546 research outputs found
An extension of the Antoci-Dei-Galeotti evolutionary model for environment protection through financial instruments.
This work moves from a recent paper by Antoci, Dei and Galeotti [1] where a dynamic model is proposed to describe an innovative method to improve environmental quality based on the exchange of financial activities, promoted by a Public Administration, between firms and tourists in a given region. We extend their analysis in two directions: we first perform a global analysis of the basins of attraction to check the stability extents of the coexisting stable attractors of the model, and we show that some undesirable and sub-optimal stable equilibria always exist, whose basins may be quite intermingled with those of the optimal equilibrium; then we introduce a structural change of the model by assuming that the Public Administration, besides its action as an intermediary between visitors and polluting firms, also performs a direct action for the pollution control. We show how the cost of this direct action of the Public Administration can be balanced by proper taxes and we prove that undesired equilibria can be ruled out by a suitable balance of financial instruments and direct actions of Public Administration for environmental remediation.Environmental economics, evolutionary dynamics, replicator equations, multistability, basins of attraction.
Walrasian versus Cournot behavior in an oligopoly of boundedly rational firms
An evolutionary oligopoly game, where firms can select between the best-reply rule and the Walrasian rule, is considered. The industry is characterized by a finite number of ex-ante homogeneous firms that, characterized by naïve expectations, decide next-period output by employing one of the two behavioral rules. The inverse demand function is linear and all firms have the same quadratic and convex cost function (decreasing return to scale). Based upon realized profits, the distribution of behavioral rules is updated according to a replicator dynamics. The model is characterized by two equilibria: the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, where all firms adopt the best-reply rule and produce the Cournot-Nash quantity, and the Walrasian equilibrium, where all firms adopt the Walrasian rule and produce the Walrasian quantity. The analysis reveals that the Walrasian equilibrium is globally stable as long as the rate of change of marginal cost exceeds the sum of residual market price sensitivities to output. If not, the Walrasian equilibrium loses stability and an attractor, representing complicated dynamics with evolutionary stable heterogeneity, arises through a bifurcation. As the propensity of firms to select the more profitable behavioral rule increases, the attractor disappears through a global bifurcation and the Cournot-Nash equilibrium can become a global Milnor attractor. To sum up, the best-reply rule can be evolutionary dominant over the Walrasian rule and this can lead an oligopoly to select the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
A piezoelectric based energy harvester with dynamic magnification: modelling, design and experimental assessment
This work presents a simple and innovative piezoelectric energy harvester, inspired by fractal geometry and intrinsically including dynamic magnification. Energy harvesting from ambient vibrations exploiting piezoelectric materials is an efficient solution for the development of self-sustainable electronic nodes. After an initial design step, the present work investigates the eigenfrequencies of the proposed harvester, both through a simple free vibration analysis model and through a computational modal analysis. The experimental validation performed on a prototype, confirms the accurate frequency response predicted by these models with five eigenfrequencies below 100 Hz. Despite the harvester has piezoelectric transducers only on a symmetric half of the top surface of the lamina, the rate of energy conversion is significant for all the investigated eigenfrequencies. Moreover, by adding a small ballast mass on the structure, it is possible to excite specific eigenfrequencies and thus improving the energy conversion
Ambiguity aversion as a route to randomness in a duopoly game
The global dynamics is investigated for a duopoly game where the perfect
foresight hypothesis is relaxed and firms are worst-case maximizers.
Overlooking the degree of product substitutability as well as the sensitivity
of price to quantity, the unique and globally stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium
of the complete-information duopoly game, loses stability when firms are not
aware if they are playing a duopoly game, as it is, or an oligopoly game with
more than two competitors. This finding resembles Theocharis' condition for the
stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in oligopolies without uncertainty.
As opposed to complete-information oligopoly games, coexisting attractors,
disconnected basins of attractions and chaotic dynamics emerge when the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium loses stability. This difference in the global
dynamics is due to the nonlinearities introduced by the worst-case approach to
uncertainty, which mirror in bimodal best-reply functions. Conducted with
techniques that require a symmetric setting of the game, the investigation of
the dynamics reveals that a chaotic regime prevents firms from being ambiguity
averse, that is, firms are worst-case maximizers only in the
quantity-expectation space. Therefore, chaotic dynamics are the result and at
the same time the source of profit uncertainty
Evolutionary competition between boundedly rational behavioral rules in oligopoly games
In this paper, we propose an evolutionary model of oligopoly competition where agents can select between different behavioral rules to make decisions on productions. We formalize the model as a general class of evolutionary oligopoly games and then we consider an example with two specific rules, namely Local Monopolistic Approximation and Gradient dynamics. We provide several results on the global dynamic properties of the model, showing that in some cases the attractor of the system may belong to an invariant plane where only one behavioral rule is adopted (monomorphic state). The attractors on the invariant planes can be either strong attractors or weak attractors. However, we also explain why the system can be in a state of Evolutionary Stable Heterogeneity, where it is more profitable for the agents to employ both heuristics in the long term (polymorphic state)
Computing the survival probability in the Madan-Unal credit risk model: application to the CDS market
We obtain a quasi-analytical approximation of the survival probability in the credit risk model proposed in [Madan, D.B. and Unal, H., Pricing the risk of default. Rev. Deriv. Res., 1998, 2(2), 121--160]. Such a formula, which extensive numerical simulations reveal to be accurate and computationally fast, can also be employed for pricing credit default swaps (CDSs). Specifically, we derive a quasi-analytical approximate expression for CDS par spreads, and we use it to estimate the parameters of the model. The results obtained show a rather satisfactory agreement between theoretical and real market data
MULTISPECIES EXPLOITATION WITH EVOLUTIONARY SWITCHING OF HARVESTING STRATEGIES
none3noIn this paper, we propose a bioeconomic model which describes a fishery in which each of two noninteracting species is harvested by a given group of fishers during a defined time period. Then the Fishing Regulatory Authority allows each fisher to reconsider the harvesting decision at fixed (discrete) periods of time. The model derives from an Italian fisheries management experience in the Northern Adriatic Sea, where this kind of self-adjusting fishing policy has been proposed to regulate harvesting of two shellfish species. The proposed dynamic model assumes the form of a hybrid system, as the natural growth functions of the two species (in continuous time) are coupled with a discrete time adaptive system that regulates how agents switch from one harvesting strategy to the other period by period according to an evolutionary mechanism based on profit comparison. In order to obtain some insights into the basic mechanisms of the system, some relevant benchmark cases are analyzed before tackling (mainly numerically) the complete hybrid model. Our results suggest that, for proper sets of parameters, this kind of myopic and adaptive self-regulation may ensure a virtuous trade-off between profit maximization and resource conservation, driven by cost externalities and market pressure.openG.I. Bischi; F. Lamantia; D. RadiBischi, GIAN ITALO; F., Lamantia; D., Rad
A prey-predator fishery model with endogenous switching of harvesting strategy
We propose a dynamic model to describe a fishery where both preys and predators are harvested by a population of fishermen who are allowed to catch only one of the two species at a time. According to the strategy currently employed by each agent, i.e. the harvested variety, at each time period the population of fishermen is partitioned into two groups, and an evolutionary mechanism regulates how agents dynamically switch from one strategy to the other in order to improve their profits. Among the various dynamic models proposed, the most realistic is a hybrid system formed by two ordinary differential equations, describing the dynamics of the interacting species under fishing pressure, and an impulsive variable that evolves in a discrete time scale, in order to describe the changes of the fraction of fishermen that harvest a given stock. The aim of the paper is to analyze the economic consequences of this kind of self-regulating fishery, as well as its biological sustainability, in comparison with other regulatory policies. Our analytic and numerical results give evidence that in some cases this kind of myopic, evolutionary self-regulation might ensure a satisfactory trade-off between profit maximization and resource conservation
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