Direct activation of RNA polymerase III transcription by c-Myc

The proto-oncogene product c-Myc has a direct role in both metazoan cell growth and division. RNA polymerase III (pol III) is involved in the generation of transfer RNA and 5S ribosomal RNA, and these molecules must be produced in bulk to meet the need for protein synthesis in growing cells. We demonstrate here that c-Myc binds to TFIIIB, a pol III-specific general transcription factor, and directly activates pol III transcription. Chromatin immunoprecipitation reveals that endogenous c-Myc is present at tRNA and 5S rRNA genes in cultured mammalian cells. These results suggest that activation of pol III may have a role in the ability of c-Myc to stimulate cell growt

Facio ut facias

This exploratory study takes a look at the puzzle of what type of contracts are suitable for governing innovation, with particular atte ntion to inter-firm networks. It employs a conceptual framework that integrates organizational theory of formal coordination with economic perspectives on contracting, and innovate previous analyses in two ways: developing an assessment of alternative contractual forms in terms of knowledge governance and not only in terms of conflict resolution; analyzing contracts according to the intensity at which they incorporate not only market-like mechanisms, but also hierarchical and bureaucratic mechanisms, and a usually neglected array of associational and democratic mechanisms, as related to the level of uncertainty and innovation. A new type of 'associational' and 'constitutional' contract, resource based rather than action-based, is singled out as particularly fit to the governance of innovation. The framework is empirically applied to content analyze the written agreements regulating inter firm alliances for innovation in a comparative case study approach

Types of Complementarity, Combinative Organization Forms and Structural Heterogeneity: Beyond Discrete Structural Alternatives

In the first Section, this paper offer a critical re-reading of the notions of organization forms as clusters of 'attributes' in organization theory and organization economics aimed at singling out what they have established and what problems have to be solved. In the second Section, building on those elements and on earlier works of the authors, the paper provides a typology of organizational ‘features’, a theory of how they are expected to combine inspired by an analogy with chemistry, and a formalized operationalization of the main propositions through an innovative application of Boolean algebra

The co-design of contractual and extra-contractual governance: lessons from the project-based economy

Organizational economics tends to express a pessimistic view on the effectiveness of inter-firm contracts under uncertainty, and sees the use of authority and of relational governance as possible remedies. Organization theory inspires some skepticism on the effectiveness of these therapies. In particular, it identifies also reasons to expect a sustained level of formalization in strategic alliances and, conversely, to expect a moderate use of centralization. To help filling this gap, this study empirically assesses the relationship between uncertainty and complexity in the context of strategic alliances, and the use of formalization and centralization for their governance. The assessment extends to the intensity of use and the relationships of three modes of governance: contractual, formal extra-contractual, and informal and social. This exercise is carried out on a new database that collects in formation on 540 project-based alliances. We find that inter-organizational projects employ a mix of contractual and extra-contractual governance mechanisms. Different from usual conceptualization, these agreements are not characterized by high informality. Extra contractual governance seems to be employed to respond to additional factors, rather than to substitute or complement formal agreements. Finally, the pattern of allocation of property rights also interestingly deviates from standard property right theory predictions, to conform to a more pluralist, negotiation based view

The bearable lightness of inter-firm strategic alliances: resource-based and procedural contracting

This paper inquires into how contracts can regulate the complex and uncertain matters on which strategic alliances get formed. It highlights that contracts can be 'light' without being mistakenly incomplete. It is argued that the contracts constituting and regulating strategic alliances are composed by an associational core, focused on resource commitments and on the specification of property rights, broadly intended; and of a belt of contractual clauses incorporating a variety of coordination mechanisms (including, and actually privileging, joint decision making procedures). The interpretive power of the framework is illustrated through the analys is of three alliance contracts

Configurational Analysis and Organization Design: Towards a Theory of Structural Heterogeneity

This chapter reconstructs the roots, evolution and some prospects of configurational analysis (CA) in organization theory (OT) and organizational economics (OE), focusing on those components of CA that are particularly relevant to organizational design. This excursus leads to: a) revealing the presence of elements of CA in many OT and OE approaches - a continuity that is seldom acknowledged and arguably extends (rather than diminishes) the implications and applications of CA; b) identifying ‘structural heterogeneity’ (SH) -both ‘internal’ among organizational attributes within a configuration, and ‘external’ among configurations under the same conditions (or ‘equifinality’)- as an organizational property that can be distinctively studied by CA. This claim, as well as the substantive insights that can be gained by a configurational analysis of structural heterogeneity, is substantiated by an empirical analysis on a multi-sector sample of firm