New World Limnichinae IV. \u3ci\u3eEulimnichus\u3c/i\u3e Casey. B. Descriptions of New Species (Coleoptera: Limnichidae)

Thirteen new species of Eulimnichus are described: Eulimnichus visendus, corrinae, langleyae, coheni, improcerus, pellucidus, sharpi, incultus, rugulosus, nrsticus, acutus, subitus, and spangleri. A key to the 27 known species is included

New World Limnichinae III. A Revision of \u3ci\u3eLimnichites\u3c/i\u3e Casey (Coleoptera: Limnichidae)

A diagnosis is given for the genus Limnichites. Descriptions and a key to separate the 12 known species, including five new species, are presented. The new species are Limnichites imparatus, L. porrectus. rudis, L. browni, L. simplex

New World Limnichinae IV. \u3ci\u3eEulimnichus\u3c/i\u3e Casey. A. Synonymies, Lectotype Designations, and Redescriptions (Coleoptera: Limnichidae)

A recharacterization of Eulimnichus and redescriptions for all previously described species are presented. In most cases, illustrations of the aedeagus are also presented. Seven names are placed in synonymy, and a new name E. impostus, is proposed for E. elongatus (Pic) which is preoccupied. Lectotype designations are made for 10 of the 14 species and one synonymous species

Hard and Soft Preparation Sets in Boolean Games

A fundamental problem in game theory is the possibility of reaching equilibrium outcomes with undesirable properties, e.g., inefficiency. The economics literature abounds with models that attempt to modify games in order to avoid such undesirable properties, for example through the use of subsidies and taxation, or by allowing players to undergo a bargaining phase before their decision. In this paper, we consider the effect of such transformations in Boolean games with costs, where players control propositional variables that they can set to true or false, and are primarily motivated to seek the satisfaction of some goal formula, while secondarily motivated to minimise the costs of their actions. We adopt (pure) preparation sets (prep sets) as our basic solution concept. A preparation set is a set of outcomes that contains for every player at least one best response to every outcome in the set. Prep sets are well-suited to the analysis of Boolean games, because we can naturally represent prep sets as propositional formulas, which in turn allows us to refer to prep formulas. The preference structure of Boolean games with costs makes it possible to distinguish between hard and soft prep sets. The hard prep sets of a game are sets of valuations that would be prep sets in that game no matter what the cost function of the game was. The properties defined by hard prep sets typically relate to goal-seeking behaviour, and as such these properties cannot be eliminated from games by, for example, taxation or subsidies. In contrast, soft prep sets can be eliminated by an appropriate system of incentives. Besides considering what can happen in a game by unrestricted manipulation of players’ cost function, we also investigate several mechanisms that allow groups of players to form coalitions and eliminate undesirable outcomes from the game, even when taxes or subsidies are not a possibility

The joy of matching

Here, the authors discuss matching problems and how the Gale-Shapley algorithm solves them, while also explaining some matching techniques

Diet elucidation: Supplementary inferences from mysid feeding appendage morphology

Scanning electron microscope investigations were made of the mandibles, feeding baskets and gut armatures of Mesopodopsis slabberi and Gastrosaccus psammodytes collected in Algoa Bay, southern Africa. Comparison of the structure of the feeding appendages of these two marine mysid species allows dietary inferences supplementing data derived from gut content analyses. Both species occur in abundance in the surf zone off sandy beaches where they contribute significantly to energy transfer through the food web

Characterising the Manipulability of Boolean Games

The existence of (Nash) equilibria with undesirable properties is a well-known problem in game theory, which has motivated much research directed at the possibility of mechanisms for modifying games in order to eliminate undesirable equilibria, or induce desirable ones. Taxation schemes are a well-known mechanism for modifying games in this way. In the multi-agent systems community, taxation mechanisms for incentive engineering have been studied in the context of Boolean games with costs. These are games in which each player assigns truth-values to a set of propositional variables she uniquely controls in pursuit of satisfying an individual propositional goal formula; different choices for the player are also associated with different costs. In such a game, each player prefers primarily to see the satisfaction of their goal, and secondarily, to minimise the cost of their choice, thereby giving rise to lexicographic preferences over goal-satisfaction and costs. Within this setting, where taxes operate on costs only, however, it may well happen that the elimination or introduction of equilibria can only be achieved at the cost of simultaneously introducing less desirable equilibria or eliminating more attractive ones. Although this framework has been studied extensively, the problem of precisely characterising the equilibria that may be induced or eliminated has remained open. In this paper we close this problem, giving a complete characterisation of those mechanisms that can induce a set of outcomes of the game to be exactly the set of Nash Equilibrium outcomes

Internationalisation, cultural distance and country characteristics: a Bayesian analysis of SME's financial performance

Relying on the accounting data of a panel of 403 Italian manufacturing SMEs collected over a period of 5 years, we find results suggesting that multinationality per se does not impact on the economic performance of international small and medium sized firms. It is the characteristics of the country selected i.e. the political hazard, the financial stability and the economic performance that significantly influence SMEs financial performance. The management implication for small and medium sized firms selecting and entering new geographic markets is significant, since our results show that for SMEs it is the market selection process that really matters and not the degree of multinationality

Analysis of Dialogical Argumentation via Finite State Machines

Dialogical argumentation is an important cognitive activity by which agents exchange arguments and counterarguments as part of some process such as discussion, debate, persuasion and negotiation. Whilst numerous formal systems have been proposed, there is a lack of frameworks for implementing and evaluating these proposals. First-order executable logic has been proposed as a general framework for specifying and analysing dialogical argumentation. In this paper, we investigate how we can implement systems for dialogical argumentation using propositional executable logic. Our approach is to present and evaluate an algorithm that generates a finite state machine that reflects a propositional executable logic specification for a dialogical argumentation together with an initial state. We also consider how the finite state machines can be analysed, with the minimax strategy being used as an illustration of the kinds of empirical analysis that can be undertaken.Comment: 10 page

Nash equilibrium and bisimulation invariance

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system states to player actions. Analysing a system in such a setting involves computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the concurrent game. However, we show that, with respect to the above model of strategies (arguably, the "standard" model in the computer science literature), bisimilarity does not preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. Thus, two concurrent games which are behaviourally equivalent from a semantic perspective, and which from a logical perspective satisfy the same temporal logic formulae, may nevertheless have fundamentally different properties (solutions) from a game theoretic perspective. Our aim in this paper is to explore the issues raised by this discovery. After illustrating the issue by way of a motivating example, we present three models of strategies with respect to which the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved under bisimilarity. We use some of these models of strategies to provide new semantic foundations for logics for strategic reasoning, and investigate restricted scenarios where bisimilarity can be shown to preserve the existence of Nash equilibria with respect to the conventional model of strategies in the computer science literature