Water distribution in the hypothermic dog

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston Universit

Commitment of Monetary Policy with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences

In this paper we analyse the equilibrium degree of commitment in monetary policy to an independent central banker whose preferences are imperfectly observed by private agents. We characterize the incentive compatible strategies by a central bank in office for two periods with no restrictions on its type space. The equilibrium level of commitment is also characterized. We show that when incentive compatibility constraints are binding for a non trivial subset of types of central banks the equilibrium level of commitment involves bunching: different types of rational governments commit monetary policy to similar institutions.monetary policy, delegation, signalling games.

Bank institutional setting and risk-taking: The missing role of directors’ education and turnover

Purpose: This paper aims to analyze the relationship between bank institutional setting and risk-taking by exploring whether board education and turnover are drivers of the risk propensity of cooperative banks compared to jointstock banks. Design/methodology/approach: Based on a comprehensive dataset of Italian banks over the 2011-2017 period, we examine whether these board characteristics affect the risk propensity of cooperative and joint-stock banks. Bank risk is measured by the Zindex, profit volatility and the ratio of non-performing loans to total gross loans. Findings: The findings show that cooperatives take less risk than joint-stock banks and have lower board turnover and education. Furthermore, we find that while board education mediates the relationship between the cooperative model and bank risk-taking, we do not find evidence of board turnover. Thus, the lower educational level of cooperative directors contributes to explaining the lower risk-taking of cooperative banks. Implications: The findings have several implications. In terms of the more general policy debate, our results point to the need to strengthen the governance model for both joint-stock and cooperative banks while supporting the view that a more ad hoc perspective on the best models and practices for each type of institutional setting would be preferable. In particular, the study reveals how board education’s effects on bank risk-taking should be carefully monitored. Originality/value: Through a mediation framework, this study provides empirical evidence on the relationship between bankinstitutional setting (by distinguishing between cooperative and joint-stock banks) and risk-taking behavior by exploring the underlying mechanisms at the board level, which is novel in the literature

The mortality of the Italian population: Smoothing techniques on the Lee--Carter model

Several approaches have been developed for forecasting mortality using the stochastic model. In particular, the Lee-Carter model has become widely used and there have been various extensions and modifications proposed to attain a broader interpretation and to capture the main features of the dynamics of the mortality intensity. Hyndman-Ullah show a particular version of the Lee-Carter methodology, the so-called Functional Demographic Model, which is one of the most accurate approaches as regards some mortality data, particularly for longer forecast horizons where the benefit of a damped trend forecast is greater. The paper objective is properly to single out the most suitable model between the basic Lee-Carter and the Functional Demographic Model to the Italian mortality data. A comparative assessment is made and the empirical results are presented using a range of graphical analyses.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/10-AOAS394 the Annals of Applied Statistics (http://www.imstat.org/aoas/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Political Intergenerational Risk Sharing

TIn a stochastic two-period OLG model, featuring an aggregate shock to the economy, ex-ante optimality requires intergenerational risk sharing. We compare the level of time-consistent intergenerational risk sharing chosen by a benevolent government and by an office-seeking politician. In our political system, the transfer of resources across generations is determined as a Markov equilibrium of a probabilistic voting game. Low realized returns on the risky asset induce politicians to compensate the old through a PAYG system. This political system typically generates an intergenerational risk sharing scheme that is (i) larger, (ii) more persistent, and (iii) less responsive to the realization of the shock than the (time consistent) social optimum. This is because the current politician anticipates her transfers to the elderly to be compensated by future politicians through offsetting transfers, and hence overspends. Aging increases the optimal transfer, but surprisingly makes office-seeking politicians more conservative, by increasing the cost for future politicians to compensate the current young.Pension Systems, Markov equilibria, social optimum

Short Description of the Mines of Precious Stones, in the District of Kyat-pyen, in the Kingdom of Ava, by Pere Giuseppe d'Amato, edited by Michael W. Charney

This first-hand communication from Giuseppe d’Amato appears to have been written originally in Italian. It was translated for publication in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1833, although the translator’s name is not provided. However short this account, it provides valuable detailed information mining in royal Burma as well as a few hints concerning Chinese traders in Upper Burma

Three-types models of multidimensional screening

This paper analyzes the variety of optimal screening contracts in a relatively simple multidimensional framework a` la Armstrong and Rochet (1999), when only three types of agents are present. It is shown, among other things, that the well known principle in optimal contract theory of `no distortion at the top' does not carry over to the multidimensional caseAsymmmetric information; multidimensional screening; optimal contract

Environmental policy as a multi-task principal-agent problem

We use a multi-task principal-agent model with moral hazard to study environmental regulation of a private agent by an EPA that can also allocate its budget to an alternative project with environmental benefits. In a first possible optimum, the EPA imposes a flat fine that exhausts the agent's participation constraint. In the second, the EPA provides the harshest possible punishment for a "poor" observed environmental performance and the highest possible reward for a "good" observed environmental performance. Increases in the available budget and in the maximally allowed penalty have then an ambiguous e_ect on total environmental quality.environmental regulation, multi-tasking