International Environmental Agreement: a Dynamic Model of Emissions Reduction

We model an International Environmental Agreement as a two stages game: during the first stage each country decides whether or not to join the agreement while, in the second stage, the quantity of emissions reduction is choosen. Players determine their abatement levels in a dynamic setting, given the dynamics of pollution stock and the strategies of other countries. Players may act cooperatively, building coalitions and acting according to the interest of the coalition, or they make their choices taking care of their individual interest only. Countries can behave myopically or in a farsighted way. As a consequence, the size of stable coalition can completely change. A continuous time framework is choosen in the present paper and consequently the problem is studied by a differential game.IEA, Differential games, Coalition stability.

Farsighted Stable Sets

A coalition is usually called stable if nobody has an immediate incentive to leave or to enter the coalition since he does not improve his payoff. This myopic behaviour does not consider further deviations which can take place after the first move. Chwe (1994) incorporated the idea of a farsighted behaviour in his definition of large consistent set (LCS). In some respects, we propose a different idea of dominance relation based on indirect dominance and on a different concept of belief on moving coalitions' behavior. A notion of stability for a coalitional game is introduced by taking into account the different degree of risk/safety of any player participating in a move. Some results about uncovered sets, internal stability are investigated. By exploiting our dominance and stability concepts, the prisoner's dilemma in coalitional form and its Nash equilibrium are studied. Some examples illustrating the differences between the largest consistent set, our stable set and stable set due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) are presented.

Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry

The paper deals with the imitation of fashion products, an issue that attracts considerable interest in practice. Copying of fashion originals is a major concern of designers and, in particular, their financial backers. Fashion firms are having a hard time fighting imitations, but legal sanctions are not easily implemented in this industry. We study an alternative strategy that has been used by designers. Instead of fighting the imitators in the courtroom, designers fight them in the market. The designer markets her products in separate markets, typically a high class market in which the products are sold in exclusive stores at high prices. Customers in this market seek exclusivity and their utility diminishes when seeing an increasing number of copies around. Their perception of the brand tend to dilute which poses a serious threat to a fashion company. The second market is a middle class market in which there are many more buyers, and the fashion firm competes directly with the imitators in this market. This market can be used to practise price discrimination, to sell off left-over inventories, and to get a spin-off from the design. The paper models the decision problems of the fashion firm and the imitators as a two-period game in which firms make pricing decisions and decisions on when to introduce their products in the markets. In addition, the fashion firm decides how much efforts to spend to increase its brand image in the two markets.

Optimal marketing decision in a duopoly: a stochastic approach

Let us consider two new perfect substitute durable products which are produced and sold in a market by two competing firms. Looking at a potential buyer, we build a stochastic rule by which she purchases the good from one of the two firms (so that she becomes an adopter). The model is considered discrete in time and space. The probability of transition from the non adopter state to the adopter one depends on an imitation mechanism (word-ofmouth) as well as on the pricing and advertising policies of the producers/sellers. It is assumed that only actual information about the market determine the evolution in the subsequent time step so that a Markov process arises. Both firms maximize their expected discounted profits by choosing optimal marketing strategies. Suitable equilibria are characterized and, because of the lack of convexity in the model, the simulated annealing algorithm is proposed to compute them.

Optimal Control Problems Arising In Marketing Models

The diffusion in time of a new product in a monopolistic or oligopolistic market can be described by a system of evolution equations (PDE, ODE, DDE) containing one or more control parameters (advertising, prices, plant locations, ...). The productors choose the control parameters in order to maximize their (discounted) prots. Hence an optimal control problems (in the case of a monopoly) or a dynamic game (in the case of an oligopoly) has to be solved. A specic model is proposed and an exhaustive description of its solution is given.

Cooperazione e competizione nello sfruttamento di una risorsa rinnovabile

In this paper we propose a static model describing the commercial exploitation of a common property renewable resource by a population of agents. Players can cooperate or compete; cooperators maximize the utility of their group while defectors maximize their own profit. Agents aren't assumed to be divided into the two groups from the beginning; by solving the static game we obtained the best response function of i-th player without making other agents positions. Then, the Nash equilibria we calculated point out how different strategies - all the players cooperate, all the players compete or players can be divided into cooperators and defectors - can coexist.Resource Exploitation, Game theory

Contextualized property market models vs. Generalized mass appraisals: An innovative approach

The present research takes into account the current and widespread need for rational valuation methodologies, able to correctly interpret the available market data. An innovative automated valuation model has been simultaneously implemented to three Italian study samples, each one constituted by two-hundred residential units sold in the years 2016-2017. The ability to generate a "unique" functional form for the three different territorial contexts considered, in which the relationships between the influencing factors and the selling prices are specified by different multiplicative coefficients that appropriately represent the market phenomena of each case study analyzed, is the main contribution of the proposed methodology. The method can provide support for private operators in the assessment of the territorial investment conveniences and for the public entities in the decisional phases regarding future tax and urban planning policies

Cultural and religious heritage enhancement initiatives: A logic-operative method for the verification of the financial feasibility

The relevance to develop effective interventions for the enhancement and reuse of the disused religious heritage is increasing. In the present research, a logic-operative method for the verification of the finan- cial feasibility of a redevelopment project is proposed. The articulation of the developed methodological approach into six steps is explained. Moreover, the defined method is applied to a functional reconversion project related to a former church located in the city of Bologna (Italy) and to be carried out through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) operational tool. In particular, the new intended use to be introduce in the religious building is identified consistently with the current needs of the communities and by exam- ining the reference market demand and supply at different scales (urban, regional and national), in order to define adequate uses able to respect the historical identity and past memories of the asset, to enhance its monumental forms and to become a significant new landmark for the territory. The outputs obtained from the implementation of the proposed method attest the feasibility of the initiative from the private investor point of view. In this sense, the method can constitute a useful tool for Public Administrations to define transformation sustainable strategies on the deconsecrated heritage

Redevelopment Initiatives on Brownfield Sites: An Evaluation Model for the Definition of Sustainable Investments

With reference to brownfield sites redevelopment interventions, an innovative model for the definition of effective and financially sustainable initiatives is proposed and tested. The model borrows the operative logic of the break-even analysis (BEA). It neglects the basic assumption of BEA related to revenue linearity, by considering the real trend of the revenues. In fact, in specific contexts characterized by a real estate over supply—e.g., in small urban centers, or where a new plan includes a relevant increase in new buildings and/or the functional reconversion of existing disused complexes—the BEA hypothesis on revenue linearity could be inconsistent, as prices will tend to become depressed. In the mentioned situations, discount mechanisms on the unit prices could occur. These phenomena determine a reduction in the unit selling price in correspondence of the amount of gross floor area (GFA) increase. Taking into account the current and cogent needs of effective strategies for brownfields renovation, the innovative evaluation model is developed for supporting public and private investors’ decision processes. It could represent a valid reference in the preliminary phases of decision-making processes for public and private subjects, able to ensure the break-even point of the initiative balance sheet is reached