Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence

This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range. The observed individual behavior, based on 40 rounds of bargaining, is shown to be drastically affected by the design of automated negotiation. The settlement rule encourages disputants to behave strategically by adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism is not able to promote agreements and generate efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect: Automated negotiation tends to "chill" bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on their own. However, this perverse effect induced by the settlement rule depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit.Online Dispute Resolution, Arbitration, Experimental Economics, Electronic Commerce, Bargaining

Training Without Certification: An Experimental Study

Our study considers the question of training in firms using an experimental laboratory approach. We investigate the following questions : What conditions, excluding external certification, will bring workers and employers to cooperate and share a rent generated by the workers' training? What conditions will induce workers to accept the training offer, for employers to initially offer the training and to reward the trained workers in the last stage of the game? We analyse the impact of the size of the rent created by training and the existence of an information system on employer reputation rewarding trained employees. Reputation does matter to induce cooperation, but in the absence of external institutions, coordination on the optimal outcome remains difficult. Nous étudions les déterminants de la formation des travailleurs en entreprises en mobilisant l’économie expérimentale. Nous voulons répondre aux questions suivantes : Sous quelles conditions, excluant la formule d’une accréditation externe, les travailleurs et les employeurs acceptent de collaborer dans la formation des travailleurs? Sous quelles conditions une offre de formation est proposée par l’employeur, acceptée par le travailleur, et honorée par l’employeur dans la dernière phase du jeu? L’étude montre l’impact du niveau des gains générés par la formation sur la coopération entre employeurs et travailleurs. Elle montre également qu’un système d’information qui révèle aux travailleurs la réputation de l’employeur à honorer ses promesses, favorise la coopération et la formation des travailleurs. Mais, néanmoins, sans institution externe validant la formation reçue, la coopération optimale demeure difficile à réaliser.general and specific training in firms, accreditation, cooperation and reputation, experimental economics., formation générale et spécifique en entreprises, accréditation, coopération et réputation, économie expérimentale.

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements? Experimental Evidence

This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovativebargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising fromInternet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chillbargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, whichimplies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverseeffect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs ismore credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested inmaximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications ofthese results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputationmechanisms in Cyberspace: Online Dispute Resolution, Electronic Commerce, Bargaining, Arbitration,Experimental Economics

Early or Late Conflict Settlement in a Variety of Games - An Experimental Study -

The game theoretic prediction for alternating offer bargaining depends crucially on how "the pie'' changes over time, and whether the proposer in an early round has ultimatum power. We experimentally study eight such games. Each game is once repeated before being followed by the next one, which defines a cycle of altogether 16 successive plays. Participants play three such cycles. There are no major experience effects but strong and reliable effects of anticipated rule changes. The latter, however, are not due to strategic considerations but rather to the social norms of fairness and efficiency. La théorie des jeux prédit que la résolution des jeux de négociation séquentielle dépend essentiellement de l'évolution de la rente à partager dans le temps (taux d'escompte), et du pouvoir d'ultimatum de l'offreur à la première période. Nous étudions à l'aide de la méthode expérimentale huit jeux de négociation séquentielle afin d'évaluer l'impact du pouvoir de négociation et du taux d'escompte sur les comportements. Chaque jeu est répété une fois avant de passer à un nouveau jeu, notre test est composé de cycle composé de 16 jeux consécutifs. Les participants ont été confrontés à 3 cycles. Au cours du test, aucun effet d'expérience lié à la répétition des jeux n'a été détecté. Les participants ont adopté un comportement stable et robuste d'anticipation des changements de règle de jeu. Les stratégies mises en ?uvre font référence à des considérations, non stratégiques, basées à la fois sur des normes sociales d'équité et d'efficience.Alternating bargaining games, ultimatum, Jeux de négociation séquentiels, ultimatum

Does Resorting to Online Dispute Resolution Promote Agreements ? Experimental Evidence

Working Paper du GATE 2004-01This paper presents the results of an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internetbased transactions. Automated negotiation is an online sealed-bid process in which an automated algorithm evaluates bids from the parties and settles the case if the offers are within a prescribed range. The observed individual behavior, based on 40 rounds of bargaining, is shown to be drastically affected by the design of automated negotiation. The settlement rule encourages disputants to behave strategically by adopting aggressive bargaining positions, which implies that the mechanism is not able to promote agreements and generate efficiency. This conclusion is consistent with the experimental results on arbitration and the well-known chilling effect: Automated negotiation tends to “chill” bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations and discourage them to converge on their own. However, this perverse effect induced by the settlement rule depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit.Ce papier présente les résultats d'une expérience dont l'objectif est de tester les propriétés d'un nouveau mécanisme de résolution des litiges électroniques (la négociation automatisée). Cette procédure consiste en un programme informatique accessible en ligne qui analyse les propositions d'accord émises par les parties et règle le différend si ces offres appartiennent à un intervalle prédéterminé. Le comportement individuel, observé sur 40 périodes de négociation, apparaît comme fortement influencé par le design de la procédure. La règle de négociation considérée incite les parties à adopter un comportement agressif, ce qui limite la capacité du mécanisme à favoriser la résolution du litige. Conformément aux résultats expérimentaux relatifs à la procédure d'arbitrage, la négociation automatisée crée un effet de glaciation tel que les individus ne sont pas incités à révéler leurs véritables valeurs de réserve et à trouver un accord par eux-mêmes. Cependant, cet effet pervers dépend fortement de l'intensité du conflit opposant les parties. Lorsque la menace d'un désaccord gagne en crédibilité, l'effet stratégique diminue dans la mesure où les défendeurs utilisent la procédure de manière plus efficiente afin de maximiser la probabilité de résolution du litige

The reform of European securities settlement systems : Towards an integrated financial market

The European Central Bank (ECB) will offer to banks in 2013 an european shared platform for securities settlement, named TARGET 2 Securities (T2S), in order to open the national financial markets. The financial crisis did not change the ECB agenda. This paper develops a spatial competition model to understand the impact of this new organisation on european post-trading services. We analyse the incentives of the Central Securities Depositaries (CSD) to move to T2S when they become competitors in the market for settlement services and remain in a monopoly position for depository services. Settlement and depository services are complementary goods, because banks have to pay for these two services to buy or sell a security. We show that such a reform should induce a decrease in the settlement price and more generally in post-trading prices, but that prices depend strongly on market organisation. Under certain conditions, partial adhesion would make prices increase. This configuration appears as a Nash equilibrium. As CSDs are free to adhere to T2S, the ECB might be forced to regulate.Post-trading organisation; securities settlement; depositary services; compatibility

Trust and Reciprocity in the Investment Gamewith Indirect Reward

Experimental studies have shown that trust and reciprocity are effective in increasing efficiency when complete contracting is infeasible. One example is the study by Berg et al. (1995) of the investment game. In this game the person who receives the investment is the one who may reward the investor. This is a direct reward game. Similar to Dufwenberg et al. (2000) it is investigated to what extent trust and reward are still observable when reward is indirect; i.e., when the investor may only be rewarded by a third person who did not receive his investment. Furthermore we investigate the influence of social comparison (information about other players’ investments). Our main finding is that mainly indirect reward reduces significantly mutual cooperation

The reform of European securities settlement systems : Towards an integrated financial market

Working paper du GATE 2011-29The European Central Bank (ECB) will offer to banks in 2013 an european shared platform for securities settlement, named TARGET 2 Securities (T2S), in order to open the national financial markets. The financial crisis did not change the ECB agenda. This paper develops a spatial competition model to understand the impact of this new organisation on european post-trading services. We analyse the incentives of the Central Securities Depositaries (CSD) to move to T2S when they become competitors in the market for settlement services and remain in a monopoly position for depository services. Settlement and depository services are complementary goods, because banks have to pay for these two services to buy or sell a security. We show that such a reform should induce a decrease in the settlement price and more generally in post-trading prices, but that prices depend strongly on market organisation. Under certain conditions, partial adhesion would make prices increase. This configuration appears as a Nash equilibrium. As CSDs are free to adhere to T2S, the ECB might be forced to regulate

Phytomanagement and Remediation of Cu-Contaminated Soils by High Yielding Crops at a Former Wood Preservation Site: Sunflower Biomass and Ionome

This long-term field trial aimed at remediating a Cu-contaminated soil to promote crop production and soil functions at a former wood preservation site. Twenty-eight field plots with total topsoil Cu in the 198–1,169 mg kg−1 range were assessed. Twenty-four plots (OMDL) were amended in 2008 with a compost (made of pine bark chips and poultry manure, OM, 5% w/w) and dolomitic limestone (DL, 0.2%), and thereafter annually phytomanaged with a sunflower—tobacco crop rotation. In 2013, one untreated plot (UNT) was amended with a green waste compost (GW, 5%) whereas 12 former OMDL plots received a second compost dressing using this green waste compost (OM2DL, 5%). In 2011, one plot was amended with the Carmeuse basic slag (CAR, 1%) and another plot with a P-spiked Linz-Donawitz basic slag (PLD,1%). Thus six soil treatments, i.e., UNT, OMDL, OM2DL, GW, CAR, and PLD, were cultivated in 2016 with sunflower (Helianthus annuus L. cv Ethic). Shoots were harvested and their ionome analyzed. Athigh soil Cu contamination, the 1M NH4NO3-extractable vs. total soil Cu ratio ranked in decreasing order: Unt (2.35)>CAR (1.02), PLD (0.83)>GW (0.58), OMDL (0.44), OM2DL (0.37), indicating a lower Cu extractability in the compost-amended plots. Allamendments improved the soil nutrient status and the soil pH, which was slightly acidicin the UNT soil. Total organic C and N and extractable P contents peaked in the OM2DL soils. Both OMDL and OM2DL treatments led to higher shoot DW yields and Cu removals than the GW, CAR, and PLD treatments. Shoot DW yields decreased as total topsoil Cu rose in the OMDL plots, on the contrary to the OM2DL plots, demonstrating the benefits to repeat compost application after 5 years. Shoot Cu concentrations notably of OMDL and OM2DL plants fitted into their common range and can be used by biomass Mench et al. Phytomanagement of Cu-Contaminated Soils processing technologies and oilseeds as well. In overall, there is a net gain in soil physico-chemical properties and underlying soil functions

A united statement of the global chiropractic research community against the pseudoscientific claim that chiropractic care boosts immunity.

BACKGROUND: In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, the International Chiropractors Association (ICA) posted reports claiming that chiropractic care can impact the immune system. These claims clash with recommendations from the World Health Organization and World Federation of Chiropractic. We discuss the scientific validity of the claims made in these ICA reports. MAIN BODY: We reviewed the two reports posted by the ICA on their website on March 20 and March 28, 2020. We explored the method used to develop the claim that chiropractic adjustments impact the immune system and discuss the scientific merit of that claim. We provide a response to the ICA reports and explain why this claim lacks scientific credibility and is dangerous to the public. More than 150 researchers from 11 countries reviewed and endorsed our response. CONCLUSION: In their reports, the ICA provided no valid clinical scientific evidence that chiropractic care can impact the immune system. We call on regulatory authorities and professional leaders to take robust political and regulatory action against those claiming that chiropractic adjustments have a clinical impact on the immune system