Science – logic – philosophy. An old problem resuscitated

I argue that Hume’s and Carnap’s criticism of philosophy (meta-physic) contains a rational core and that this core can be much more sharply formulated as soon as a procedural theory of concepts is applied. Also, a possible solution to the problem can be suggested in a much more definite manner

Quine’s criticism of the “First dogma of empiricism”

Quine’s argumentation is shown to be invalid since its conclusion would need one premise more; such a premise is shown to be false

Adjusting the Aperture: The International Law Case for Qualifying Unmanned Vessels as Warships

A number of stakeholders in the international community have advocated for the establishment of restrictions on the development and acquisition of unmanned vessels capable of contributing to naval warfare. These efforts are often based on the notion that the law did not anticipate the existence and use of unmanned vessels, and therefore the drafters of applicable legal frameworks—including the longstanding international law definition of a “warship”—did not consider them. However, this article evaluates, element by element, how unmanned vessels can, should, and already do meet the requirements for the warship designation under international law, based on a reading compatible with the prevailing approach to the interpretation of international treaty language. It also includes an assessment of the notion that unmanned vessels were not foreseen at the time of the conception of the warship paradigm and explains why this is a flawed premise on which to rely as a pretext for establishing a new regime to account specifically for unmanned vessels. The increased use of submarines by States throughout the twentieth century is occasionally referenced as an instructive model for considering the application of the term “warship” to emerging technologies

Concepts as hyperintensional objects

The author defends the view that the notion of concept, if used in the logical (not cognitivist) tradition, should be explicated procedurally (i.e., not set-theoretically). He argues that Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic is an apt tool for such an explication and derives the respective definition. Some consequences of this definition concern the notions of emptiness, simple concepts, empirical concepts and algorithmic concepts

The notion of problem, intuitionism and partiality

Problems are defined as abstract procedures. An explication of procedures as used in Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) and called constructions is presented and the subclass of constructions called concepts is defined. Concepts as closed constructions modulo α- and η-conversion can be associated with meaningful expressions of a natural or professional language in harmony with Church’s conception. Thus every meaningful expression expresses a concept. Since every problem can be unambiguously determined by a concept we can state that every problem is a concept and every concept can be viewed as a problem.Kolmogorov’s idea of a connection between problems and Heyting’s calculus is examined and the non-classical features of the latter are shown to be compatible with realistic logic using partial functions

Is Transparent Intensional Logic a non-classical logic?

It is shown that:(a) classicality is connected with various criteria some of which are fulfilled by TIL while some other are not;(b) some more general characteristic of classicality connects it with philosophical realism whereas (radical) anti-realism is connected with non-classical logics;(c) TIL is highly expressive due to its hyperintensionality, which makes it possible to handle procedures as objects sui generis.Thus TIL is classical in obeying principles of realism and non-classical in transcending some principles taught by textbooks of classical logic

Once more on analytic vs. synthetic

The boundary between analytic and synthetic sentences is well definable. Quine’s attempt to make it vague is based on a misunderstanding: instead of freeing semantics from shortcomings found, e.g. in Carnap’s work, Quine actually rejects semantics of natural language and replaces it by behavioristically articulated pragmatics. Semantics of natural language as a logical analysis is however possible and it can justify hard and fast lines between analyticity and syntheticity

An Unnecessary Consternation: An Analysis of the Future of EU Arbitration in the Wake of the \u3cem\u3eWest Tankers\u3c/em\u3e Decision

This article proposes that, despite the West Tankers decision, parties are still not free to breach the terms of an arbitration agreement. On the contrary, there has been a strong trend by English courts to find ways of preventing parties from breaching such agreements. In short, this article serves to quell the panic and elucidate that the West Tankers decision is not a nail in the coffin, but rather a mechanism to reiterate European courts\u27 dedication to ensuring that arbitration provisions remain a potent force against economic infidelity. Part II of this article will provide a brief background of anti-suit injunctions and the West Tankers decision in the context of EU Arbitration. Part III will outline reactions to this decision and pay particular attention to commentary that illustrates trepidation regarding the future of arbitration agreements in Europe. Part IV will reveal why these fears are overplayed by analyzing two relevant English court decisions, their implications on both micro and macro levels, and why the present system of EU arbitration will remain unchanged. Though such measures are likely premature, Part V discusses some proposals aimed at bypassing a system where anti-suit injunctions are nonexistent. Part VI advocates a fresh perspective reframing West Tankers as a catalyst to understanding the bright future of EU arbitration. Finally, Part VII offers a conclusion reiterating the reality of this supposed crisis