Quantum Game Theory

Quantum game theory is the study of strategic behavior by agents with access to quantum technology. Broadly speaking, this technology can be employed in either of two ways: As part of a randomization device or as part of a communications protocol. We survey some of the main ideas from both branches of the subject

Nash Equilibria in Quantum Games

When the players in a game G can communicate with a referee via quantum technology (e.g. by sending emails composed on a quantum computer), their strategy sets naturally expand to include quantum superpositions of pure strategies. These superpositions lead to probability distributions among payoffs that would be impossible if players were restricted to classical mixed strategies. Thus the game G is replaced by a much larger “quantum game” GQ. When G is a 2 x 2 game, the strategy spaces of GQ are copies of the threedimensional sphere S3; therefore a mixed strategy is an arbitrary probability distribution on S3. These strategy spaces are so large that Nash equilibria can be difficult to compute or even to describe. The present paper largely overcomes this difficulty by classifying all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in games of the form GQ. One result is that we can confine our attention to probability distributions supported on at most four points of S3; another is that these points must lie in one of several very restrictive geometric configurations. A stand-alone Appendix summarizes the relevant background from quantum mechanics and quantum game theory.

Measurement of determinants of health in elementry school children

Study setting : Maliseet First Nation community on the banks of the Saint John River (New Brunswick).In an attempt to ascertain the health status of a cohort of elementary school children a determinant of health study was undertaken from October 2004 to June 2005. It was hoped that by knowing the current health status of the children it would provide a lens for the researcher to assess the potential future development of chronic diseases of this group. Under the premise that the development of healthy lifestyle practices early in childhood decreases the risk of future development of chronic diseases, the primary purpose of this study was to measure the health status of this cohort of elementary school children, to determine the prevalence of risk factors associated with the future development of chronic diseases

Proof-of-Burn

Proof-of-burn has been used as a mechanism to destroy cryptocurrency in a verifiable manner. Despite its well known use, the mechanism has not been previously formally studied as a primitive. In this paper, we put forth the first cryptographic definition of what a proof-of-burn protocol is. It consists of two functions: First, a function which generates a cryptocurrency address. When a user sends money to this address, the money is irrevocably destroyed. Second, a verification function which checks that an address is really unspendable. We propose the following properties for burn protocols. Unspendability, which mandates that an address which verifies correctly as a burn address cannot be used for spending; binding, which allows associating metadata with a particular burn; and uncensorability, which mandates that a burn address is indistinguishable from a regular cryptocurrency address. Our definition captures all previously known proof-of-burn protocols. Next, we design a novel construction for burning which is simple and flexible, making it compatible with all existing popular cryptocurrencies. We prove our scheme is secure in the Random Oracle model. We explore the application of destroying value in a legacy cryptocurrency to bootstrap a new one. The user burns coins in the source blockchain and subsequently creates a proof-of-burn, a short string proving that the burn took place, which she then submits to the destination blockchain to be rewarded with a corresponding amount. The user can use a standard wallet to conduct the burn without requiring specialized software, making our scheme user friendly. We propose burn verification mechanisms with different security guarantees, noting that the target blockchain miners do not necessarily need to monitor the source blockchain. Finally, we implement the verification of Bitcoin burns as an Ethereum smart contract and experimentally measure that the gas costs needed for verification are as low as standard Bitcoin transaction fees, illustrating that our scheme is practical

The Positive Economics of Methodology

Does an observation constitute stronger evidence for a theory if it was made after rather than before the theory was formulated, when it may have influenced the theory's construction? Philosophers have discussed this question (of "novel confirmation") but have lacked a formal model of scientific research and incentives. The question applies to all types of research. One example in economics involves evaluating models constructed on the basis of VARs (where a researcher looks at evidence and then constructs a theory) versus structural models with formal econometric tests (where a model is constructed before some of the evidence on it is obtained). This paper develops a simple model of scientific research. It discusses the issues that affect the answer to this question of the timing and theory-construction and observation or experimentation. We also address issues of social versus private incentives in the choice of research strategies, and of socially optimal rewards for researchers in the presence of information and incentive constraints.

Dose Finding Study To Assess Safety, Pk And Efficacy Of Fimepinostat (Cudc‐907) With Venetoclax Or Rituximab Plus Bendamustine In Patients With Relapsed/Refractory Lymphoma

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149554/1/hon9_2632.pd

Doves and hawks in economics revisited. An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises

The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree of aggressive behaviour remains within a given population of agents. However, as the consequences of the financial crisis exhibit, it would be desirable to change the 'rules of the game' in a way that prevents the occurrence of any aggressive behaviour and thereby also the danger of market crashes. The paper picks up this aspect. Through the extension of the in literature well-known Hawk-Dove game by a quantum approach, we can show that dependent on entanglement, also evolutionary stable strategies can emerge, which are not predicted by classical evolutionary game theory and where the total economic population uses a non aggressive quantum strategy