147 research outputs found
On the competition of asymetric agents
Rank-order tournaments are usually implemented in organizations to provide incentives for eliciting employeesâ
effort and/or to identify the agent with the higher ability, e.g. in promotion tournaments. We close a gap in the
literature by experimentally analyzing a ceteris paribus variation of the prize spread â being the major design
feature of tournaments â in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting. We find that effort significantly increases
with the prize spread as predicted by standard theory. However, only if the prize spread is sufficiently large weak
players competing against strong players strain themselves all the more and sorting of agents is feasible
Feedback in Tournaments under Commitment Problems: The-ory and Experimental Evidence
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate information regarding the agentsâ previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credi-bly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model
Sabotage in Tournaments: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment
Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm one of the key insights from theory: effort and sabotage increase with the wage spread. Additionally, we find that even in the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem. Destructive activities are reduced by explicitly calling them by their name 'sabotage'. Communication among principal and agents curbs sabotage due to agreements on flat prize structures and increased output.sabotage, tournament, reciprocity, relative performance scheme, experiment
Performance Appraisals and the Impact of Forced Distribution: An Experimental Investigation
A real effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors were not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution system in which they had to assign differentiated grades. We find that productivity was significantly higher under a forced distribution by about 8%. But also in the absence of forced distribution, deliberate differentiation positively affected output in subsequent work periods.performance measurement, forced distribution, motivation, experiment
Sabotage in Asymmetric Contests â An Experimental Analysis
In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning. Contestants, however, could also improve their own relative position by harming the other players. We experimentally analyze contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail.Contest, Experiments, Sabotage, Tournament
Working with ELSA â How an Emotional Support Agent Builds Trust in Virtual Teams
Virtual collaboration is an increasing part of daily life for many employees. Despite many advantages, however, virtual collaborative work can lead to a lack of trust among virtual team members, e.g., due to spatial separation and little social interaction. Previous findings indicated that emotional support provided by a conversational agent (CA) can impact human-agent trust and the perceived social presence. We developed an emotional support agent called ELSA and conducted a between-subject online experiment to examine how CAs can provide emotional support in order to increase the level of trust among colleagues in virtual teams. We found that human-agent trust positively influences the level of calculus-based trust among team members and increases team cohesion, whereas perceived anthropomorphism and social presence towards a CA seems to be less important for trust among team members
Interpersonal comparison, status and ambition in organizations
This paper shows that introducing status concerns into a tournament model has substantial implications for the provision of incentives. We emphasize the role of reference groups and determine the optimal number of winners and losers in tournaments. To compensate employees for the disutility of low status, a profit-maximizing employer may be reluctant to demote employees and instead reward workers through promotions. This rationalizes the prevalence of compensation systems which reward winners without explicitly identifying losers. Differences in ambition and ability affect contestantsâ efforts and may result in inefficient promotion outcomes. We analyze how to mitigate these inefficiencies when managing a diverse workforce by using mixed and segregated tournament
Excludability: A laboratory study on forced ranking in team production
Exclusion has long been employed as a common disciplinary measure against defectors, both at work and in social life. In this paper, we study the effect of excludability - exclusion of the lowest contributor - on contributions in three different team production settings. We demonstrate theoretically and experimentally that excludability increases contributions. Excludability is particularly effective in production settings where the average or maximum effort determines team production. In these settings, we observe almost immediate convergence to full contribution. In settings where the minimum effort determines team production, excludability leads to a large increase in contributions only if the value of the excluded individual's contribution to the public good is redistributed among the included individuals
Sabotage in Contests: A Survey
A contest is a situation in which individuals expend irretrievable resources to win valuable prize(s). âSabotageâ is a deliberate and costly act of damaging a rivalâs' likelihood of winning the contest. Sabotage can be observed in, e.g., sports, war, promotion tournaments, political or marketing campaigns. In this article, we provide a model and various perspectives on such sabotage activities and review the economics literature analyzing the act of sabotage in contests. We discuss the theories and evidence highlighting the means of sabotage, why sabotage occurs, and the effects of sabotage on individual players and on overall welfare, along with possible mechanisms to reduce sabotage. We note that most sabotage activities are aimed at the ablest player, the possibility of sabotage reduces productive effort exerted by the players, and sabotage may lessen the effectiveness of public policies, such as affirmative action, or information revelation in contests. We discuss various policies that a designer may employ to counteract sabotage activities. We conclude by pointing out some areas of future research
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