The Equity-Efficiency Relationship: the Double Criterion versus Pareto-Efficiency

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the equity-efficiency relationship from the standpoint of the proposed double criterion of efficiency as opposed to the criterion of Pareto-efficiency. The equity-efficiency relationship with an extremum, obtained in the paper exceeds the boundaries of the traditional approach to this problem. Empirical verification of the proposed model shows that it corresponds to the facts much better than the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off model.equity-efficiency trade-off, Pareto-efficiency, double criterion of efficiency.

The Equity-Efficiency Relationship: The Double Criterion versus Pareto-Efficiency

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the equity-efficiency relationship from the standpoint of the proposed double criterion of efficiency as opposed to the criterion of Pareto-efficiency. The equity-efficiency relationship with an extremum, obtained in the paper exceeds the boundaries of the traditional approach to this problem. Empirical verification of the proposed model shows that it corresponds to the facts much better than the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off model

Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: The Case of Ukraine

This paper discusses different dimensions and measurements of central bank independence, the arguments and possible drawbacks of granting more autonomy to central banks, factors influencing the degree of central bank independence, the experience of different countries, as well as objectives and procedures for strengthening central bank accountability and transparency. The paper makes an attempt to measure formal and actual degree of independence of the National Bank of Ukraine, to highlight the main problems undermining and effective independence, accountability and transparency of the Bank and, on the basis of conducted analysis, provides recommendations aimed at enhancing policy in the direction

Modeling electromechanical properties of layered electrets: Application of the finite-element method

We present calculations on the deformation of two- and three-layer electret systems. The electrical field is coupled with the stress-strain equations by means of the Maxwell stress tensor. In the simulations, two-phase systems are considered, and intrinsic relative dielectric permittivity and Young's modulus of the phases are altered. The numerically calculated electro-mechanical activity is compared to an analytical expression. Simulations are performed on two- and three-layer systems. Various parameters in the model are systematically varied and their influence on the resulting piezoelectricity is estimated. In three-layer systems with bipolar charge, the piezoelectric coefficients exhibit a strong dependence on the elastic moduli of the phases. However, with mono-polar charge, there is no significant piezoelectric effect. A two-dimensional simulation illustrated that higher piezoelectricity coefficients can be obtained for non-uniform surface charges and low Poisson's ratio of phases. Irregular structures considered exhibit low piezoelectric activity compared to two-layer structures.Comment: To be appaer in J Electrostatic

calculation of a priori power distributions for the united nations

abstract (introduction; abridged): as luce and raiffa have pointed out, one of the most interesting and fruitful applications of n-person game theory to a sociological problem is the estimation of the a priori power distribution as determined by theconstitution of a voting committee. in this paper we are trying to make such an application: our problem here is the calculation of relative voting strengths of the members of the united nations, the voting issue being world politics security questions (see articles 24 and 39 ff. of the charta of the united nations). (...) in this paper we shall pose three questions and shall try to answer them in a quantitative manner: 1) how does the power distribution in the united nations look like nowadays? 2) did the 1963 amendment of the charta (effective since aug. 31, 1965) involve a change in power distribution or was it only a ficticious modification? 3) what effect on the power distribution would the abolition of the veto of the "big five" in the security council have?

Economic Determinants Of Intellectual Property Development In Ukraine

A detailed analysis of the negative trends in the development of intellectual property has been carried out, which create significant risks for Ukraine to lag behind technological leaders, reduce the independence and competitiveness of the economy, and devalue domestic investments in science and technology. The main ways of commercialization of intellectual property are determined: the use of intellectual property rights in one's own production; the introduction of rights to objects of intellectual property rights in the authorized capital of the enterprise; transfer (sale) of intellectual property rights. Emphasis is placed on the need to use as an objective criterion for determining the market value of an intellectual property object using the economic effect that the user of this property expects to receive within a certain period of time

Restructuring of Ukrainian Enterprises after Privatization: Does Ownership Structure Matter?

For a set of data from a survey of middle-sized and large industrial enterprise in Ukraine after privatization regression equations are estimated that explain the response of restructuring and performance indicators to ownership structures, competitive pressures, and hardening budget constraints. While ownership matters less for restructuring activity than competition and budget constraints, in particular concentrated outside ownership does have a significant positive impact on the firms’ performance.restructuring enterprise privatization competition

competition and collusion in bilateral markets

abstract: in this paper, the core of a market game which constitutes the set of equilibria in the process of competitive contracting and recontracting is criticized as a solution concept for not being immune against "theory absorption" in the sense that knowledge of the core on part of the traders may result in a collusive stabilization of some dominated imputation. it is pointed out that a stable set (or, von neumann-morgenstern) solution does not suffer from this deficiency. moreover, it is argued that stable set solutions provide an adequate analytical framework for the study of collusion, and are in this respect superior to the approach (relying on the core concept) chosen by aumann in his work on disadvantageous monopolies. for symmetric bilateral market games - generated by markets involving the exchange of only two commodities, one of which also serves as a means of side payment and utility transfer, among two types of traders - with one seller and one up to three buyers all symmetric solutions are determined. furthermore, a symmetric solution for markets with equal, but otherwise arbitrary, numbers of sellers and buyers is given. the symmetric stable sets of imputations are interpreted as rational standards of behavior providing the consistent and defensible rules of division necessary to make a cartel agreement viable.