Understanding the U.S. distribution of wealth

This article describes the current state of economic theory intended to explain the unequal distribution of wealth among U.S. households. The models reviewed are heterogeneous agent versions of standard neoclassical growth models with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. The models endogenously generate differences in asset holdings as a result of the household's desire to smooth consumption while earnings fluctuate. Both of the dominant types of models--dynastic and life cycle models--reproduce the U.S. wealth distribution poorly. The article describes several features recently proposed as additions to the theory based on changes in earnings, including business ownership, higher rates of return on high asset levels, random capital gains, government programs to guarantee a minimum level of consumption, and changes in health and marital status. None of these features has been fully analyzed yet, but they all seem to have potential to move the models in the right direction.Wealth

Accounting for the U.S. Earnings and Wealth Inequality

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Implementing the 35 Hour Workweek by Means of Overtime Taxation

In this paper we study the implications of taxing overtime work in order to reduce the workweek. To this purpose we study the roles played by team work, commuting costs and idiosyncratic output risk in determining the choice of the workweek. In order to obtain reliable estimates of the consequences of our policy experiment, we calibrate our model economy to the substitutability between overtime and employment using business cycle information. We find that a tax-rate of 12% of overtime wages implements the desired reduction of the workweek from 40 to 35 hours (12.5%). We also find that this tax change increases employment by 7% and reduces output and productivity by 10.2% and 4.2%, respectively. We also study a model economy with cross-sectional variations in the workweek that arise from plant-specific output risk and we find that in this model economy the tax-rates needed to achieve the same workweek reduction are significantly larger. Finally, we find that taxing overtime dampens business cycle fluctuations and that its welfare costs seem to be very largeWorkweek, Overtime, 35 Hours week, Labour Policy

Business Cycles and Household Formation: The Micro vs the Macro Labor Elasticity

We provide new evidence on the the cyclical behavior of household size in the United States from 1979 to 2010. During economic downturns, people live in larger households. This is mostly, but not entirely, driven by young people moving into or delaying departure from the parental home. We assess the importance of these cyclical movements for aggregate labor supply by building a model of endogenous household formation within a real business cycle structure. We use the model to measure how much more volatile are hours due to two mechanisms: (i) the presence of a large group of mostly young individuals with non-traditional living arrangements; and (ii) the possibility for these individuals to change their living situation in response to aggregate conditions. Our exercise assumes that older people living in stable households have a Frisch elasticity that is consistent with the micro evidence that is based on such people. The inclusion of people living in unstable households yields an implied aggregate, or macro, Frisch elasticity that is around 45% larger than the assumed micro elasticity.

Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the Trade-Offs of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in the U.S. Ohio

This papaer quantifies the steady-state aggregate, distributinal and mobility effects of switching the U.S. to a proportional income tax system. As a perriquisite to the analysi, we propose a theory of earnings and wealth inequality capable of accounting quantitatively for the key aggregate and inequality facts of the U. S. economy. This theory is based on saving to smooth uninsured household-specific risk, for dynastic households that also have some life-cycle characteristics. A suitable calibration of our model economy replicates the U.S. growth facts, earnings and wealth distributions, the progressivity of the tax system and the size of the U.S. government. We also solve a similar model economy in which the government livies a proportional income tax to finance the same flow of government expenditures and public transfers. Our finding show that in this class of model worlds a switch from the U.S. tax system to a proporcional tax system implies the following trade-offs, i.) it increases efficiency as measured by aggregate output by 4,4%, ii. ) it increases inequality as measured by the Gini index of the wealth distribution by 10.4%, and iv.) it changes by little the mobility between the different earnings and wealth groups

Habit formation: implications for the wealth distribution

In this paper we study the role of habit formation in shaping the wealth distribution in an otherwise standard heterogeneous agents model economy with idiosyncratic uncertainty. We compare the inplications for precautionary savings and for wealth concentration between economies that only differ in the role played by habit formation. Once preferences are properly adjusted so that the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substituion is the same in all model economies studied, we find that habit formation brings a hefty increase in precautionary savings and very mild reductions in the coefficient of variation and in the Gini index of wealth. We also find that the reductions in these measures of inequality also hold when we adjust our economy so that aggregate savings are the same as in the economy without habit formation. These findings hold for both persistent and non persistent habits although for the former the quantitative size of the effects is much larger. We conclude that habit formation, while being a mechanism that increases the amount of precautionary savings generated in a model, does not change the implications for wealth inequality that arise from standard models

A finite-life private-information theory of unsecured consumer debt

The authors present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Specifically, debtors signal their low-risk status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance terms. The authors explore two different mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Their theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer credit and auto insurance markets.

Unemployment spells and income distribution dynamics

In the U.S., during the 1948-86 period, an approximation to the Gini Index based on the quintiles and on the top 5% of the income distribution yielded a value of 0.351. Further, during this same period, the income share earned by the first quintile was procyclical and 7% more volatile than aggregate yearly output. In this paper we quantify the role played by unemployment spells in determining these and other related issues. To this purpose, we use an extension of the general equilibrium stochastic growth model that includes an endogenous distribution of households indexed by wealth and employment status. Our main findings are the following: i) in a model economy where all households have the same endowments of skills and are subject to the same employment processes, uninsured unemployment spells alone account for a very small share of the concentration of income observed in the U.S., and of the income distribution dynamics -the approximated Gini Index in this model economy is 18% of the one observed in the U.S., and the income share earned by the first quintile is 58% more volatile, ii) this result is robust to including a technology that allows for cyclically moving factor shares, and iii) in a model economy where households are partitioned into different skills groups that are subject to different employment processes in accordance to U.S. data, unemployment spells account for a significantly greater share of the U.S. statistics -the approximated Gini Index in this model economy is 70% of the one observed in the U.S., and the income share earned by the first quintile is 10% more volatile

Dimensions of inequality: facts on the U.S. distributions of earnings, income, and wealth

This article describes some facts about financial inequality in the United States that a good theory of inequality must be able to explain. These include the facts that labor earnings, income, and wealth are all unequally distributed among U.S. households, but the distributions are significantly different. Wealth is much more concentrated than the other two. Wealth is positively correlated with earnings and income, but not strongly. The movement of households up and down the economic scale is greater when measured by income than by earnings or wealth. Differences across the three variables remain when the data are disaggregated by age, employment status, educational level, and marital status of the heads of U.S. households. Each of these classifications also has significant differences across households. All the facts are based on data taken from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 1984–85 and 1989–90 Panel Study of Income Dynamics.Income distribution ; Wealth

On the Welfare Implications of Financial Globalization without Financial Development

It is widely argued that countries can reap large gains from liberalizing their capital accounts if financial globalization is accompanied by the development of domestic institutions and financial markets. However, if liberalization does not lead to financial development, globalization can result in adverse effects on social welfare and the distribution of wealth. We use a multi-country model with non-insurable idiosyncratic risk to show that, if countries differ in the degree of asset market incompleteness, financial globalization hurts the poor in countries with less developed financial markets. This is because in these countries liberalization leads to an increase in the cost of borrowing, which is harmful for those heavily leveraged, i.e. the poor. Quantitative analysis shows that the welfare effects are sizable and may justify policy intervention.