Nested potentials and robust equilibria

This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).incomplete information, potential games, robustness, refinements

Nested potentials and robust equilibria

This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potentials for complete information games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).incomplete information, potential games, robustness, refinements

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games

This note shows that every finite game of strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game defined in Uno (2007, Economics Bulletin 3 (17)) if the action set of each player is one-dimensional, except possibly for one playerStrategic complementarities, potential games, existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium