Distributed Ledger for Provenance Tracking of Artificial Intelligence Assets

High availability of data is responsible for the current trends in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML). However, high-grade datasets are reluctantly shared between actors because of lacking trust and fear of losing control. Provenance tracing systems are a possible measure to build trust by improving transparency. Especially the tracing of AI assets along complete AI value chains bears various challenges such as trust, privacy, confidentiality, traceability, and fair remuneration. In this paper we design a graph-based provenance model for AI assets and their relations within an AI value chain. Moreover, we propose a protocol to exchange AI assets securely to selected parties. The provenance model and exchange protocol are then combined and implemented as a smart contract on a permission-less blockchain. We show how the smart contract enables the tracing of AI assets in an existing industry use case while solving all challenges. Consequently, our smart contract helps to increase traceability and transparency, encourages trust between actors and thus fosters collaboration between them

Cosmopolitan Risk Community and China's Climate Governance

Ulrich Beck asserts that global risks, such as climate change, generate a form of ‘compulsory cosmopolitanism’, which ‘glues’ various actors into collective action. Through an analysis of emerging ‘cosmopolitan risk communities’ in Chinese climate governance, this paper points out a ‘blind spot’ in the theorisation of cosmopolitan belonging and an associated inadequacy in explaining shifting power-relations. The paper addresses this problem by engaging with the intersectionality of the cosmopolitan space. It is argued that cosmopolitan belonging is a form of performative identity. Its key characteristic lies in a ‘liberating prerogative’, which enables individuals to participate in the solution of common problems creatively. It is this liberating prerogative that coerces the state out of political monopoly and marks the cosmopolitan moment

Urban agriculture: a global analysis of the space constraint to meet urban vegetable demand

Urban agriculture (UA) has been drawing a lot of attention recently for several reasons: the majority of the world population has shifted from living in rural to urban areas; the environmental impact of agriculture is a matter of rising concern; and food insecurity, especially the accessibility of food, remains a major challenge. UA has often been proposed as a solution to some of these issues, for example by producing food in places where population density is highest, reducing transportation costs, connecting people directly to food systems and using urban areas efficiently. However, to date no study has examined how much food could actually be produced in urban areas at the global scale. Here we use a simple approach, based on different global-scale datasets, to assess to what extent UA is constrained by the existing amount of urban space. Our results suggest that UA would require roughly one third of the total global urban area to meet the global vegetable consumption of urban dwellers. This estimate does not consider how much urban area may actually be suitable and available for UA, which likely varies substantially around the world and according to the type of UA performed. Further, this global average value masks variations of more than two orders of magnitude among individual countries. The variations in the space required across countries derive mostly from variations in urban population density, and much less from variations in yields or per capita consumption. Overall, the space required is regrettably the highest where UA is most needed, i.e., in more food insecure countries. We also show that smaller urban clusters (i.e., <100 km2 each) together represent about two thirds of the global urban extent; thus UA discourse and policies should not focus on large cities exclusively, but should also target smaller urban areas that offer the greatest potential in terms of physical space

Large-Scale Investment in Science: Economic Impact and Social Justice

Abstract Science is not a free lunch. Worldwide, R&D expenditures per year, from basic research to product development by firms, are about USD1.7 trillion (according to UNESCO estimates for 2017). There are perhaps 7.8 million professional researchers globally, around one researcher out of one thousand inhabitants of the planet. In the OECD area, which includes the most developed economies, government R&D spending is worth about USD 315 billion per year and the share of government of the total R&D expenditures is 28%. Hence, citizens support research in two ways: firstly, as consumers by paying a price for goods and services which in turn include in their production costs such expenditures; secondly, by paying taxes which support government R&D expenditures, mostly for basic science. In this short essay, I discuss two questions: What is the economic impact of basic research? What are the implications for social justice of the interplay between -on one side- government funded science and -on the other side- R&D supported by business? I will argue that the ultimate economic impact of large-scale investment in basic research is often (but not always) positive (i.e. benefits are greater than costs). There is, however, a potential concern for social justice arising from the private appropriation by business of rents arising from knowledge as a public good

The geographies of access to enterprise finance: the case of the West Midlands, UK

The geographies of access to enterprise finance: the case of the West Midlands, UK, Regional Studies. Whilst there is a long history of credit rationing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK, the financial crisis has seen banks retreat further from lending to viable SMEs due to a reassessment of risk and lack of available capital. In so doing, the credit crunch is thought to be creating new geographies of financial exclusion. This paper explores the financial inclusion of enterprise through community development finance institutions (CDFIs) which provide loan finance to firms at the commercial margins in the West Midlands, UK. The paper concludes that CDFIs could partially address the financial exclusion of enterprise as an additional, alternative source of finance to that of mainstream banks

Loving work: drawing attention to pleasure and pain in the body of the cultural worker

In this article, we present our current research into the body and mind at work, with a particular focus on experiences and implications of enjoyment and love of work within the culture sector. This research is developed through the project Manual Labours that explores the historical conditioning between the body and mind in the so-called immaterial labour conditions. The project aims to identify positive and negative affective labour and the role that physical relationships to work can have in helping conceptualise current working conditions. The enjoyment of work leads to complex differentiations between work and life. This article explores the implications of exploitative labour conditions as self-employed or salaried passionate workers are internalising and developing a sense of ‘un-alienated’ ownership over their wage labour

Investigating the Information Systems Heterarchy

This article assesses how one IS organization is changing in response to the increased globalization of software development and posits the emergence of a new form of multi-national enterprise (MNE)—the heterarchy. Data from two projects create new insights into the structures and behaviors of ISMNEs as they adapt to global systems development. The article identifies four primary dimensions of impact—cultural, economic, operational, and organizational—and suggests how such organizations are evolvin

A critical review of smaller state diplomacy

In The Peloponnesian War, Thucydides (1972: 402) highlights the effects of the general, overall weakness of smaller states vis-à-vis larger, more powerful ones in a key passage, where the Athenians remind the Melians that: “… since you know as well as we do that, as the world goes, right is only in question between equals in power. Meanwhile, the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Concerns about the vulnerability of small, weak, isolated states have echoed throughout history: from Thucydides, through the review by Machiavelli (1985) of the risks of inviting great powers to intervene in domestic affairs, through 20th century US-led contemporary political science (Vital, 1971; Handel, 1990) and Commonwealth led scholarship (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1985). In the context of 20th century ‘Balkanization’, the small state could also prove unstable, even hostile and uncooperative, a situation tempting enough to invite the intrusion of more powerful neighbours: a combination, according to Brzezinski (1997: 123-124) of a power vacuum and a corollary power suction2: in the outcome, if the small state is ‘absorbed’, it would be its fault, and its destiny, in the grand scheme of things. In an excellent review of small states in the context of the global politics of development, Payne (2004: 623, 634) concludes that “vulnerabilities rather than opportunities are the most striking consequence of smallness”. It has been recently claimed that, since they cannot defend or represent themselves adequately, small states “lack real independence, which makes them suboptimal participants in the international system” (Hagalin, 2005: 1). There is however, a less notable and acknowledged but more extraordinary strand of argumentation that considers ‘the power of powerlessness’, and the ability of small states to exploit their smaller size in a variety of ways in order to achieve their intended, even if unlikely, policy outcomes. The pursuance of smaller state goals becomes paradoxically acceptable and achievable precisely because such smaller states do not have the power to leverage disputants or pursue their own agenda. A case in point concerns the smallest state of all, the Vatican, whose powers are both unique and ambiguous, but certainly not insignificant (The Economist, 2007). Smaller states have “punched above their weight” (e.g. Edis, 1991); and, intermittently, political scientists confront their “amazing intractability” (e.g. Suhrke, 1973: 508). Henry Kissinger (1982: 172) referred to this stance, with obvious contempt, as “the tyranny of the weak”3. This paper seeks a safe passage through these two, equally reductionist, propositions. It deliberately focuses first on a comparative case analysis of two, distinct ‘small state-big state’ contests drawn from the 1970s, seeking to infer and tease out the conditions that enable smaller ‘Lilliputian’ states (whether often or rarely) to beat their respective Goliaths. The discussion is then taken forward to examine whether similar tactics can work in relation to contemporary concerns with environmental vulnerability, with a focus on two other, small island states. Before that, the semiotics of ‘the small state’ need to be explored, since they are suggestive of the perceptions and expectations that are harboured by decision makers at home and abroad and which tend towards the self-fulfilling prophecy.peer-reviewe

The role of collective narcissism in populist attitudes and the collapse of democracy in Hungary

What are the psychological processes responsible for the recent spread of populist political systems and movements? All political systems essentially reflect the mental representations of their populations, and collective narcissism has recently emerged as a contributing factor in the rise of populism. This article presents two studies examining the role of collective narcissism in predicting populist attitudes and voting intentions in Hungary. Hungary offers a particularly important case study of state-sponsored populism and illiberalism in Europe, as this country has gone furthest in undermining democratic principles and practices within the EU. To establish the pervasive role of collective narcissism we first review the historical evidence, survey research, and narrative analyses of Hungarian political representations. We then present two empirical studies where we predicted and found that collective narcissism was a significant predictor of negative attitudes toward the EU (Study 1), conservatism, and support for the ruling populist party (Studies 1 and 2). Collective narcissism predicted these variables independently from other factors, such as in-group positivity or perceived relative deprivation. However, once conservatism was controlled for the effects of collective narcissism faded out in some cases. The results nevertheless indicate that collective narcissism plays important role in promoting populist politics. The implications of these findings for understanding the psychological appeal of populism and illiberalism are discussed