A Methodology for Assessing National Sustainable Development Strategies

At the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, governments undertook to develop and adopt national sustainable development strategies as a key component of implementing the goals of Agenda 21. Only partial progress was reported at the 2002 World Summit in Johannesburg, with uncertainty as to the effectiveness of those strategies that had been introduced. This paper describes a methodology for assessing a country's progress in implementing a national sustainable development strategy for (NSDS) and for identifying potential areas for improvement. Five key principles of sustainable development and strategic planning are identified, and a set of assessment criteria are proposed for each principle. The results of applying the methodology in two Eastern European countries, Belarus and Slovakia, are reported. These case studies suggest that the proposed NSDS assessment methodology has considerable potential for strengthening sustainability planning at the national level. The effectiveness of the NSDS assessment methodology in strengthening national processes for sustainable development and strategic planning will also require greater transparency and accountability in governance practices. This suggests that progress in improving the quality of NSDS processes is likely to be conditional on broader considerations of institutional building and governance reform.sustainable development, strategic planning, national sustainable development strategies, transition countries, Environmental Economics and Policy, International Development,

Energy policy: Renewables targeted before Fukushima

Masahiro Sugiyama and colleagues write that Japan expanded the role of renewables after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident (Nature 531, 29–31; 2016). In fact, Japan's targets for renewables were essentially unaffected by the disaster — although the country did alter its nuclear plans. Japan's projected electricity mix for 2030 is set out in its Strategic Energy Plans. The 2014 plan (see go.nature.com/xnkn4k) aims to cut nuclear power's contribution to 20–22% by 2030, down from 53% in the 2010 plan (J. Duffield and B. Woodall Energy Policy 39, 3741–3749; 2011). Fossil fuels, not renewables, are set to make up the shortfall — with the projected contribution for 2030 up by 30% compared with the 2010 plan. Meanwhile, the 2014 plan's 23% contribution from renewables by 2030 is almost unchanged (21% in the 2010 plan). The authors rightly praise Japan's post-Fukushima attempt to expand solar power. For several decades, the country has developed this technology alongside nuclear power (R. Bointner Energy Policy 73, 733–747; 2014). Japanese companies such as Sharp, Sanyo and Kyocera pioneered solar energy, whereas Hitachi, Mitsubishi and Toshiba became leaders in nuclear power. It is good news for the global climate that these technologies can be developed alongside each other

Is China’s Outward Investment in Oil a Global Security Concern?

The dramatic increase in investment by Chinese SOEs in overseas oil assets is primarily driven by energy security concerns. Whether such investment will benefit or harm energy security of other countries is hotly contested. On one hand, this investment can supplement the overall lack of investment in the sector, benefiting all consumers. On the other hand, it may exacerbate environmental and political problems associated with fossil fuels

COVID-19 weakens both sides in the battle between coal and renewables

By disrupting investment, supply chains and technology diffusion, COVID-19 may harm renewables more than coal, but still weaken coal lock-in in developing countries. To enable new low-carbon energy choices, international flows of low-carbon technology and policy expertise must quickly re-emerge

The concept of energy security: Beyond the four As

AbstractEnergy security studies have expanded from their classic beginnings following the 1970s oil crises to encompass various energy sectors and increasingly diverse issues. This viewpoint contributes to the re-examination of the meaning of energy security that has accompanied this expansion. Our starting point is that energy security is an instance of security in general and thus any concept of it should address three questions: “Security for whom?”, “Security for which values?” and “Security from what threats?” We examine an influential approach – the ‘four As of energy security’ (availability, accessibility, affordability, and acceptability) and related literature of energy security – to show it does not address these questions. We subsequently summarize recent insights which propose a different concept of energy security as ‘low vulnerability of vital energy systems’. This approach opens the road for detailed exploration of vulnerabilities as a combination of exposure to risks and resilience and of the links between vital energy systems and critical social functions. The examination of energy security framed by this concept involves several scientific disciplines and provides a useful platform for scholarly analysis and policy learning

Energy security assessment framework and three case-studies

This chapter provides a novel framework for assessing energy security and illustrates its application by the Global Energy Assessment, the IEA Model for Short-term energy security and in several studies of long-term global energy security

Failing the formative phase: The global diffusion of nuclear power is limited by national markets

Understanding the role of technology characteristics and the context in the diffusion of new energy technologies is important for assessing feasibility of climate mitigation. We examine the historical adoption of nuclear power as a case of a complex large scale energy technology. We conduct an event history analysis of grid connections of first sizable commercial nuclear power reactors in 79 countries between 1950 and 2018. We show that the introduction of nuclear power can largely be explained by contextual variables such as the proximity of a country to a major technology supplier (‘ease of diffusion’), the size of the economy, electricity demand growth, and energy import dependence (‘market attractiveness’). The lack of nuclear newcomers in the early 1990s can be explained by the lack of countries with high growth in electricity demand and sufficient capacities to build their first nuclear power plant, either on their own or with international help. We also find that nuclear accidents, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, and the advances made in competing technologies played only a minor role in nuclear technology failing to be established in more countries. Our analysis improves understanding of the feasibility of introducing contested and expensive technologies in a heterogenous world with motivations and capacities that differ across countries and by a patchwork of international relations. While countries with high state capacity or support from a major technology supplier are capable of introducing large-scale technologies quickly, technology diffusion to other regions might undergo significant delays due to lower motivations and capacities

Coal phase-out pledges follow peak coal: evidence from 60 years of growth and decline in coal power capacity worldwide

Transitioning to net-zero carbon emissions requires phasing-out unabated coal power; however, recently it has only been declining in some countries, while it stagnated or even increased in others. Where and under what circumstances, has coal capacity reached its peak and begun to decline? We address this question with an empirical analysis of coal capacity in 56 countries, accounting for 99% of coal generation in the world. The peaks in national coal power have been equally spread per decade since 1970. The peaks are more likely to occur in country-years with high levels of electoral democracy, higher GDP per capita, slower electricity demand growth, and with low levels of political corruption. Normally, peaking coal power preceded rather than followed political coal phase-out pledges, often with long time lags. We conclude that though the cost of coal alternatives are declining and concerns over climate change increasing, coal power does not automatically peak even in situations with low demand growth, aging power plants and high import dependence. A quick and decisive destabilization of coal regimes requires, in addition, having sufficient economic capacities and strong democratic governance.publishedVersio