2,430 research outputs found

    Cipes: The Crime War

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    A Review of The Crime War by Robert M. Cipe

    Miller: The Assault on Privacy

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    A Review of The Assault on Privacy by Arthur R. Mille

    Information Processing is not Affected by Multiple Concussions in College Age Students

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    Mental Health is not Affected by Multiple Concussions in Young Adults

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    RFD-SF and Time to Peak Force for Grip Strength is not affected in College Aged Students with Multiple Concussions

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    Unifying stylistic syntheses in the late compositions (1939–1945) of Béla Bartók

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    Bartók’s later works from the years 1939–1945 present an impressive synthesis of his musical innovations. Beginning with the Divertimento and Sixth String Quartet (both composed in 1939), the Hungarian composer starts with a freely tonal, neo-Classical foundation. Above this initial compositional level he then superimposes Beethovenian formal structures gleaned from the latter’s opp. 53 and 135, in addition to a prominent Stravinsky quotation from The Rite of Spring, part two. In both works Bartók achieves an impressive large-scale cyclical unity, frequently through wholetone scalar integration. The Concerto for Orchestra (1943) blends pervasive quotation techniques with analogous cyclical intervallic patterns, such as major third cells on F–A–D4. One is again distinctly reminded of the F Major Divertimento. Like the latter work, the Concerto is especially notable for its expansive codas, which function in the manner of Beethovenian second developments. Similarly, the Sonata for Solo Violin (1944) fuses neo-Bachian counterpoint with the expansive forms of the Concerto for Orchestra. Finally, the interrelated last two Concertos for piano and viola (both penned in 1945) present a cumulative synthesis of Bartókʼs later style, emphasizing the tertial (and modal) degrees of VI and flattened VI. Here, too, we encounter elaborate quotational systems that distantly recall the 1910s and 1920s music of French composers as Debussy, Ravel and Satie

    Oscillatory decay of a two-component Bose-Einstein condensate

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    We study the decay of a two-component Bose-Einstein condensate with negative effective interaction energy. With a decreasing atom number due to losses, the atom-atom interaction becomes less important and the system undergoes a transition from a bistable Josephson regime to the monostable Rabi regime, displaying oscillations in phase and number. We study the equations of motion and derive an analytical expression for the oscillation amplitude. A quantum trajectory simulation reveals that the classical description fails for low emission rates, as expected from analytical considerations. Observation of the proposed effect will provide evidence for negative effective interaction.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figue

    The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games

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    A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particular coalition structure). This payment is conditional on players not deviating from their coalition(s). The sum of this payment plus the actual gains of the coalition(s) may then be divided among the agents so as to promote stability. We define the \emph{cost of stability (CoS)} as the minimal external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of games which can model decision-making in political bodies, and cooperation in multiagent settings. Finally, we extend our model and results to games with coalition structures.Comment: 20 pages; will be presented at SAGT'0
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