12,728 research outputs found

    Reynolds and Mach number simulation of Apollo and Gemini re-entry and comparison with flight

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    Reynolds and Mach numbers simulation of Apollo and Gemini reentry compared with flight dat

    A thermalized ion explosion model for high energy sputtering and track registration

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    A velocity spectrum of neutral sputtered particles as well as a low resolution mass spectrum of sputtered molecular ions was measured for 4.74 MeV F-19(+2) incident of UF4. The velocity spectrum is dramatically different from spectra taken with low energy (keV) bombarding ions, and is shown to be consistent with a hot plasma of atoms in thermal equilibrium inside the target. A thermalized ion explosion model is proposed for high energy sputtering which is expected to describe track formation in dielectric materials. The model is shown to be consistent with the observed total sputtering yield and the dependence of the yield on the primary ionization rate of the incident ion

    Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform

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    Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial to shareholders. This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and shareholder voting on the merger. If the supplemental disclosures produced by the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder voting behavior. Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect, “compelled” by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it. Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public company mergers from 2005-2012, we find no such effect. We find no significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting. These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law. Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class. In turn, this substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffs’ lawyers to an award of attorneys’ fees. Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit. As a result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public company merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a basis for attorney fee awards. Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak cases, but it would have an additional benefit. Current practice drags state court judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in connection with the approval of fee awards. We argue, instead, for a more efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness

    Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform

    Get PDF
    Shareholder litigation challenging corporate mergers is ubiquitous, with the likelihood of a shareholder suit exceeding 90%. The value of this litigation, however, is questionable. The vast majority of merger cases settle for nothing more than supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. The attorneys that bring these lawsuits are compensated for their efforts with a court-awarded fee. This leads critics to charge that merger litigation benefits only the lawyers who bring the claims, not the shareholders they represent. In response, defenders of merger litigation argue that the lawsuits serve a useful oversight function and that the improved disclosures that result are beneficial to shareholders. This Article offers a new approach to assessing the value of these claims by empirically testing the relationship between merger litigation and shareholder voting on the merger. If the supplemental disclosures produced by the settlement of merger litigation are valuable, they should affect shareholder voting behavior. Specifically, supplemental disclosures that are, in effect, “compelled” by settlement should produce new and unfavorable information about the merger and lead to a lower percentage of shares voted in favor of it. Applying this hypothesis to a hand-collected sample of 453 large public company mergers from 2005-2012, we find no such effect. We find no significant evidence that disclosure-only settlements affect shareholder voting. These findings warrant a reconsideration of Delaware merger law. Specifically, under current law, supplemental disclosures are viewed by courts as providing a substantial benefit to the shareholder class. In turn, this substantial benefit entitles the plaintiffs’ lawyers to an award of attorneys’ fees. Our evidence suggests that this legal analysis is misguided and that supplemental disclosures do not in fact constitute a substantial benefit. As a result, and in light of the substantial costs generated by public company merger litigation, we argue that courts should reject disclosure settlements as a basis for attorney fee awards. Our approach responds to critiques of merger litigation as excessive and frivolous by reducing the incentive for plaintiffs’ lawyers to bring weak cases, but it would have an additional benefit. Current practice drags state court judges into the task of indirectly promulgating disclosure standards in connection with the approval of fee awards. We argue, instead, for a more efficient specialization between state and federal courts in the regulation of mergers: public company merger disclosure should be policed by the federal securities laws while state corporate law focuses on substantive fairness

    Guidance and Control in a Josephson Charge Qubit

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    In this paper we propose a control strategy based on a classical guidance law and consider its use for an example system: a Josephson charge qubit. We demonstrate how the guidance law can be used to attain a desired qubit state using the standard qubit control fields.Comment: 9 pages, 5 figure

    Ion-beam-enhanced adhesion in the electronic stopping region

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    The use of ion beams in the electronic stopping region to improve the adhesion of insulators to other materials is described. In particular, the bonding of Au films to Teflon, ferrite, and SiO2 was improved by bombarding them with He and Cl, respectively. Improvements in bonding were also observed for Au on glass, Au and Cu on sapphire, and Si3N4 on Si. The mechanism is apparently associated with sputtering and track forming processes occurring in the electronic stopping region. Some applications are discussed

    Magnetic excitations in the spin-trimer compounds Ca3Cu3-xNix(PO4)4 (x=0,1,2)

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    Inelastic neutron scattering experiments were performed for the spin-trimer compounds Ca3Cu3-xNix(PO4)4 (x=0,1,2) in order to study the dynamic magnetic properties. The observed excitations can be associated with transitions between the low-lying electronic states of linear Cu-Cu-Cu, Cu-Cu-Ni, and Ni-Cu-Ni trimers which are the basic constituents of the title compounds. The exchange interactions within the trimers are well described by the Heisenberg model with dominant antiferromagnetic nearest-neighbor interactions J. For x=0 we find JCu-Cu=-4.74(2) meV which is enhanced for x=1 to JCu-Cu=-4.92(6) meV. For x=1 and x=2 we find JCu-Ni=-0.85(10) meV and an axial single-ion anisotropy parameter DNi=-0.7(1) meV. While the x=0 and x=1 compounds do not exhibit long-range magnetic ordering down to 1 K, the x=2 compound shows antiferromagnetic ordering below TN=20 K, which is compatible with the molecular-field parameter 0.63(12) meV derived by neutron spectroscopy.Comment: 22 pages (double spacing), 1 table, 9 figures, Submitted to Phys. Rev. B (2007
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