Assessing relevance

This paper advances an approach to relevance grounded on patterns of material inference called argumentation schemes, which can account for the reconstruction and the evaluation of relevance relations. In order to account for relevance in different types of dialogical contexts, pursuing also non-cognitive goals, and measuring the scalar strength of relevance, communicative acts are conceived as dialogue moves, whose coherence with the previous ones or the context is represented as the conclusion of steps of material inferences. Such inferences are described using argumentation schemes and are evaluated by considering 1) their defeasibility, and 2) the acceptability of the implicit premises on which they are based. The assessment of both the relevance of an utterance and the strength thereof depends on the evaluation of three interrelated factors: 1) number of inferential steps required; 2) the types of argumentation schemes involved; and 3) the implicit premises required

The Dimensions of Argumentative Texts and Their Assessment

The definition and the assessment of the quality of argumentative texts has become an increasingly crucial issue in education, classroom discourse, and argumentation theory. The different methods developed and used in the literature are all characterized by specific perspectives that fail to capture the complexity of the subject matter, which remains ill-defined and not systematically investigated. This paper addresses this problem by building on the four main dimensions of argument quality resulting from the definition of argument and the literature in classroom discourse: dialogicity, accountability, relevance, and textuality (DART). We use and develop the insights from the literature in education and argumentation by integrating the frameworks that capture both the textual and the argumentative nature of argumentative texts. This theoretical background will be used to propose a method for translating the DART dimensions into specific and clear proxies and evaluation criteria

What we hide in words: Value-based reasoning and emotive language

There are emotively powerful words that can modify our judgment, arouse our emotions and influence our decisions. This paper shows how the use of emotive meaning in argumentation can be explained by showing how their logical dimension, which can be analysed using argumentation schemes, combines with heuristic processes triggered by emotions. Arguing with emotive words is shown to use value-based practical reasoning grounded on hierarchies of values and maxims of experience for evaluative classification

Coding relevance

UID/FIL/00183/2019Relevance is one of the crucial criteria for assessing the quality of argumentation in education. In argumentation and education, relevance has never been analyzed or coded. While several theories have included in their analysis some indicators of cohesion or clarity, this characteristic of dialogue and discourse has never been addressed as a distinct phenomenon. This paper builds on the existing studies in linguistic and philosophy to advance criteria for assessing relevance, which in turn can be used for developing a coding scheme for evaluating dialogue moves. Relevance is analyzed starting from the pragmatic principle that dialogue moves are instruments for pursuing a common dialogical goal. Starting from a classification of the possible types of dialogue moves, defined based on the possible dialogue that they propose or continue, five criteria of relevance are illustrated, capturing both pragmatic and topical coherence. Such criteria are shown to provide guidance for distinguishing not only relevant from irrelevant moves, but also the degrees of strength of relevance. The theoretical framework and the assessment criteria will be illustrated through a corpus of classroom interactions collected in Portuguese middle-grade schools.publishersversionepub_ahead_of_prin

A coded dataset

PTDC/FER‐FIL/28278/2017 UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020This coded database presents a corpus of argumentative tweets published by four politicians (Matteo Salvini, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Joe Biden) within 6 months from their taking office, which corresponds to the official end of their election campaign. The coding is based on a threefold method of analysis based on the instruments of argumentation theory and pragmatics. First, the types of arguments are recognized and classified according to a systematic organization of the argumentation schemes developed in the literature. Second, arguments are evaluated considering the fallacies committed. Third, the uses and misuses of “emotive words” are assessed. Based on this theoretical framework, each tweet is thus attributed three categories of codes: 1) argument types (maximum two, corresponding to the most important ones); 2) fallacies (maximum two types of fallacies, plus a distinct indication of the lack of necessary evidence or false presupposition); and 3) emotive language (maximum three emotive words, plus the most important emotion expressed). A total of 2657 tweets are coded, providing a ground for comparative works and an instrument for training further coding of different corpora.publishersversionpublishe

Dialectical and heuristic arguments: presumptions and burden of proof.

Presumption is a complex concept in law, affecting the dialogue setting. However, it is not clear how presumptions work in everyday argumentation, in which the concept of “plausible argumentation” seems to encompass all kinds of inferences. By analyzing the legal notion of presumption, it appears that this type of reasoning combines argument schemes with reasoning from ignorance. Presumptive reasoning can be considered a particular form of reasoning, which needs positive or negative evidence to carry a probative weight on the conclusion. For this reason, presumptions shift the burden of providing evidence or explanations onto the interlocutor. The latter can provide new information or fail to do so: whereas in the first case the new information rebuts the presumption, in the second case, the absence of information that the interlocutor could reasonably provide strengthen the conclusion of the presumptive reasoning. In both cases the result of the presumption is to strengthen the conclusion of the reasoning from lack of evidence. As shown in the legal cases, the effect of presumption is to shift the burden of proof to the interlocutor; however, the shift a presumption effects is only the shift of the evidential burden, or the burden of completing the incomplete knowledge from which the conclusion was drawn. The burden of persuasion remains on the proponent of the presumption. On the contrary, reasoning from definition in law is a conclusive proof, and shifts to the other party the burden to prove the contrary. This crucial difference can be applied to everyday argumentation: natural arguments can be divided into dialectical and presumptive arguments, leading to conclusions materially different in strength

From Guangdong to Brazil: Itineraries of a sino-mozambican community

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Enrichments and Their Use for Manipulating Commitments

PTDC/FER-FIL/28278/2017 EXPL/FER-FIL/0276/2021 UIDB/00183/2020 UIDP/00183/2020The fallacy of ignoring qualifications, or secundum quid et simpliciter, is a deceptive strategy that is pervasive in argumentative dialogues, discourses, and discussions. It consists in misrepresenting an utterance so that its meaning is broadened, narrowed, or simply modified to pursue different goals, such as drawing a specific conclusion, attacking the interlocutor, or generating humorous reactions. The “secundum quid” was described by Aristotle as an interpretative manipulative strategy, based on the contrast between the “proper” sense of a statement and its meaning taken absolutely or in a certain respect. However, how can an “unqualified” statement have a proper meaning different from the qualified one, and vice versa? This “linguistic” fallacy brings to light a complex relationship between pragmatics, argumentation, and interpretation. The secundum quid is described in this paper as a manipulative argument, whose deceptive effect lies in its pragmatic dimension. This fallacy is analyzed as a strategy of decontextualization lying at the interface between pragmatics and argumentation and consisting of the unwarranted passage from an utterance to its semantic representation. By ignoring the available evidence and the presumptive interpretation of a statement, the speaker places it in a different context or suppresses textual and contextual evidence to infer a specific meaning different from the presumable one.publishersversionpublishe

Commentary on: Jan Albert van Laar\u27s Criticism in need of clarification

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