Why do Europeans Work so Little?

Market work per person is roughly 10 percent higher in the U.S. than in Sweden. However, if we include the work carried out in home production, the total amount of work only differs by 1 percent. I set up a model with home production, and show that differences in policy - mainly taxes – can account for the discrepancy in labor supply between Sweden and the U.S. Moreover, even though the elasticity of labor supply is rather low for individual households, labor taxes are estimated to be associated with considerable output losses. I also show that policy can account for the falling trend in market work in Sweden since 1960. The largest reduction occurs from 1960 until around 1980, both in the model and the data. After the early 1980s, the trends for both taxes and actual hours worked are basically flat. This is also true for hours worked in the model.Labor supply; Taxes; Home production

The Welfare Gains of Improving Risk Sharing in Social Security

This paper shows that improved intergenerational risk sharing in social security may imply very large welfare gains, amounting to up to 15 percent of the per-period consumption relative to the current U.S. consumption. Improved risk sharing raises welfare through a direct effect, i.e., by correcting an initially inefficient allocation of risk, and through a general equilibrium (GE) effect. The GE effect is due to the fact that the allocation of risk in the pay-as-you-go system influences the demand for capital. As a result, with an efficient risk sharing arrangement, the crowding out effect associated with an unfunded system can actually be completely eliminated. Efficient risk sharing in social security implies highly volatile and pro-cyclical benefits, i.e., that retirees' exposure to productivity risk is increased. Consequently, a policy involving completely safe benefits will unambiguously be welfare reducing.Social security; Risk sharing

Social Security and the Equity Premium Puzzle

This paper shows that social security may be an important factor in explaining the equity premium puzzle. In the absence of shortselling constraints, the young shortsell bonds to the middle-aged and buy equity. Social security reduces the bond demand of the middle-aged, thereby restricting the possibilities of the young to finance their equity purchases. They demand less equity and the return to equity goes up. Social security also increases the covariance between future consumption and the equity income of the young. The efect on the equity premium is substantial. In fact, a model with social security and borrowing constraints can generate a fairly realistic equity premium.Asset prices; the equity premium puzzle; social security

Analyzing the Social Structure and Dynamics of E-mail and Spam in Massive Backbone Internet Traffic

E-mail is probably the most popular application on the Internet, with everyday business and personal communications dependent on it. Spam or unsolicited e-mail has been estimated to cost businesses significant amounts of money. However, our understanding of the network-level behavior of legitimate e-mail traffic and how it differs from spam traffic is limited. In this study, we have passively captured SMTP packets from a 10 Gbit/s Internet backbone link to construct a social network of e-mail users based on their exchanged e-mails. The focus of this paper is on the graph metrics indicating various structural properties of e-mail networks and how they evolve over time. This study also looks into the differences in the structural and temporal characteristics of spam and non-spam networks. Our analysis on the collected data allows us to show several differences between the behavior of spam and legitimate e-mail traffic, which can help us to understand the behavior of spammers and give us the knowledge to statistically model spam traffic on the network-level in order to complement current spam detection techniques.Comment: 15 pages, 20 figures, technical repor

On the Possibility of Political Change – Outcomes in Between Local and Global Equilibria

We study voting over education subsidies where poor individuals may be excluded and the rich may chose private alternatives. With plausible changes of the standard game we show that this problem typically has multiple equilibria; one with low taxes, many excluded, and many in private schooling; another with high taxes, everyone in schooling, and few choosing the private alternative. Shifts between these equilibria can only happen through jumps in policy, not through gradual change. The method we develop identifies the global, as well as all local majority rule equilibria, and it characterizes "stability regions" around each local equilibrium. Introducing costs into the political system can make the local equilibria the globally stable outcome which, for example, implies that identical countries with different starting points could end up with completely different redistributive systems. Outcomes change in intuitive ways with the parameters and several insights with respect to the possibilities of political change seem general for problems of redistribution with excludability.political economy; political equilibrium; voting; redistribution; education subsidies; local equilibrium; non-median voter equilibrium

The origin of the core-level binding energy shifts in nanoclusters

We investigate the shifts of the core-level binding energies in small gold nanoclusters by using {\it ab initio} density functional theory calculations. The shift of the 4$f$ states is calculated for magic number nanoclusters in a wide range of sizes and morphologies. We find a non-monotonous behavior of the core-level shift in nanoclusters depending on the size. We demonstrate that there are three main contributions to the Au 4$f$ shifts, which depend sensitively on the interatomic distances, coordination and quantum confinement. They are identified and explained by the change of the on-site electrostatic potential.Comment: 7 pages, 9 figure

Seroprevalence and risk factors for Rift Valley fever and Capripoxvirus in small ruminants in the border region of Tanzania - Zambia

Tanzania is a country where poverty is still high and many households are dependent on agriculture to support their families. Small ruminants, such as sheep and goats, make up an important part of agriculture; they are cheap to buy and can easily be sold or exchanged for the farmers. The animals therefore function as a living bank and should unforeseen expenses arise, the money can be made available by selling an animal. This means that the health of these animals is important socio-economically for the farmers. Rift Valley fever (RVF) and sheep and goat pox (SGP) are two diseases that OIE have listed as notifiable. Rift Valley fever virus (RVFV) is an arbovirus transmitted by arthropod vectors such as mosquitoes. It is mainly infecting ruminants such as sheep, goats, cattle, buffaloes and camels, but is also a zoonotic disease and can infect humans. When domestic ruminants are infected, massive abortions can be seen in all stages in pregnant animals and a high fatality rate in young animals. Sheep and goat pox virus (SGPV) is a Capripoxvirus (CaPV) that belongs to Capripoxvirus genus. The virus is mainly transmitted through direct contact with infected animals, but indirect transmission through environment, or mechanical, through biting vectors, is also possible. Animals infected with SGPV show clinical signs of fever, loss of appetite, increased salivation and ocular and nasal discharge. After a few days, papules appear in the skin and on mucous membranes, even inside the body, which can cause serious and fatal complications. Young animals suffer more from the disease and the case fatality rate can be high. For farmers in rural communities, both diseases can have significant negative socioeconomic impact, due to the loss of production and animals. The gender-equality between men and women may also be affected since women often are the main caretaker of the livestock. This master thesis was performed as a Minor Field Study (MFS) that investigated the seroprevalence of RVF and SGP in Tanzania, in the two districts Momba and Tunduma close to the border of Zambia. The aim was to evaluate the seroprevalence in sheep and goats to understand the epidemiology of these diseases in the southwestern part of Tanzania and also investigate associated risk factors. Of the samples collected, 484 were from goats and 7 from sheep. Totally 16 of 491 analyzed samples were seropositive for RVFV, giving a seroprevalence of 3.3% on an individual level. All seropositive animals were goats, 93.8% females and 6.2% males. In total 31.7% (13/41) of the villages had seropositive animals, with a seroprevalence within the villages ranging up to 25%. The majority of the farmers reported that they utilized communal grazing system for their animals, where the majority of sheep and goats were reported to have daily contact with other domestic livestock. Only few sheep and goats had contact with wild ruminants. In this study, farmers buying their animals or had farmers in the same village buying their animals from markets, had significantly more seropositive animals In this study only a single animal was seropositive for CaPV, a female goat belonging to the Momba district

A Search for Appropriate Judicial Scrutiny - An analysis of the implications of the jurisprudence laid down by the CJEU regarding third party challenges to commitment decisions

As of 2004, with the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has been granted a possibility to substitute its infringement procedure in competition law enforcement, for a simplified commitment procedure. The major difference lies in that instead of having to conduct a thorough investigation into the behaviour of one or more undertakings, and follow this investigation with a finding of infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU and a possible fine, the Commission can now accept commitments from undertakings addressing its competition concerns. The Commission must only conduct a preliminary investigation, concluding that it intends to adopt an infringement decision in order for this option to become available, in accordance with Article 9 of the regulation. This essay aims to investigate the positive and negative aspects of the commitment procedure. A further aim is to analyse the possibilities for a third party of challenging a commitment decision. This possibility brings with it several positive outcomes as well as many possible detriments. On the positive side are aspects such as a greater efficiency in competition enforcement and a more effective use of the Commission’s resources – the Commission being the main enforcer of EU competition law. Another positive outcome is that this development was at large a codification something that was already occurring, however previously without any possibility of actually enforcing the offered commitments. The negative impacts of the procedure include a decline in legal certainty, and a lack of consideration for the interests of third parties, consumers as well as the public interest. Concerns have also been expressed regarding the possibility for the Commission to use the procedure as a way of regulating specific markets, and taking the adjudication on novel legal issues into its own hands. 1 Especially after the CJEU developing some jurisprudence there are concerns relating to an overuse of the procedure, and that the procedure will be used as a loophole for the Commission in order to escape judicial review. In cases Commission v Alrosa and Morningstar v Commission, the CJEU has granted the Commission a vast degree of discretion as to what commitments it may accept, limiting its own scope for judicial review drastically compared to in infringement decisions. The two rulings are the only cases where the EU Courts have ruled on the validity of a commitment decision, and in both cases the appeal before the Court came from a third party applicant. Research shows that an undertaking subject to a commitment decision has never brought an action for appeal. In Alrosa the applicant, with the same name, was a business partner to the undertaking which has offered commitments to the Commission. Alrosa considered the commitments to be disproportionate in that they were too onerous. In Morningstar the applicant was a competitor of the view that the commitments were not enough to address the competition concerns expressed by the Commission. Both cases were ruled in favour of the Commission, and in my opinion the message is quite clear: the current legal situation does not seem to provide third parties with any real possibilities of challenging commitment decisions. As it seems third parties are the only actual parties currently submitting appeals to commitment decision, the limiting of their doing so may mean limiting the real possibility for judicial review of commitment decisions. The current legal situation does in my view not offer an appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of commitment decisions.Sedan 2004, när förordning 1/2003 trädde ikraft, har kommissionen givits en möjlighet att ersätta sitt förfarande för överträdelsebeslut inom tillämpningen av konkurrensrätt, med ett förenklat förfarande där specifika åtaganden görs bindande gentemot företag. Den huvudsakliga skillnaden ligger i att istället för att behöva genomföra en grundlig utredning gällande ett eller flera företags ageranden, och därefter fatta ett beslut om överträdelse av antingen Artikel 101 eller 102 FEUF, ofta inkluderande en bot, kan kommissionen nu godta åtaganden från de berörda företagen vilka har som syfte att undanröja kommissionens betänkligheter. Kommissionen behöver enbart göra en preliminär bedömning, och med bakgrund i denna avse att fatta ett beslut om att en överträdelse ska upphöra för att detta alternativ ska bli tillgängligt, i enlighet med artikel 9 i förordningen. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka de positiva och negativa aspekterna av åtagandeförfarandet. Ett ytterligare syfte är att analysera möjligheterna för tredje parter att utmana ett kommissionsbeslut som gör sådana åtaganden bindande. Möjligheten stadgad i artikel 9 bär med sig såväl ett antal positiva konsekvenser, som flertalet negativa sådana. På den positiva sidan finns aspekter såsom en ökad effektivitet i tillämpningen av konkurrensrätten samt en nyttigare användning av kommissionens resurser – då kommissionen har rollen som den huvudsaklige tillämparen av EUs konkurrensrätt. Ytterligare en behållning är att utvecklingen av ett formellt åtagandeförfarande i stort egentligen var en kodifiering av vad som redan pågick, dock tidigare utan praktiskt möjlighet att göra åtaganden formellt bindande gentemot de berörda företagen och därmed hålla dem till dessa. De negativa inverkningarna av förfarandet innefattar ett avtagande i rättssäkerheten, och en brist på hänsyn gentemot tredje parters intressen, konsumenters intressen och det allmänna intresset. Bekymmer har även uttryckts vad gäller möjligheten för kommissionen att använda åtagandeförfarandet som ett sätt att reglera 3 specifika marknader och sektorer, och därmed ta prövningen av nya rättsliga frågor och dilemman i sina egna händer. Särskilt sedan EU-domstolen utvecklat praxis på området råder betänkligheter kring en överanvändning av förfarandet, samt att förfarandet kan komma att användas som ett kryphål för kommissionen för att slippa undan domstolsgranskning. I fallen Kommissionen mot Alrosa och Morningstar mot kommissionen har EU-domstolens båda instanser givit kommissionen ett omfattande utrymme för skönsmässig bedömning gällande vilka åtagande den är villig att acceptera, Därmed begränsas domstolens eget utrymme för granskning drastiskt jämfört med för överträdelsebeslut. De två rättsfallen är de enda där EU-domstolen har beslutat om giltigheten för ett åtagandebeslut, och i båda fallen kom överklagandet från en tredje part. Undersökningar visar att ett företag som själv är föremål för ett åtagandebeslut aldrig har begärt överprövning av kommissionens beslut. I Alrosa kom begäran från en affärspartner till det företag som hade erbjudit kommissionen åtaganden. Den sökande ansåg att åtagandena var oproportionerliga i det att de var alltför långtgående. I Morningstar var den sökande en konkurrent, med synen att åtaganden inte var tillräckliga för att undanröja kommissionens konkurrensrättsliga betänkligheter. Båda fallen blev beslutade till förmån för kommissionen, och i min mening är budskapet relativt tydligt: det gällande rättsläget verka inte erbjuda tredje parter några reella möjligheter att överklaga kommissionsbeslut som gör åtagande bindande. Då det verkar som att tredje parter är de enda som faktiskt söker överprövning gentemot sådana beslut, kan en begräsning såsom denna innebära en begräsning av den faktiska möjligheten för granskning av åtagandebeslut. Det rådandet rättsläget erbjuder i min åsikt inte tillräckliga möjligheter för rättslig granskning av åtagandebeslut

Who can compete? Analysing the concept of potential competition in reverse patent settlements

After the General Court’s (GC) decision in case T-472/13 H. Lundbeck A/S and Lundbeck Ltd v Commission it seems the concept of potential competition in the context of so-called ‘pay-for-delay’ agreements, or reverse patent settlements, might have been altered; that the bar in order for an undertaking to qualify as a potential competitor might have been lowered. This thesis aims to examine whether this is true, and if so to what extent. Starting with an introduction to competition law and the concept of patent settlements, followed by a description of the specifics of Article 101 TFEU, and the relationship between competition law and intellectual property rights, this essay aims to provide enough knowledge that the reader will have no trouble following the analysis of the case and its potential implications. In 2010, the Commission launched formal proceedings against Lundbeck, a Danish pharmaceutical company, which in 2002 and 2003 had entered into agreements with four generic pharmaceutical undertakings concerning the anti-depressant citalopram. The four companies undertook to not enter the market with generic versions of citalopram for a certain period of time. In exchange, Lundbeck paid each sums which largely corresponded to the profits that the generic firms expected to make had they entered the market, or to the damages they would have obtained if they had been successful in litigation against Lundbeck. The agreements were all separately found, by the Commission and later also the GC, to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object as they restricted potential competition. At time the agreements were concluded Lundbeck’s original compound patents had expired, however they still held a number of process patents. Had any of the four generic undertakings chosen to enter the market they might have done so at risk of infringing one of Lundbeck’s patents. The Commission and the GC however still regarded the four companies to be potential competitors to Lundbeck, thus paying them to stay off the market was a restriction on competition. Comparing the ruling in Lundbeck to previous case-law dealing with the concept of potential competition, and relying on comments and opinions by legal scholars and practitioners the analysis centres around whether the GC did right in defining potential competition as it did, and what the implications of the case might be in that regard. Many questions remain without answer in the GC’s judgement, hopefully clarification will be provided for when the European Court of Justice reviews the case, which is currently under appeal