Arresting gully formation in the Ethiopian highlands

Over the past five decades, gullying has been widespread and has become more severe in the Ethiopian highlands. Only in very few cases, rehabilitation of gullies has been successful in Ethiopia due to the high costs. The objective of this paper is to introduce cost effective measures to arrest gully formation. The research was conducted in the Debre-Mewi watershed located at 30 km south of Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. Gullying started in the 1980s following the clearance of indigenous vegetation and intensive agricultural cultivation, leading to an increase of surface and subsurface runoff from the hillside to the valley bottoms. Gully erosion rates were 10–20 times the measured upland soil losses. Water levels, measured with piezometers, showed that in the actively eroding sections, the water table was in general above the gully bottom and below it in the stabilized sections. In order to develop effective gully stabilizing measures, we tested and then applied the BSTEM and CONCEPT models for their applicability for Ethiopian conditions where active gully formation has been occurring. We found that the model predicted the location of slips and slumps well with the observed groundwater depth and vegetation characteristics. The validated models indicated that any gully rehabilitation project should first stabilize the head cuts. This can be achieved by regrading these head cuts to slope of 40 degrees and armoring it with rock. Head cuts will otherwise move uphill in time and destroy any improvements. To stabilize side walls in areas with seeps, grass will be effective in shallow gullies, while deeper gullies require reshaping of the gullies walls, then planting the gully with grasses, eucalyptus or fruit trees that can be used for income generation. Only then there is an incentive for local farmers to maintain the structures

Wann werden Konflikte manifest? Politische Opportunitätsstrukturen für Proteste gegen Goldbergbau in Burkina Faso

Der aktuelle Bergbau-Boom geht weltweit mit Konflikten um ökologische Fragen, die Verteilung der Gewinne und Steuern, Menschenrechte, Landnutzungskonkurrenzen und territoriale Ansprüche, kollektive Identitäten entlang von Kategorien wie Indigenität, Ethnizität und Nationalität, kulturelle Repräsentation und Deutungshoheit in Entwicklungspolitik und diskursen einher. Der Artikel untersucht, unter welchen Bedingungen diese Konflikte, die dem Bergbau aufgrund seiner erheblichen sozialen und ökologischen Auswirkungen inhärent sind, manifest werden und eskalieren. Unter Rückgriff auf zwei Konzepte aus der contentious-politics-Forschung -politische Gelegenheitsstrukturen und Protestrepertoires- werden drei aktuelle Konflikte um den Goldbergbau in Burkina Faso analysiert, einem der Staaten in Subsahara-Afrika, in denen der extraktive Sektor gegenwärtig am schnellsten wächst. Ich stelle dar, welcher Protestrepertoires sich die jeweiligen Akteure bedienen und zeige, dass der Sturz des langjährigen Staatspräsidenten Blaise Compaoré Ende Oktober 2014 die zentrale Verschiebung in den politischen Gelegenheitsstrukturen darstellt, welche die Eskalation der Konflikte in allen drei Beispielen bedingte.All over the world, the recent boom in mining is accompanied by conflicts over the ecological impacts, distribution of rents and taxes, human rights, land use and territorial claims, collective identity related to indigeneity, ethnicity and citizenship, cultural representations, and the prerogative of interpretation regarding policies and discourses of development. This paper investigates under which conditions these conflicts, which are inherent to the mining sector because of its enormous social and ecological impacts, become manifest and escalate. Referring to two concepts from contentious politics research -political opportunity structures and repertoires of contention- three actual conflicts over gold mining in Burkina Faso are analysed. Burkina Faso is of the sub-Saharan countries where the extractive sector is quickly growing. The paper traces which repertoires of contention the respective actors use, and demonstrates that the overthrow of the long-standing President Blaise Compaoré in late October 2014 was the central political opportunity structure that, in all three cases, enabled the escalation of the local conflicts