La economía política de la supervivencia de los dictadores

Este trabajo explora qué factores explican la supervivencia de los dictadores en el poder centrándoseen las estrategias de compra de lealtad. Se muestra así que los dictadores que son capaces deincorporar en las estructuras del régimen a aquellos que necesita para estabilizar su cargo y a laoposición potencial permanecen mayor tiempo en el poder. Para lograrlo, los gobernantes autoritariosrecurren a la distribución de rentas y, en caso de que sectores más amplios deban ser cooptados,a creación de instituciones. Se muestra, además, cómo diferentes grupos tienen distintas utilidadeso preferencias respecto a qué bienes pueden comprar su lealtad. Para evitar ser derrocado porla propia elite, es crucial repartir rentas procedentes de la exportación de materias primas. Las institucionesdictatoriales ayudan a prevenir intervenciones militares y de la propia elite, mientras quelos cambios derivados de movimientos populares pueden ser evitados mediante bienes públicoscomo el crecimiento económico

Why ineffectiveness is often baked-in to American intervention overseas

When it wants to promote democracy in other countries, the US has a number of options, ranging from foreign aid to economic sanctions to military intervention. But how do Americans feel about these different ways of intervening? In new survey research, Abel Escribà-Folch, Lala Muradova, and Toni Rodon find that Americans are more supportive of intervening in autocratic countries which do not hold elections, and are not US allies. But past experience, they write, also shows that intervening in countries that have these characteristics often does not lead to the growth of democracy

How Mechanization Shapes Coups

Civil-military relations are characterized by a fundamental dilemma. To lower coup risk, leaders frequently empower the military, which satisfies the armed forces with the status quo and enables them to fight against threats challenging the civilian leadership. Simultaneously, a too powerful military itself constitutes a potential threat that is capable of overthrowing the government. Our research adds to this debate by examining the impact of mechanization, that is, the degree to which militaries rely on armored vehicles relative to manpower, on coup risk. We discuss several (opposing) mechanisms before developing the theoretical expectation that higher levels of mechanization should lower the likelihood of a coup due to the increased costs of coup execution. Empirical evidence strongly supports this claim and, thus, contributes to our understanding of the emergence of coups as an essential breakdown of civil-military relations, while adding to the debate surrounding the many trade-offs leaders face when coup-proofing their regimes

Pitfalls of Professionalism? Military Academies and Coup Risk

Military academies tend to be strongly linked to the professionalization of the armed forces. This explains why many countries in the world have created such institutions. The following article studies a potential negative externality stemming from military schools: increased coup risk. We argue that military academies may create, inculcate, and strengthen cohesive views that could conflict with incumbent policies, and that these schools establish networks among military officers that may facilitate coordination necessary for plotting a putsch. We also contend and empirically demonstrate that these negative side effects of military academies are in particular pronounced in nondemocracies, that is, military academies have diverse effects across regime types. This work has significant implications for our understanding civil–military relations. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on military education and professionalization, as we suggest that military academies are important vehicles through which coups can emerge predominantly in authoritarian states

Autocrats' modes of exit, rents, and crisis in Africa

Studies analyzing dictators’ duration in power do not generally distinguish the way through which rulers are booted out. In consequence, a destabilizing effect is attributed to some variables without specifying and testing the mechanisms through which this effect may operate. In this paper, we argue that ‘regular’ leadership changes stem from the incumbent’s incapacity to thwart elite defection and opposition groups coordination through the use of patronage, whereas, ‘irregular’ changes are mainly brought about by economic collapse and the widespread of poverty. We also analyze the patterns behind the steady institutionalization of African politics. Data from all African countries between 1946 (or the year of independence) and 2000 permit us to put such general hypotheses under scrutiny and confirm them using multinomial logistic duration regressions. It is also shown that foreign pressure, aid conditionality and domestic opposition have been the major determinants of institutionalization of African dictatorships, making, thus, possible the decrease in the number of irregular ousters

La economía política de la supervivencia de los dictadores

Este trabajo explora qué factores explican la supervivencia de los dictadores en el poder centrándose en las estrategias de compra de lealtad. Se muestra así que los dictadores que son capaces de incorporar en las estructuras del régimen a aquellos que necesita para estabilizar su cargo y a la oposición potencial permanecen mayor tiempo en el poder. Para lograrlo, los gobernantes autoritarios recurren a la distribución de rentas y, en caso de que sectores más amplios deban ser cooptados, a creación de instituciones. Se muestra, además, cómo diferentes grupos tienen distintas utilidades o preferencias respecto a qué bienes pueden comprar su lealtad. Para evitar ser derrocado por la propia elite, es crucial repartir rentas procedentes de la exportación de materias primas. Las instituciones dictatoriales ayudan a prevenir intervenciones militares y de la propia elite, mientras que los cambios derivados de movimientos populares pueden ser evitados mediante bienes públicos como el crecimiento económico

Maten al león: el castigo a los dictadores salientes

Este artículo analiza las condiciones bajo las cuales los dictadores son castigados tras perder el poder. Mediante el empleo de una nueva variable que codifica cuál fue el destino de los dictadores derrocados entre 1946 y 2000 se demuestra la incapacidad de los regímenes democráticos sucesores para llevar ante la justicia a sus antiguos tiranos por razones estratégicas. Además, se ofrece evidencia de que el castigo es más probable para dictadores perso nalistas, y mucho menos para líderes de regímenes militares o de partido único. El contexto internacional tiene efectos contraintuitivos: un mayor número de dictaduras en la región hace el castigo más probable, mientras un mayor porcentaje de democracias en el mundo lo dificultan.This article analyzes the conditions under which dictators are punished after losing power. A new variable that codifies the fate of dictators defeated between 1946 and 2000 is used to demonstrate the inability of subsequent democratic regimes to bring former tyrants to justice for strategic reasons. It also provides evidence that punishment is more likely for personalistic dictators, and much less for military or one party regimes. At the same time, the international context has counter-intuitive effects: a higher number of dictatorships in the region make punishment more likely, whereas a higher percentage of democracies in the world makes it more difficult

El destino de los dictadores tras el poder, ¿quién y cómo puede castigarlos?

Este artículo analiza desde una perspectiva comparada el destino de los dictadores tras perder o abandonar el poder, es decir, busca explicar bajo qué condiciones es posible castigar a los dictadores salientes o, por el contrario, bajo qué condiciones pueden éstos exiliarse o permanecer impunes en sus países. Para hacerlo, partimos de un simple modelo de teoría de juegos mediante el cual se pone de relieve que hay dos principales factores detrás de tales destinos: La fuerza relativa de la oposición y el contexto internacional. Nuevos datos sobre el modo de salida del poder y el destino pospoder de los dictadores que gobernaron entre 1946 y 2000, nos ha permitido poner a prueba nuestras hipótesis.This article analyses from a comparative point of view the fate of dictators once they have lost or given power up, in other words, it seeks to explain under what conditions it is possible to punish outgoing rulers and under which ones dictators can exile or remain unpunished in their countries. To do so, we depart from a simple game-theoretic model through which we stress that there are two main factors that explain rulers’ fate: The relative strength of the opposition and the international context. New data for the period 1945-2000 on dictators’ mode of exiting power and post-power fate have allowed us to put our hypotheses under empirical scrutiny

Dictadores, instituciones y derechos de propiedad

Este estudio explora las condiciones y los incentivos que llevan a algunos dictadores a crear o mantener instituciones legislativas en sus regímenes. Con tal fin se desarrolla un modelo de teoría de juegos con información incompleta en el cual se asume que los dictadores son agentes que buscan maximizar los ingresos a través de impuestos. Del modelo se desprende que son dos los factores clave que explican la creación de parlamentos: una mayor proporción de capital móvil en la economía y un alto factor de descuento del dictador. Ambos aumentan las probabilidades de que dicha institución sea creada. Dos implicaciones más se derivan del modelo y se confirman en la parte empírica: las dictaduras con parlamentos imponen menores tipos impositivos y aumentan el nivel de inversión

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions