Learning the Right Lessons from Iraq

Foreign policy experts and policy analysts are misreading the lessons of Iraq. The emerging conventional wisdom holds that success could have been achieved in Iraq with more troops, more cooperation among U.S. government agencies, and better counterinsurgency doctrine. To analysts who share these views, Iraq is not an example of what not to do but of how not to do it. Their policy proposals aim to reform the national security bureaucracy so that we will get it right the next time. The near-consensus view is wrong and dangerous. What Iraq demonstrates is a need for a new national security strategy, not better tactics and tools to serve the current one. By insisting that Iraq was ours to remake were it not for the Bush administration's mismanagement, we ignore the limits on our power that the war exposes and in the process risk repeating our mistake. The popular contention that the Bush administration's failures and errors in judgment can be attributed to poor planning is also false. There was ample planning for the war, but it conflicted with the Bush administration's expectations. To the extent that planning failed, therefore, the lesson to draw is not that the United States national security establishment needs better planning, but that it needs better leaders. That problem is solved by elections, not bureaucratic tinkering. The military gives us the power to conquer foreign countries, but not the power to run them. Because there are few good reasons to take on missions meant to resuscitate failed governments, terrorism notwithstanding, the most important lesson from the war in Iraq should be a newfound appreciation for the limits of our power

A Computer-based Study of Mnemic Neglect

Mnemic neglect may be a form of attentional control which protects us from threatening criticism about our personalities. According to the model, positive feedback is recalled more easily than negative feedback when it is about the self. However, this is not the case when feedback is about other people. Mnemic neglect occurs even when people are told to simply imagine that the feedback is real. The reason for this is assumed to be that people spend relatively little time attending to or thinking about self-threatening feedback. The current study replicated the mnemic neglect effect but also directly measured how long people spent focusing on different kinds of feedback. A computer recorded the time spent reading behaviors and also administered mood measures to measure participants’ affect; however, neither of the measures yielded results that shed light on what mediates mnemic neglect

A Pacific Culture among Wild Baboons: Its Emergence and Transmission

Reports exist of transmission of culture in nonhuman primates. We examine this in a troop of savanna baboons studied since 1978. During the mid-1980s, half of the males died from tuberculosis; because of circumstances of the outbreak, it was more aggressive males who died, leaving a cohort of atypically unaggressive survivors. A decade later, these behavioral patterns persisted. Males leave their natal troops at adolescence; by the mid-1990s, no males remained who had resided in the troop a decade before. Thus, critically, the troop's unique culture was being adopted by new males joining the troop. We describe (a) features of this culture in the behavior of males, including high rates of grooming and affiliation with females and a “relaxed” dominance hierarchy; (b) physiological measures suggesting less stress among low-ranking males; (c) models explaining transmission of this culture; and (d) data testing these models, centered around treatment of transfer males by resident females

Assessing the effects of repeated handling on physiology and condition of semi-precocial nestlings

Repeated exposure to elevated levels of glucocorticoids during development can have long-term detrimental effects on survival and fitness, potentially associated with increased telomere attrition. Nestling birds are regularly handled for ecological research, yet few authors have considered the potential for handling-induced stress to influence hormonally-mediated phenotypic development or bias interpretations of subsequent focal measurements. We experimentally manipulated the handling experience of the semi-precocial nestlings of European Storm Petrel Hydrobates pelagicus to simulate handling in a typical field study and examined cumulative effects on physiology and condition in late postnatal development. Neither baseline corticosterone (the primary glucocorticoid in birds), telomere length nor body condition varied with the number of handling episodes. The absence of a response could be explained if Storm Petrels did not perceive handling to be stressful or if there is dissociation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis from stressful stimuli in early life. Eliciting a response to a stressor may be maladaptive for cavity-dwelling young that are unable to escape or defend themselves. Furthermore, avoiding elevated overall glucocorticoid exposure may be particularly important in a long-lived species, in which accelerated early-life telomere erosion could impact negatively upon longevity. We propose that the level of colony-wide disturbance induced by investigator handling of young could be important in underlining species-specific responses. Storm Petrel nestlings appear unresponsive to investigator handling within the limits of handling in a typical field study and handling at this level should not bias physiological and morphological measurements

Acquisition Reform

This report reviews the six most recent major acquisition reform reports, starting in 1949 with the Hoover Commissions and including McNamara's Total Package Procurement, Fitzhugh Commission, the Commission on Government Procurement,the Grace Commission, and ending with the Packard Commission report in 1986. The reports' recommendations are devided into six areas: centralized procurement, professionalization of the acquisition corps, management improvements, changes in contracting procedures, new development strategies, and legislative/executive relations.Lean Aerospace Initiativ

The effect of stress on the expression of the amyloid precursor protein in rat brain

AbstractThe abnormal processing of the amyloid precursor protein (APP) is a pivotal event in the development of the unique pathology that defines Alzheimer's disease (AD). Stress, and the associated increase in corticosteroids, appear to accelerate brain ageing and may increase vulnerability to Alzheimer's disease via altered APP processing. In this study, rats were repeatedly exposed to an unavoidable stressor, an open elevated platform. Previous studies in this laboratory have shown that a single exposure produces a marked increase in plasma corticosterone levels but animals develop tolerance to this effect between 10 and 20 daily sessions. Twenty-four hours after stress, there was an increase in the ratio of the deglycosylated form of APP in the particulate fraction of the brain, which subsequently habituated after 20 days. The levels of soluble APP (APPs) tended to be lower in the stress groups compared to controls except for a significant increase in the hippocampus after 20 days of platform exposure. Since APPs is reported to have neurotrophic properties, this increased release may represent a neuroprotective response to repeated stress. It is possible that the ability to mount this response decreases with age thus increasing the vulnerability to stress-induced AD-related pathology

Nohwere

Imagine the frustration of Samuel Butler’s protagonist, Higgs, with the strange society he encounters in Erewhon: Was there nothing which I could say to make them feel that the constitution of a person’s body was a thing over which he or she had had at any rate no initial control whatever, while the mind was a perfectly different thing, and capable of being created anew and directed according to the pleasure of its possessor? Could I never bring them to see that while habits of mind and character were entirely independent of initial mental force and early education, the body was so much a creature of parentage and circumstances, that no punishment for ill-health should be ever tolerated save as a protection from contagion, and that even where punishment was inevitable it should be attended with compassion? The Erewhonians had it all wrong, backward actually: they would criminally prosecute someone for the physical illnesses manifested, such as consumption, but would never prosecute those who made bad, immoral choices. And it would not matter that your ill-health was the product of a genetic weakness or malformation: It is all very well for you to say that you came of unhealthy parents, and had a severe accident in your childhood which permanently undermined your constitution; excuses such as these are the ordinary refuge of the criminal; but they cannot for one moment be listened to by the ear of justice. I am not here to enter upon curious metaphysical questions as to the origin of this or that—questions to which there would be no end were their introduction once tolerated, and which would result in throwing the only guilt on the tissues of the primordial cell, or on the elementary gases. Are the Erewhonians wrong? Are we? Or are we both wrong to imagine “fault” in the case of mechanical entities, like human agents? Higgs was certain that the Erewhonians failed to understand the nature of human agency, and we are compelled to wonder if they are right and it is we who are wrong. That is the challenge to which contemporary neuroscientific insights expose accepted normative systems, similar to our legal system (and even our moral responsibility system). We think the Erewhonians were wrong to impose criminal responsibility on those who were the victims of illness. The consumptive is not at fault in any way that could make sense if our object is to reduce the suffering illness causes. Indeed, criminalizing disease would actually exacerbate the problems illness presents. The costs incurred by doing so would increase the burden that illness imposes on society and would undermine human thriving. But we are also sure that contemporary legal and moral systems are just as wrong as the Erewhonian system. Extant legal doctrine and practices (civil as well as criminal) actually undermine human thriving: they are not merely a distraction; they are an impediment. Our normative systems conceive of law and morality as the Erewhonians understood physical disease—a product of sufficient choice to attach blame, fault, and concepts of desert. But on what basis do we draw the distinctions between physical and normative malady: Are not both just (generally) distinguishable manifestations of mechanical causes? If human agents are essentially mechanical entities, on what basis could we find a normative difference between, say, tuberculosis and selfishness or insufficient ability to feel compassion for others? In fact, if you are actually indifferent to the suffering of others, a typical psychopath, what could be the nonphysical cause of that indifference? Butler was prescient, and his Erewhon demonstrates an understanding of human agency that is precocious, anticipating what would only be revealed at the dawn of the Age of Realization: “Man, he said, was a machinate mammal.” All we are is mechanism, and that conclusion is not undermined in the least by the fact that we do not yet understand all that there is to understand about the mechanism. While it may not be possible for us to predict the next instant even were we to know all there is to know about the past and current instants, that does not undermine a mechanical conception of human agency, or of the universe for that matter. It is enough that we understand that mechanics capture well enough what we are at the level that matters to human thriving and the law, so we do not even need to know very much about quantum mechanics (though we need to know some relativity to understand GPS). At the level of acuity the law requires, it is enough that we appreciate the mechanical nature of human agency, for that is the level at which we can appreciate the immorality of basing normative systems, such as law, on ephemeral noninstrumental theory. Ours is an extreme position. Essentially, we are building on Francis Crick’s Astonishing Hypothesis and Bruce Waller’s arguments in Against Moral Responsibility. We are elaborating on Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen’s conclusion that “For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and Everything.” While we have reservations about what can be concluded about free will from Benjamin Libet’s science, we find much that makes good sense to us in Daniel Wegner’s and Leonard Mlodinow’s reservations about the substance of consciousness. Having located ourselves in the literature, starting with Butler, we explain what the law understands human agency to be and demonstrate why the law profoundly misunderstands matters. Butler challenged us to understand the difference between disease and choice. Common wisdom (the irony is intentional) understands those two phenomena to be diametric opposites. As a normative matter, disease is foisted upon you, choice is your own creation, the product of an uncaused cause. But if there are no uncaused causes, if, that is, we are not divine (because only the divine is an uncaused cause in a mechanical universe), there is no such thing as “choice.” And without choice there can be no moral responsibility—no blame, no desert, no retribution, and no punishment (strictly construed). So, there is much at stake in understanding law’s dependence on the insubstantial choice fiction and the mechanics that reveal that choice is a fiction. What we do in this Article is, first, demonstrate the law’s reliance on an inauthentic conception of human agency. We trace that fundamental misapprehension through the three primary areas of the law: contract, tort, and criminal law. In each area, the law reaches conclusions that actually undermine human thriving by relying on a misconception of what it means to be human. “Consent” does not mean what it needs to mean for the contract law to be coherent; “fault” is a distraction if the object of the tort law is, as it should be, to reduce the cost of accidents; and the criminal law, most obviously, fails if it is based, albeit obliquely, on conceptions of moral responsibility that lack a reality referent. The second part of the Article demonstrates why and how there is no room for choice for uncaused causes in the human saga. Any decision or event you can imagine has premises that trace from the instant before the apparent choice and the time immemorial leading up to that choice. We can no more choose to do something unconstrained by the forces that formed the current moment, including us and our place in the current moment, than we could choose to be ten feet tall or be a member of a different species. We are the culmination of forces over which we have nothing but the most ostensible “control.” That control is wholly ostensible because it only seems to be real. Now we recognize that “seeming” is quite convincing; it is all we know, really. The illusion is convincing because it is adaptive; it is much of the story of our social evolution. Proof of that is your inability to even imagine that you do not have free will, that your consciousness does not reveal to you all you need to know to make free choices. You may be able, at some level, to conceive of yourself as a wholly determined creature, but you could not maintain that mental posture for very long. You would slip back into a sense of willingness. While we assert that free will is a fiction and that choice is an illusion, we do not doubt that they are useful. Free will supports a moral responsibility system that has served our species well (enough) for quite some time. And it is helpful to be able to rely on the imposition of guilt and reward of praise to teach others (including one’s children, perhaps unwittingly) to behave in ways that will promote social success, social cohesion, and human thriving. Free will is helpful until it is not helpful. At some point, a point revealed in much of the extant law, conceptions of free will, conclusions premised on the reality of unfettered choice, will actually undermine human thriving, even though it might “feel good” in the instant. This Article is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. It is realistic. We imagine that as the science matures, the law’s incoherence will be manifest, and so will the incoherence of many of the institutions that are founded on an inauthentic understanding of human agency. When neuroscience tells us, more and more eloquently, what it means to be human, we shall appreciate, more and more fully, that the law errs in its assumptions about human agency and errs in ways that not only frustrate, but undermine, law’s object. Just as witch trials seem absurd to us today, many of contemporary law’s dictates will seem barbaric in the not-too-distant future. Prosecute those addicted to controlled substances on account of their consumption of the controlled substance? Wouldn’t that be like punishing someone for having a disease? Are we in Erewhon? Or our own Nohwere