43 research outputs found
A Practical and Theoretical Approach to Social Venturing Entrepreneurship
Research in social venturing entrepreneurship promoted by Professor Gert Van Dijk is gaining ground. The concept of social venturing entrepreneurship is not new. It is rooted in entrepreneurship as described by classical authors like Von Mises, Kirzner, Schumpter Knight and social reformer like Raiffeisen. It is anchored in new institutional and behavioral economics and exit strategy theory. A social venturing entrepreneur is a creator of effective social change in the context of economic, social and political conditions. Social venturing entrepreneur masters the skills of networking and lobbying. A social venturing entrepreneur is recognized by the social venturing and co-operative entrepreneurship business model they employ to execute their teleology. Social venturing entrepreneurship has advantages above conventional entrepreneurship as it has reintroduced the concept as entrepreneurship as a calling. They aim to empower the stakeholders for whom they setup the social venture and exit when the stakeholders are able to self-manage the enterprise. This chapter explains the commonly used concepts, ontologies, the social venturing entrepreneurâs social venturing and co-operative business model, the economic theories and conceptual framework and practical application from appreciative inquiry point of view
Arrow's theorem for weak orders
We characterize binary decision rules which are independent and strongly paretian,or independent and almost strongly paretian when the individual preferences and the collective preference are weak orders.Binary decision rule, lexicographic dictatorship
Preference aggregation, collective choice and generalized binary constitutions
The aim of this paper is to study the notion of Generalized Binary Constitution (GBC), a distribution of power due to Ferejohn and Fishburn (1979), which generalizes some classical notions such as simple games and voting games. The GBC helps us to define a preference aggregation rule (PAR) and we characterize GBC's whose collective preferences are either complete, asymmetric, transitive or acyclic when individual preferences are weak orders or linear orders. Since the procedure of aggregation of preferences which satisfies IIA is equivalent to the preference aggregation rule of a GBC, we give relations between our results and some Arrovian results. We also characterize core-stable GBC's and therefore deduce classical results and in particular Nakamura's theorem for simple games.Ce papier, intitulĂ© agrĂ©gation des prĂ©fĂ©rences, choix collectif et constitutions gĂ©nĂ©ralisĂ©es binaires, a pour objectif l'Ă©tude de la notion de constitution gĂ©nĂ©ralisĂ©e binaire (CGB), distribution de pouvoir dĂ©finie par Ferejohn et Fishburn (1979) qui gĂ©nĂ©ralise les notions de jeux simples et de jeux de vote. Une CGB permet de dĂ©finir une procĂ©dure d'agrĂ©gation des prĂ©fĂ©rences (PAP) et nous caractĂ©risons les CGB pour lesquels les PAP associĂ©es conduisent Ă des prĂ©fĂ©rences collectives qui sont toujours soit complĂštes, soit asymĂ©triques, soit transitives, soit acycliques lorsque les prĂ©fĂ©rences individuelles ont des prĂ©ordres ou des ordres totaux. Les PAP associĂ©es Ă des CGB Ă©tant Ă©quivalentes aux procĂ©dures d'agrĂ©gation des prĂ©fĂ©rences vĂ© l'indĂ©pendance vis-Ă -vis des alternatives extĂ©rieures, nous faisons un tour d'horizon de quelques rĂ©sultats arrowiens. Sous les mĂȘmes hypothĂšses de prĂ©fĂ©rences individuelles, nous caractĂ©risons les CGB dont le coeur est non vide et obtenons les rĂ©sultats classiques dont le thĂ©orĂšme de Nakamura sur les jeux simples
Pouvoir mesuré et capacité d'un électeur à influencer le résultat du vote
We study the power relation â„ P. This binary relation on the set of voters was used in [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] to show that the Taylorâs influence relation â„ T appraises the voterâs capacity of influencing the voting outcome when individual preference relations are linear orders, if the classical dominance stands for the social outcome and the Kendalâs distance is the means of measuring a voterâs dissatisfaction. In this paper, the definition of â„P is extended in two directions: on the one hand, dissatisfaction is measured by any distance (apart from the Kendalâs distance), and on the other hand, the domain of individual preference relations has no restriction (it may contain complete weak orders apart from complete linear orders). The above mentioned result on â„ T now being at times wrong, we come out with a sufficient condition under which â„ T actually appraises the voterâs capacity of influencing the voting outcome. Moreover we succeed, thanks to this highly unifying condition, in generalizing all the other results of [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000].Nous Ă©tudions ce que nous appelons la relation de puissance. Cette relation binaire, dĂ©finie sur lâensemble des Ă©lecteurs dâun jeu de vote, a permis dans [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000] de montrer que la relation dâinfluence de Taylor traduit la capacitĂ© du votant Ă influencer le rĂ©sultat du vote, lorsque les prĂ©fĂ©rences individuelles sont des ordres totaux, le rĂ©sultat du vote Ă©tant reprĂ©sentĂ© par la dominance classique et lâinsatisfaction du votant mesurĂ©e au moyen de la distance de la diffĂ©rence symĂ©trique. Dans cet article, la dĂ©finition de la relation de puissance est gĂ©nĂ©ralisĂ©e dans deux directions : dâune part, lâinsatisfaction est mesurĂ©e Ă lâaide dâune distance quelconque (au lieu de la distance de la diffĂ©rence symĂ©trique), et dâautre part, le domaine de prĂ©fĂ©rences individuelles est maintenant quelconque (et peut ĂȘtre constituĂ© de prĂ©ordres totaux au lieu dâordres totaux). Le rĂ©sultat suscitĂ© sur la relation d'influence de Taylor Ă©tant alors parfois faux, nous obtenons une condition pour que la relation d'influence de Taylor traduise la capacitĂ© du votant Ă influencer le rĂ©sultat du vote. En outre, nous parvenons, grĂące Ă cette condition suffisamment unificatrice, Ă gĂ©nĂ©raliser les autres rĂ©sultats obtenus dans [Diffo Lambo, Moulen, 2000]
Nature and statistics of majority rankings in a dynamical model of preference aggregation
We present numerical results on a complex dynamical model for the aggregation
of many individual rankings of S alternatives by the pairwise majority rule
under a deliberative scenario. Agents are assumed to interact when the Kemeny
distance between their rankings is smaller than a range R. The main object of
interest is the probability that the aggregate (social) ranking is transitive
as a function of the interaction range. This quantity is known to decay fast as
S increases in the non-interacting case. Here we find that when S>4 such a
probability attains a sharp maximum when the interaction range is sufficiently
large, in which case it significantly exceeds the corresponding value for a
non-interacting system. Furthermore, the situation improves upon increasing S.
A possible microscopic mechanism leading to this counterintuitive result is
proposed and investigated.Comment: 11 page
Ondernemingsrecht
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