Modes of Participation in Mass Atrocity

In this essay in the Symposium on Milosevic & Hussein on Trial, the author addresses the choice between command responsibility & participation in a joint criminal enterprise in mass atrocity to argue that the International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) makes liability under command responsibility too difficult to prosecute. Analysis of the incentives of prosecutors & the limitations of the binary character of liability delineates the difficulties of linking perpetrators & accessories. The US posture toward enterprise participation is discussed in terms of national versus international prosecutors & superior responsibility. A discussion of the domestic politics of international justice, modes of criminal participation, complicity, & amnesty supports the concluding argument that national prosecution should be limited to top chieftains to avoid the creation of incentives, & the obstruction of political transition. J. Harwel

Perder a perspectiva, distorcer a história

La relación entre enjuiciamiento penal e interpretación histórica es problemática por múltiples razones. Krenz afirma, en breve, que las dos tareas son radicalmente diferentes y que no deben ser abordadas en el mismo foro. Maier “responde” que las dos tareas son, en efecto, distintas, pero, en última instancia, inextricables. Por lo tanto, debemos tratar de reconciliar esas dos tareas de la mejor manera posible. La tensión entre lo que considero la verdad de cada una de las anteriores afirmaciones constituye el tema de este artículo. The relation between criminal judgment  and historical interpretation is problematic in myriad ways. Krenz says, in short, that the two tasks are radically different and should not be addressed in the same forum. Charles Maier 'responds' that these tasks are indeed distinct, but ultimately inextricable. So we must get on with reconciling the two as best we can. The tension between what I take to be the truth in both statements is the subject of the present paper. A relação entre ajuizamento penal e interpretação histórica é problemática por múltiplas razões. Krenz afirma, em breve, que as duas tarefas são radicalmente diferentes e que não devem ser abordadas no mesmo foro. Maier “responde” que as duas tarefas são, em efeito, distintas, mas em última instância inextricáveis. Portanto, devemos tentar reconciliar essas duas tarefas da melhor forma possível. A tensão entre o que considero a verdade de cada uma das anteriores afirmações constitui o tema deste artigo.

Perder a perspectiva, distorcer a história

La relación entre enjuiciamiento penal e interpretación histórica es problemática por múltiples razones. Krenz afirma, en breve, que las dos tareas son radicalmente diferentes y que no deben ser abordadas en el mismo foro. Maier “responde” que las dos tareas son, en efecto, distintas, pero, en última instancia, inextricables. Por lo tanto, debemos tratar de reconciliar esas dos tareas de la mejor manera posible. La tensión entre lo que considero la verdad de cada una de las anteriores afirmaciones constituye el tema de este artículo. The relation between criminal judgment  and historical interpretation is problematic in myriad ways. Krenz says, in short, that the two tasks are radically different and should not be addressed in the same forum. Charles Maier 'responds' that these tasks are indeed distinct, but ultimately inextricable. So we must get on with reconciling the two as best we can. The tension between what I take to be the truth in both statements is the subject of the present paper. A relação entre ajuizamento penal e interpretação histórica é problemática por múltiplas razões. Krenz afirma, em breve, que as duas tarefas são radicalmente diferentes e que não devem ser abordadas no mesmo foro. Maier “responde” que as duas tarefas são, em efeito, distintas, mas em última instância inextricáveis. Portanto, devemos tentar reconciliar essas duas tarefas da melhor forma possível. A tensão entre o que considero a verdade de cada uma das anteriores afirmações constitui o tema deste artigo.

The Trauma of Justice: Sexual Violence, Crimes against Humanity and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

This article explores the relationship between the concepts of trauma and justice in the jurisprudence of crimes against humanity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, focusing upon cases of sexual violence. It argues that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence conceives this crime as a traumatic violation of both the subject of rights and of universal humanity. The Tribunal’s models of international justice as procedure, punishment, recognition and therapy understand justice as the legal suturing of this trauma. In these models, the notion of ‘justice’ functions as phantasy in the psychoanalytic sense of an imaginary scene that veils its impossibility. However, figuring international justice as the resolution of the trauma of crimes against humanity reiterates the traumatic wrong in humanitarian law. Humanitarian law therefore requires a new model of international justice - a model that does not reiterate the past but which can institute the future