Lietuvos užsienio politika tarpukariu: kova su likimu ar tradicija?

JAV prezidento Woodrow Wilsono politinė filosofija, vadinamasis vilsonizmas, 1919 m. Europojebuvo regima kaip išeitis iš chaotiškos ir beveik beviltiškos 1918 m. rudens tarptautinių santykiųsituacijos. Ši filosofija įtvirtino naują tarptautinių santykių ideologiją, pagrįstą suvereniųvalstybių lygiateisiškumu, kolektyvinio saugumo doktrina ir taikos bei stabilumo išsaugojimu.Europos ir pasaulio politinėje istorijoje tai pradėjo geopolitinį eksperimentą, kuris didele dalimitebesitęsia iki šiol. Nauji tarptautinės politikos subjektai, tokie kaip 1918 m. paskelbta Lietuvosvalstybė, prie naujosios ideologijos irgi turėjo derintis. Straipsnyje apžvelgiama, kas skatinoir kas stabdė Lietuvą eiti tokiu užsienio politikos keliu laikotarpiu tarp dviejų pasaulinių karų.Remiantis Lietuvos ir Rusijos archyvuose saugomais šaltiniais, jau publikuotais dokumentaisbei istorikų tyrinėjimais, atskleidžiamos Lietuvos užsienio politikos sąsajos su kontroversiškuistoriniu paveldu, sudėtingais politiniais vidaus procesais ir bandymai spręsti savo problemasbendradarbiaujant su bolševikine Rusija (SSRS ).Pagrindiniai žodžiai: lietuvių nacionalizmas; Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai; lietuvių-sovietųsantykiai; Vilniaus klausimas; kolektyvinis saugumas; Tautų Sąjunga

The LCP activities during the election to the Third Seimas

At the joint of 1925-1926 the Soviet Union and the Comintern changed their tactics of subversive activities abroad. Under the conditions of releasing social strain in Europe the international epicentre of communism became more inclined to realise its antidemocratic Bolshevik aspirations through legal or semi-legal forms of activity. The Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) - a section of the Comintern which was illegal in Lithuania - reorganised its activity respectively. Communists worked their way into legal state and public institutions: trade unions, army, "Šauliai" union, labour parties, various public societies as well as students' and pupils' organisations. They sought rapprochement with the legal constitutional party of the leftists - the Social Democrats. The Bolshevists encouraged their members and supporters to learn how to handle weapons in order to be able "to turn them at the right moment against the power of "kulaks", landowners and factory owners". The tactical changes of communist activity virtually coincided with the election to the Third Seimas in Lithuania. Though the underground communist organisation did not recognise parliamentarism, "bourgeois constitution" and "bourgeois democracy" as standards of social-political life, following the directives of the Comintern it illegally participated in the elections to the Seimas shielding itself behind the names of neutral organisations. By participating in the elections to the Seimas the LCP pursued two aims: 1) to oust from the government the coalition of the Christian-Democrats and in this way to create better conditions for anti-state activities; 2) to win a few places in the Seimas in order to use the parliament tribune for the revolutionization of society and preparation for the "proletarian revolution". Besides, it was suggestive that following the directives from Moscow and fawning upon German communists, the LCP, in its elective programme, argued Lithuanian's supremacy in the Klaipėda region which had been not long ago annexed to Lithuania. The communist underground in Lithuania was generously financed by Moscow - the famous Bolshevists received monthly salaries, whereas their families were granted allowances. The expenses of election campaign were covered by the Comintern. In the first half of 1926 the LCP received from Moscow more than 3,000 USD, a few thousand Litas and a few thousand Soviet roubles. Some of the money for the election campaign was collected in Lithuania from local people. Money was also raised abroad - among the Lithuanian emigration in the USA and Argentina. Therefore, the total sum of money which the LCP was able to allot for the election campaign amounted to twenty-thirty thousand Litas. For comparison we can mention that the Lithuanian Nationalistic Union-a legal constitutional party - could afford only about 15,000 Litas for its election campaign. The money received by the communists was used rather effectively. For example, in the second election area alone (there were 6 election areas in Lithuania) communists disseminated more than 87,000 units of various communist propaganda literature, visited about 40 cities, boroughs and villages, organised about 30 meetings and used almost 100 agitators for the communist candidates. Communists included their candidates in the lists of all six electoral areas. Ten lists of communists comprised 80 persons. From the social point of view these lists comprised mostly workers, craftsmen, landless peasants, and peasants who owned small plots of land. There were few intellectuals on these lists. From the national point of view 80% of the persons included in the lists were Lithuanians, and 20% - people of other nationalities (Jews, Germans, Russians). In choosing its candidates and compiling election lists the LCP did not avoid falsifications. Communists often falsified the names of the candidates (giving Lithuanian forms), misindicated their occupation, profession, place of residence, etc. There were cases when one and the same candidate was included in three lists. Notwithstanding great efforts, means, and agitation, the LCP failed to win even a single place in the Third Seimas. However, this was not a defeat. Without any doubt the LCP contributed to the loss of majority in the Seimas of the Christian-Democrat coalition. Besides, soon after the elections the LCP stroke another blow upon the Christian-Democrats: it escalated the rumours that the Lithuanian Party of the Christian-Democrats was no going to give its place to the opposition, characterised its activity as "Clerical Fascism" and even planned an armed sally against this constitutional party. The activity of the communists in the spring of 1926 destabilised the political life in Lithuania and became a threat to the democratic state and society

Polytical activity of T. Wróblewski and Polish community of Vilnius

Reikšminiai žodžiai: Lenkų-lietuvių santykiai; Lietuvių ir lenkų santykiai; Tautinis atgimimas; Lietuvos istorija XX a. I-je pusėje; Politinė veikla; T. Vrublevskis; T.Vrublevskis; Tadas Vrublevskis; Vilniaus lenkų bendruomenė; Lithaninan history (first half of the 20th century); Lithuanian national rebirth in Vilnius; Lithuanian-Polish Relations; Polish community of Vilnius; Polish-Lithuanian relations; Polytical acvity; T. Wroblewski; Tadeusz Wroblewski; Tadeusz Wrublewsk

Bendra idėja ir lemtis : recenzija / Lietuva, Latvija, Estija

Recenzijoje analizuojama Z. Butkaus išleista knyga ,,Baltijos valstybių vienybės idėja ir praktika 1918–1940 m.“. Tai puikiai poligrafiškai išleista, suredaguota ir sumaketuota, turinti tinkamai parinktas iliustracijas, knyga. Atkreipiamas dėmesys, kad Z. Butkaus išleista knyga parodo, kad jos autorius pasižymi darbštumu, kruopštumu ir sąžiningumu. Tai turintis talentą mokslininkas. Pažymima, kad leidinyje publikuojami istoriniai šaltiniai yra labai akademiškai atrinkti. Leidinyje pateikiami duomenys apima 1918–1940 m. pastebima, kad yra pateiktas vienas dokumentas, kuris atspindi 1990 m. gegužės įvykius. Nurodoma, kad knygoje panaudoti dokumentai yra publikuojami pirmą kartą. Pastebima, kad knygoje esantys dokumentai yra suskirstyti į penkis skyrius. Šiuose skyriuose yra parodomi tam tikri Lietuvos, Latvijos ir Estijos konsolidacijos ir nesutarimų etapai. Nurodoma, kad tarp atskirų knygos skyrių yra įvestos jungiamosios grandys. Vertinant Z. Butkaus parengtą šaltinių publikaciją, reikia pripažinti, kad tai yra gera XX a. pirmosios pusės politinės istorijos pamoka Baltijos šalių lyderiams. Teigiamai vertintina ir tai, kad leidinyje publikuojami dokumentai yra puikiai parengti archeografiškai. Svarbu tai, kad beveik visur šaltiniuose yra palikta kiek galima autentiškesnė kalba ir forma. Tai labiausiai liečia verstinius iš kitų kalbų dokumentus. Pateikiama dokumentų santrauka angliškai. Visa tai leidiniui suteikia didesnį istoriografinį aktualumą. Recenzijoje yra oponuojama autoriaus pozityviai nuomonei dėl atskirų publikuojamų dokumentų turinio interpretacijos. Reikšminiai žodžiai: Baltijos Antantė; Baltijos sąjunga; Baltijos valstybės; Bronius Kazys Balutis; Estija (Estonia); Jurgis Baltrušaitis; Latvija (Latvia); Vienybė; Zenonas Butkus; Baltic Entente, Bronius Kazys Balutis, Jurgis Baltrusaitis; Baltic Union; Baltic states; Latvia; Lithuania; Unity; Zenonas ButkusThe review analyses the book “Baltijos valstybių vienybės idėja ir praktika 1918–1940 m.” [The Idea and Practice of the Unity of the Baltic States, 1918–1940] published by Z. Butkus. The book is a perfect example of a graphically designed, edited and laid out publication with adequate illustrations. It should be noted that the book published by Butkus shows that its author is diligent, thorough and honest. This scholar has talent. The historical sources referred to in the publication have been very academically selected. The data presented in the book cover the period from 1918 to 1940. One document refers to the events of May 1990. The documents used in the book are published for the first time. They are divided into five chapters. These chapters show certain stages of consolidation and disagreements of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The individual chapters of the book have linking elements. When evaluating the publication of sources compiled by Butkus, we should admit that it is a good lesson of political history of the first half of the 20th century for the leaders of the Baltic States. Good archeographical preparation of documents published in the book is also a positive aspect. The authentic language and form has been preserved to the greatest possible extent in almost all sources. This particularly concerns the translations of documents from other languages. The summary of documents is presented in English. All this provides a greater historiographical relevance to the publication. The review opposes the author’s positive opinion concerning the interpretation of the content of individual published documents

Vakarų šalių požiūris į 1926 metų perversmą Lietuvoje

The analysis and evaluation of the 17 December 1926 coup d'etat in Lithuanian historical scholarship to a large extent remain a relevant and controversial problem. The authoritarian regime formed after the coup has received various, yet not always well-grounded, descriptions and evaluations in historical writings. The aim of this article is (without attempting to answer at once all the questions pertaining to this issue) to tackle this problem from a different angle and as if from a distance, namely to analyse the political-diplomatic reaction to the coup d'etat in Lithuania of the parties, which were not directly interested (foreign states). On the one hand, the majority of democratic governments in Europe and the US administration had at least reserved and unopposed, if not favourable, view of the events of the 17 December 1926 in Lithuania. On the other hand, public, labour professional organisations and a part of the media in a number of foreign democracies were critical about the unconstitutional change of the government in Lithuania and the dictatorial domestic policy of the government formed on authoritarian grounds. Thirdly, in the eyes of liberal and democratic citizens or societies of the Western Europe the 1926 coup impaired the international prestige of Lithuania since it prompted doubts over the democratic traditions of the young state, the maturity of its social and political culture as well as pwspects of maintaining its stat

Koncepcja "międzymorza" w myśli i praktyce politycznej obozu Józefa Pilsudskiego w latach 1918-1926 / Piotr Okulewicz. Poznań, 2001

Reikšminiai žodžiai: Geopolitika; Vilniaus krašto okupacija; Federacinis modelis; Politinė mintis; Tarpjūrių koncepcij

Molotovo-Ribbentropo slaptųjų protokolų prielaidos ir ištakos (1922-1932)

Russian and German criminal political plans, which were implemented through Molotov-Ribbentrop secret protocols on the eve of World War II, ripened in Europe for several years and underwent several metamorphoses. Thus Europe was inured to German and Soviet revisionism or even started believing that it was inevitable. States that dominated in the system created by Versailles and were potentially able to organise defence of international law in Europe regrettably seem to have been worried more about meeting Germany’s interests in the cheapest and most painless way rather that defending international law. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to state that the 1939 Russian-German agreements and their secret protocols were unexpected to Europe. There is also no grounds to state that political responsibility for these agreements and their consequences falls only on the contemporary governments of those countries. The Baltic States and Poland, which re-established after World War I or formed anew, evidently lacked international political experience and diplomatic maturity, insufficiently coordinated their interests, constantly demanded patronage and protection from Western democracies and insignificantly contributed to the termination of German and Russian revisionism. Before the beginning of the 1930s Lithuania even had hopes concerning revisionism of the said countries to the extent it was directed against Poland, thus hoping to solve the problem of its historical capital. Thus, however paradoxical it might seem, part of political responsibility falls on those states that became victims of Molotov-Ribbentrop secret protocols