the design of bilingual learning model with a BCCTapproach based on moral values and constructivism. The analysis and interpretation of data as a result of reflection and evaluation of the developmenof the learning model are used as a reference guide to produce a bilingual learning model with a BCCTapproach based on constructivism and moral values that can be used by early childhood education teachersin their respective schools