Analisi delle preferenze criminali attraverso la metodologia dell’economia sperimentale

2012-2013Lo scopo della presente ricerca è stato quello di individuare le differenze relative alla propensione cooperativa ed a quella punitiva tra un campione di studenti, uno di camorristi ed uno di detenuti comuni. A tal fine sono stati realizzati due esperimenti, composti da due diversi disegni, rappresentati rispettivamente dal classico gioco del Dilemma del Prigioniero (PD) e da un Dilemma del Prigioniero con punizione di un terzo (TP-PD). I camorristi nel PD hanno manifestato una propensione cooperativa nettamente superiore a quella degli studenti ed a quella dei detenuti comuni, mentre nel TP-PD i due campioni di criminali hanno evidenziato un livello sostanzialmente identico di cooperazione, anche se rispetto alla minaccia di subire la sanzione hanno reagito in maniera opposta (i camorristi hanno ridotto il livello di cooperazione rispetto al PD mentre i comuni hanno fatto registrare un incremento). Gli studenti, al pari dei camorristi, nel TP-PD hanno cooperato meno rispetto a quanto abbiano deciso di fare nel Dilemma del Prigioniero. Inoltre, sia i camorristi che i detenuti comuni nel TP-PD hanno evidenziato una forte propensione punitiva (maggiore di quella rilevatasi negli studenti), anche se la rispettiva modalità di applicazione si è mostrata diversa. Inoltre ai tre campioni sono stati somministrati una serie di quesiti, contenuti in un apposito questionario, al fine di verificare le affinità/divergenze tra le decisioni concretamente assunte nel gioco e le risposte fornite alle domande formulate.[a cura dell'autore]XII ciclo n.s

Cooperation, Punishment and Organized Crime: A Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in Southern Italy

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into the nature of social preferences amongst organized criminals and how these differ from "ordinary" criminals on the one hand and from the non‐criminal population in the same geographical area on the other. We provide experimental evidence on cooperation and response to sanctions by running Prisoner's Dilemma and Third Party Punishment games on three different pools of subjects; students, 'Ordinary Criminals' and Camorristi (Neapolitan 'Mafiosi'). The latter two groups being recruited from within prisons. We are thus able to separately identify 'Prison' and 'Camorra' effects. Camorra prisoners show a high degree of cooperativeness and a strong tendency to punish, as well as a clear rejection of the imposition of external rules even at significant cost to themselves. In contrast, ordinary criminals behave in a much more opportunistic fashion, displaying lower levels of cooperation and, in the game with Third Party punishment, punishing less as well as tending to punish cooperation (almost as much) as defection. Our econometric analyses further enriches the analysis demonstrating inter alia that individuals' locus of control and reciprocity are associated with quite different and opposing behaviours amongst different participant types; a strong sense of self‐determination and reciprocity both imply a higher propensity to cooperate and to punish for both students and Camorra inmates, but quite the opposite for ordinary criminals, further reinforcing the contrast between the behaviour of ordinary criminals and the strong internal mores of Camorra clans

Mannose-binding lectin genetic analysis: possible protective role of the HYPA haplotype in the development of recurrent urinary tract infections in men

SummaryFactors related to bacterial virulence and/or to the host have been implicated in the pathogenesis of recurrent urinary tract infections (rUTI), but in most cases the cause is unknown. Mannose binding lectin (MBL) is an acute phase glycoprotein that exerts immunological functions by binding to the surface of a variety of pathogens. Some human gene variants reduce MBL activity thereby predisposing the host to bacterial and viral infections. The aim of this study was to investigate MBL2 gene variants in relation to rUTI risk. Six MBL gene variants and seven haplotypes were analyzed by PCR and direct sequencing in rUTI patients (n = 83) and in healthy subjects from southern Italy (n = 642). The frequencies of the L allele (−550) and the HYPA haplotype were higher in controls than in patients stratified according to sex (p < 0.05). Our data indicate that the HYPA haplotype in the MBL2 gene could be associated with a minor risk of developing rUTI in males

Diagnostic and Therapeutic Potential for HNP-1, HBD-1 and HBD-4 in Pregnant Women with COVID-19

Pregnancy is characterized by significant immunological changes and a cytokine profile, as well as vitamin deficiencies that can cause problems for the correct development of a fetus. Defensins are small antimicrobial peptides that are part of the innate immune system and are involved in several biological activities. Following that, this study aims to compare the levels of various cytokines and to investigate the role of defensins between pregnant women with confirmed COVID-19 infection and pregnant women without any defined risk factor. TNF-α, TGF-β, IL-2 and IL-10, β-defensins, have been evaluated by gene expression in our population. At the same time, by ELISA assay IL-6, IL-8, defensin alpha 1, defensin beta 1 and defensin beta 4 have been measured. The data obtained show that mothers affected by COVID-19 have an increase in pro-inflammatory factors (TNF-α, TGF-β, IL-2, IL-6, IL-8) compared to controls; this increase could generate a sort of "protection of the fetus" from virus attacks. Contemporarily, we have an increase in the anti-inflammatory cytokine IL-10 and an increase in AMPs, which highlights how the mother's body is responding to the viral attack. These results allow us to hypothesize a mechanism of "trafficking" of antimicrobial peptides from the mother to the fetus that would help the fetus to protect itself from the infection in progress

Wings of Italy. Italian Aeropainting 1910 -1935

Wings of Italy is born out of the desire to offer the American people an outstanding and exhaustive view of the Italian aviation, retracing its fundamental steps from its beginnings to its multiple international accomplishments during the first half of the twentieth century. The exhibition, located in the lobby of Chicago's Willis Tower, will take visitors through a survey of original vintage posters realized by famous Italian artists such as Ambrosi, Boccasile, Dudovich, Manlio, Codognato Mastroianni, Mazza, Munari, Sironi and Wildt. These posters were designed in conjunction with major long-haul flights and aeronautical expositions of the 1930s. Such precious and unique masterpieces are accompanied by ancient photographs and original documents, which offer direct and lively evidence of flight's progressive affirmation and successes in the Italian society

Third party punishment and criminal behavior: an experiment with the Italian Camorra prison inmates

In this paper, we report the results of two experiments, each comprising two designs (a prisoner dilemma and a third party punishment; Fehr et al. 2004). The experiments were conducted with a sample of university students and a sample of Camorra prison inmates, both coming from the same Italian region. Our research hypothesis is that there are consistent differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior between the two samples. The presence of these differences would justify the claim that economic analyses of crime must be integrated with a behavioral perspective. The results of the experiments fully support our research hypothesis, as Camorra inmates exhibit higher propensity to cooperate and to punish defecting behavior

Third party punishment and criminal: an experiment with Italian camorra prison inmates

In Third Party punishment experiments (Fehr et al.; 2004), an agent may be punished for violating a social norm by an uninvolved observer - or third party - whose payoff is unaffected by the behavior of the same agent. In our research, we attempt to improve the understanding of Third Party punishment by reproducing an experiment conducted by Fehr et al. 2004 (TP-PD) with a sample of Camorra prison inmates. We then compare the decisions of the Camorra inmates with the behavior of university students with similar social and economic backgrounds. Our primary conclusion is that there are significant differences in cooperative and sanctioning behavior

Cooperation, Punishment and Organized Crime: A Lab‐in‐the‐Field Experiment in Southern Italy, Dp 9901, IZA DP Series, ISSN: 2365-9793

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which allows a deeper insight into the nature of social preferences amongst organized criminals and how these differ from “ordinary” criminals on the one hand and from the non‐criminal population in the same geographical area on the other. We provide experimental evidence on cooperation and response to sanctions by running Prisoner’s Dilemma and Third Party Punishment games on three different pools of subjects; students, ‘Ordinary Criminals’ and Camorristi (Neapolitan ‘Mafiosi’). The latter two groups being recruited from within prisons. Camorra prisoners show a high degree of cooperativeness and a strong tendency to punish, as well as a clear rejection of the imposition of external rules even at significant cost to themselves. In contrast, ordinary criminals behave in a much more opportunistic fashion, displaying lower levels of cooperation and, in the game with Third Party punishment, punishing less as well as tending to punish cooperation (almost as much) as defection. Our econometric analyses further enriches the analysis demonstrating inter alia that individuals’ locus of control and reciprocity are associated with quite different and opposing behaviours amongst different participant types; a strong sense of self‐determination and reciprocity both imply a higher propensity to cooperate and to punish for both students and Camorra inmates, but quite the opposite for ordinary criminals, further reinforcing the contrast between the behaviour of ordinary criminals and the strong internal mores of Camorra clans

Cooperation, punishment and organized crime: a lab-in-the-field experiment in Southern Italy

This paper reports the results of an experimental investigation which provides insights into the social preferences of organized criminals and how these differ from those of “ordinary” criminals on the one hand and from those of the non-criminal population in the same geographical area on the other. We develop experimental evidence on cooperation and response to sanctions by running prisoner's dilemma and third party punishment games on three different pools of subjects; students, ordinary criminals and Camorristi (Neapolitan ‘Mafiosi’). The latter two groups were recruited from within prisons. Camorra prisoners show a high degree of cooperativeness and a strong tendency to punish defectors, as well as a clear rejection of the imposition of external rules even at significant cost to themselves. The subsequent econometric analysis further enriches our understanding demonstrating inter alia that individuals’ locus of control and reciprocity are associated with quite different and opposing behaviours amongst different participant types; a strong sense of self-determination and reciprocity both imply a higher propensity to punish for Camorra inmates, but quite the opposite for ordinary criminals, further reinforcing the contrast between the behaviour of ordinary criminals and the strong internal mores of Camorra clans