23 research outputs found
From Parmenidean Identity to Beyond Classical Idealism and Epistemic Constructivism
Rockmoreβs paper offers a nice discussion on how classical German idealism provides a plausible account of the Parmenidean insight that thought and being are identical and suggests that idealist epistemic constructivism is arguably the most promising approach to cognition. In this short commentary, I will explore the implications of adopting other interpretations of Parmenidean identity thesis, which arguably lead to different conclusions than the ones drawn by Rockmore. En route to disavow the distinction between ontology and epistemology, I argue that one may adopt an approach on cognition which would be immunized to worries that prompt Rockmoreβs elaboration and also embrace (at least) some of its benefits
Higgs boson and the Cosmos: A philosophical reappraisal of the authoritative Catholic and Greek-Orthodox perspectives
The theoretical prediction of Higgs boson was arguably one of the most important contributions in particle physics in the 20th century, with significant implications for modern cosmology. Its reported discovery in 2012 was celebrated as one of the most significant scientific achievements of all times. The fierce public discourse that followed was at large ignited by the media-hyped nickname βGod particleβ attributed to Higgs boson. The debate regarding the science-religion relation reinvigorated once again and plenty theologically informed views were expressed. In this paper, I take into consideration the authoritative views expressed by the Catholic Church and the Greek-Orthodox Church and I discuss them
in comparison with each other, as well as in juxtaposition with other views expressed in the public discussion on the issue, in an attempt to draw philosophically interesting inferences
Sofia A. Yanovskaya: The Marxist Pioneer of Mathematical Logic in the Soviet Union
K. Marxβs 200th jubilee coincides with the celebration of the 85 years from the first
publication of his βMathematical Manuscriptsβ in 1933. Its editor, Sofia Alexandrovna
Yanovskaya (1896β1966), was a renowned Soviet mathematician, whose significant studies on the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic, as well as on the history and philosophy of mathematics are unduly neglected nowadays. Yanovskaya, as a militant Marxist, was actively engaged in the ideological confrontation with idealism and its influence on modern mathematics and their interpretation. Concomitantly, she was one of the pioneers of mathematical logic in the Soviet Union, in an era of fierce disputes on its compatibility with Marxist philosophy. Yanovskaya managed to embrace in an originally Marxist spirit the contemporary level of logico-philosophical research of her time. Due to her highly esteemed status within Soviet academia, she became one of the most significant pillars for the culmination of modern mathematics in the Soviet Union. In this paper, I attempt to trace the influence of the complex socio-cultural context of the first decades of the Soviet Union on Yanovskayaβs work. Among the several issues I discuss, her encounter with L. Wittgenstein is striking
How could Vygotsky inform an approach to scientific representations?
In the quest for a new social turn in philosophy of science, exploring the prospects of a Vygotskian perspective could be of significant interest, especially due to his emphasis on the role of culture and socialisation in the development of cognitive functions. However, a philosophical reassessment of Vygotsky's ideas in general has yet to be done. As a step towards this direction, I attempt to elaborate an approach on scientific representations by drawing inspirations from Vygotsky. Specifically, I work upon Vygotskyβs understanding on the nature and function of concepts, mediation and zone of proximal development. -/- I maintain that scientific representations mediate scientific cognition in a tool-like fashion (like Vygotskyβs signs). Scientific representations are consciously acquired through deliberate inquiry in a specific context, where it turns to be part of a whole system, reflecting the social practices related to scientific inquiry, just scientific concepts do in Vygotskyβs understanding. They surrogate the real processes or effects under study, by conveying some of the features of the represented systems. Vygotskyβs solution to the problem of the ontological status of concepts points to an analogous understanding for abstract models, which should be regarded neither as fictions nor as abstract objects. -/- I elucidate these views by using the examples of the double-helix model of DNA structure and the development of our understanding of the photoelectric effect
Fractional total colourings of graphs of high girth
Reed conjectured that for every epsilon>0 and Delta there exists g such that
the fractional total chromatic number of a graph with maximum degree Delta and
girth at least g is at most Delta+1+epsilon. We prove the conjecture for
Delta=3 and for even Delta>=4 in the following stronger form: For each of these
values of Delta, there exists g such that the fractional total chromatic number
of any graph with maximum degree Delta and girth at least g is equal to
Delta+1
On topological relaxations of chromatic conjectures
There are several famous unsolved conjectures about the chromatic number that
were relaxed and already proven to hold for the fractional chromatic number. We
discuss similar relaxations for the topological lower bound(s) of the chromatic
number. In particular, we prove that such a relaxed version is true for the
Behzad-Vizing conjecture and also discuss the conjectures of Hedetniemi and of
Hadwiger from this point of view. For the latter, a similar statement was
already proven in an earlier paper of the first author with G. Tardos, our main
concern here is that the so-called odd Hadwiger conjecture looks much more
difficult in this respect. We prove that the statement of the odd Hadwiger
conjecture holds for large enough Kneser graphs and Schrijver graphs of any
fixed chromatic number
Intuition and Awareness of Abstract Models: A Challenge for Realists
It is plausible to think that, in order to actively employ models in their inquiries, scientists should be aware of their existence. The question is especially puzzling for realists in the case of abstract models, since it is not obvious how this is possible. Interestingly, though, this question has drawn little attention in the relevant literature. Perhaps the most obvious choice for a realist is appealing to intuition. In this paper, I argue that if scientific models were abstract entities, one could not be aware of them intuitively. I deploy my argumentation by building on Chudnoffβs elaboration on intuitive awareness. Furthermore, I shortly discuss some other options to which realists could turn in order to address the question of awareness
Intuition and Awareness of Abstract Models: A Challenge for Realists
It is plausible to think that, in order to actively employ models in their inquiries, scientists should be aware of their existence. The question is especially puzzling for realists in the case of abstract models, since it is not obvious how this is possible. Interestingly, though, this question has drawn little attention in the relevant literature. Perhaps the most obvious choice for a realist is appealing to intuition. In this paper, I argue that if scientific models were abstract entities, one could not be aware of them intuitively. I deploy my argumentation by building on Chudnoffβs elaboration on intuitive awareness. Furthermore, I shortly discuss some other options to which realists could turn in order to address the question of awareness
ΠΠ΅ΡΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΡ, ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΊΠ° ΠΈ Π½Π°ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΠ΅ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π½Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅: ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ²Π°Ρ Π·Π°Π½ΠΎΠ²ΠΎ ΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΡΡ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΡΠΊΡΡ ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΡ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° // Activity, Practice and Scientific Cognition: Reassessing Soviet Marxist Critiques to Pragmatism
ΠΠ΄Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΈΠ· ΠΎΡΠΎΠ±Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΠΉ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΈΠ·Π²Π΅ΡΡΠ½ΠΎ, ΡΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΠ²ΠΊΠ° ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π½Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, ΡΠ²ΠΎΠ±ΠΎΠ΄Π½Π°Ρ ΠΎΡ Π°ΠΏΠ΅Π»Π»ΡΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΊ ΠΊΠΎΡΡΠ΅ΡΠΏΠΎΠ½Π΄Π΅Π½ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΈΡΡΠΈΠ½Ρ ΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΡΡΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ Π½Π΅Π·Π°Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠΎΠΉ (ΠΎΡ ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΎΠ²Π΅ΠΊΠ°) ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ. ΠΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΡ, ΠΊ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊΠΈΠΌ Π±Ρ Π²ΠΎΠ·Π·ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎ ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΡΠΌ Π²ΠΎΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ°ΠΌ ΠΎΠ½ΠΈ Π½ΠΈ ΡΠΊΠ»ΠΎΠ½ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΡ, ΠΏΡΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΡΠΆΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΡΡ ΠΎΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π½Π°Π½ΠΈΡ. Π‘ΠΎΠ³Π»Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎ ΡΡΠΎΠΉ ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ΠΏΡΠΈΠΈ, Π΄ΠΎΡΡΠ°ΡΠΎΡΠ½ΡΠΌ ΠΎΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ Π·Π½Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π΅Π³ΠΎ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅. ΠΠ°Π½Π½ΡΠΉ
Π°ΡΠΏΠ΅ΠΊΡ Π½Π΅ΠΎΠ΄Π½ΠΎΠΊΡΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π·Π°ΡΡΠ°Π³ΠΈΠ²Π°Π»ΡΡ Π² Ρ
ΠΎΠ΄Π΅ Π΄ΠΈΡΠΊΡΡΡΠΈΠΉ ΠΎ ΡΡ
ΠΎΠ΄ΡΡΠ²Π°Ρ
ΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π»ΠΈΡΠΈΡΡ
ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ° ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ°.
ΠΠ΅ΡΠΌΠΎΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΡΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΠ²Π΅Π½Π½ΠΎΠ΅ ΡΠ°ΡΡ
ΠΎΠΆΠ΄Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΌ Π² ΠΏΠΎΠ½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ΄Ρ Π·Π½Π°Π½ΠΈΡ, ΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈΡΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΡΡ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΈ ΠΏΠ°ΡΠ°Π»Π»Π΅Π»ΠΈ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ ΡΡΠΈΠΌΠΈ Π΄Π²ΡΠΌΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠ΅Π»Π»Π΅ΠΊΡΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΠΌΠΈ ΡΡΠ°Π΄ΠΈΡΠΈΡΠΌΠΈ. Π ΡΠ°ΡΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΠΠ΅ΡΡΡΠ°Π½ Π Π°ΡΡΠ΅Π» ΡΠΊΠ°Π·ΡΠ²Π°Π» Π½Π° Π±Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΎΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΈΠΈ ΠΡΡΠΈ Β«Π΄ΠΎΠΊΡΡΠΈΠ½Π΅ Π΄ΡΡΠ³ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΠΊΡ-Π³Π΅Π³Π΅Π»ΡΡΠ½ΡΠ°, ΠΠ°ΡΠ»Π° ΠΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠ°, ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΎΠ½Π° Π±ΡΠ»Π° ΡΡΠΎΡΠΌΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½Π° Π² Π΅Π³ΠΎ βΠ’Π΅Π·ΠΈΡΠ°Ρ
ΠΎ Π€Π΅ΠΉΠ΅ΡΠ±Π°Ρ
Π΅βΒ». ΠΠΎ ΠΌΠ½Π΅Π½ΠΈΡ Π Π°ΡΡΠ΅Π»Π°, Π΅ΡΠ»ΠΈ Π½Π΅ ΠΏΡΠΈΠ΄Π°Π²Π°ΡΡ ΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΊΠΎΠΌ Π±ΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π·Π½Π°ΡΠ΅Π½ΠΈΡ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΌΠΈΠ½ΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈΠΌ Π½ΡΠ°Π½ΡΠ°ΠΌ, ΠΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΎΠ²Π° ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΡ Π΄Π΅ΡΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ°, Π² Π³Π»Π°Π²Π½ΡΡ
ΠΌΠΎΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Ρ
Β«Π΅Π΄Π²Π° ΠΎΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΌΠ° ΠΎΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΡΡΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ°Β». ΠΡΠΎΡ Π²Π·Π³Π»ΡΠ΄ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΡΠΈΠ» ΡΠ°ΡΠΏΡΠΎΡΡΡΠ°Π½Π΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ Π΄Π°ΠΆΠ΅ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ², Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π°ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠ°Π½ΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ² (ΡΠΎΡΠ½Π΅Π΅, ΡΡΠΎΡΠΊΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²), ΠΊΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠ΅ Π² ΠΊΠΎΠ½ΡΠ΅ 40-Ρ
Π³ΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ² ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π²Π΅ΠΊΠ° ΡΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π»ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌ ΠΡΡΠΈ ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΡΡΠΌΠΎΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΎΠ»ΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΡΠΈΠ΅ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ°. ΠΠΆ. ΠΠΎΠ²Π°ΠΊ, ΠΊ ΠΏΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅ΡΡ, ΡΡΠ²Π΅ΡΠΆΠ΄Π°Π», ΡΡΠΎ Β«ΡΠ°ΠΌΡΠΌ Π²ΡΠ΄Π°ΡΡΠΈΠΌΡΡ ΡΠΎΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΌ ΠΌΡΡΠ»ΠΈΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΌ, Π²ΠΏΠΈΡΠ°Π²ΡΠΈΠΌ Π² ΡΠ΅Π±Ρ Π²ΡΠ΅ Π»ΡΡΡΠ΅Π΅, ΡΡΠΎ Π±ΡΠ»ΠΎ Ρ ΠΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠ°, ΡΠ²Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΡΡΠΈΒ». Π. ΠΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ½Π° β ΠΊΠ°ΠΊ ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΠΊΠ°, Π° Π½Π΅ ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΊΠ° β ΠΠΎΠ²Π°ΠΊ ΡΡΠΈΡΠ°Π», Π² ΡΠ²ΠΎΡ ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π΄Ρ, Β«ΡΠΊΡΡΡΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΡΠ»Π΅Π΄ΠΎΠ²Π°ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΌΒ» ΠΡΡΠΈ. Π‘ΠΎΠ³Π»Π°ΡΠ½ΠΎ Π±ΡΠ²ΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΡ Π‘. Π₯ΡΠΊΡ, ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌ β ΡΡΠΎ ΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎΡΠΎΡΠΈΡ Β«ΡΠΊΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ Π½Π°ΡΡΡΠ°Π»ΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠ°Β», Ρ. Π΅. ΡΠ΅ΠΎΡΠΈΡ, Β«ΡΠ°Π·Π²ΠΈΠ²Π°ΡΡΠ°Ρ Π½Π°ΠΈΠ±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ Π·Π΄ΡΠ°Π²ΡΠ΅ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΄ΡΠΊΡΠΈΠ²Π½ΡΠ΅ ΠΈΠ΄Π΅ΠΈ ΠΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠ° ΠΎ ΠΌΠΈΡΠ΅Β».
Π ΡΡΠ°ΡΡΠ΅ (Ρ ΠΎΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΉ Π³Π»Π°Π²Π½ΡΠΌ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ°Π·ΠΎΠΌ Π½Π° Π°ΡΠ³ΡΠΌΠ΅Π½ΡΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΡΠΊΠΈΡ
ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΡΡΠΎΠ²) ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΈΡΠ΅ΡΠΊΠΈ ΠΏΠ΅ΡΠ΅ΡΠΌΠ°ΡΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅ΡΡΡ ΡΠΈΠ»ΠΎΡΠΎΡΡΠΊΠΈΠΉ Π΄ΠΈΠ°Π»ΠΎΠ³ ΠΌΠ΅ΠΆΠ΄Ρ ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΊΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΌ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠ°Π³ΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠ·ΠΌΠΎΠΌ. ΠΡΠ½ΠΎΠ²Π½ΠΎΠ΅ Π²Π½ΠΈΠΌΠ°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΡΠ΄Π΅Π»ΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΠ½ΡΡΠΈΡ Π΄Π΅ΡΡΠ΅Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ, ΠΈΠ»ΠΈ
ΠΏΡΠ°ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠ°, Π° ΡΠ°ΠΊΠΆΠ΅ Π²Π·Π°ΠΈΠΌΠΎΡΠ²ΡΠ·ΠΈ ΡΡΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ° ΠΈ ΠΎΠ±ΡΠ΅ΠΊΡΠ° Π² ΠΏΠΎΠ·Π½Π°Π½ΠΈΠΈ.
//
It is well-known that pragmatism advocates an approach on cognition without appealing to man-independent reality and truth as correspondence with reality. Instead, pragmatists, notwithstanding the diversity of their particular views, hold an operational conception of knowledge, according to which all that is needed is knowledge to have a suitable kind of correspondence with practice. This point has been scrutinized in the long standing discussion about the convergences and deviations between Marxism and pragmatism.
The profound divergence between Marxism and pragmatism with regard to the aforementioned issues was not enough to prevent philosophers from attempting to trace affinities between these two distinct intellectual trends. For example, Bertrand Russell pointed out the βclose similarityβ of Deweyβs doctrine to βthat of another exHegelian, Karl Marx, as it is delineated in his Theses on Feuerbach.β Russell thinks that Marxβs concept of activity or praxis is in spite of differences in terminology βessentially indistinguishable from instrumentalism.β This line of reasoning seems to be quite influential, even among pragmatists. Notably, some American Marxists (especially Trotskyists, to be exact) at the late 40βs overemphasized the affinity between Deweyβs pragmatism and Marxism, and even understood Deweyβs pragmatism as a continuation of Marxism. For example, G. Novack comments that β[t]he most outstanding figure in the world today in whom the best elements of Marxβs thought are present is John Dewey,β and presents Lenin as βan unavowed disciple of Dewey in practice.β According to S. Hook, a former Marxist who turned to pragmatism and became one of the most influential philosophers who discussed the relation between Marxism and pragmatism, the latter is βthe philosophy of experimental naturalismβ which can be regarded βas a continuation of what is soundest and most fruitful in Marxβs philosophical outlook upon the world.β
In this paper, I intend to critically reassess this philosophical dialogue between Marxism and pragmatism, by further deploying the argumentation provided mainly by Soviet Marxists with regard to the aforementioned issues, focusing especially on two of them: the concept of activity (or praxis) and the interrelation of subject and object in cognition
BOOK REVIEW: Jimena Canales, The Physicist and the Philosopher: Einstein, Bergson and the Debate that Changed our Understanding of Time
Einsteinβs relativity and its reception is definitely a prominent option for a case-study aiming to highlight the impact of the socio-cultural environment to the formulation of the scientific image of the world and other aspects of the worldview of a given era. Indeed, Einsteinβs relativity clearly marked the course of 20th-century science, changed our
view and shaped our experience of time