Experiments on bivariate risk preferences

We study cross-risk preferences over wealth and two other attributes to obtain theory-free evidence on correlation aversion as well as higher-order cross-traits like cross-prudence and cross-temperance. Two experiments elicit the dependence structure of risk preferences between wealth and, respectively, waiting time and someone else's wealth. The latter experiment, which could be called ``risk preferences for you, me, and us'', connects bivariate risk preferences with (higher-order) inequality aversion. This first systematic exploration of bivariate risk attitudes helps assess the appropriateness of assumptions in economic models on health prevention, inequality, saving, or insurance

A Parametric Analysis of Prospect Theory's Functionals for the General Population

This paper presents the results of an experiment that completely measures the utility function and probability weighting function for different positive and negative monetary outcomes, using a representative sample of N = 1935 from the general public. The results confirm earlier findings in the lab, suggesting that utility is less pronounced than what is found in classical measurements where expected utility is assumed. Utility for losses is found to be convex, consistent with diminishing sensitivity, and the obtained loss aversion coefficient of 1.6 is moderate but in agreement with contemporary evidence. The estimated probability weighing functions have an inverse-S shape and they imply pessimism in both domains. These results show that probability weighting is also an important phenomenon in the general population. Women and lower educated individuals are found to be more risk averse, in agreement with common findings. Unlike previous studies that ascribed gender differences in risk attitudes solely to differences in the degree utility curvature, however, our results show that this finding is primarily driven by loss aversion and, for women, also by a more pessimistic psychological response towards the probability of obtaining the best possible outcome.loss aversion, utility for gains and losses, prospect theory, subjective probability weighting

A Parametric Analysis of Prospect Theory's Functionals for the General Population

This paper presents the results of an experiment that completely measures the utility function and probability weighting function for different positive and negative monetary outcomes, using a representative sample of N = 1935 from the general public. The results confirm earlier findings in the lab, suggesting that utility is less pronounced than what is found in classical measurements where expected utility is assumed. Utility for losses is found to be convex, consistent with diminishing sensitivity, and the obtained loss aversion coefficient of 1.6 is moderate but in agreement with contemporary evidence. The estimated probability weighing functions have an inverse-S shape and they imply pessimism in both domains. These results show that probability weighting is also an important phenomenon in the general population. Women and lower educated individuals are found to be more risk averse, in agreement with common findings. Unlike previous studies that ascribed gender differences in risk attitudes solely to differences in the degree utility curvature, however, our results show that this finding is primarily driven by loss aversion and, for women, also by a more pessimistic psychological response towards the probability of obtaining the best possible outcome.prospect theory, utility for gains and losses, loss aversion, subjective probability weighting

The Midweight Method to Measure Attitudes towards Risk and Ambiguity

This paper introduces a parameter-free method for measuring the weighting functions of prospect theory and rank-dependent utility. These weighting functions capture risk attitudes, subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitudes. Our method, called the midweight method, is based on a convenient way to obtain midpoints in the weighting function scale. It can be used both for risk (known probabilities) and for uncertainty (unknown probabilities). The resulting integrated treatment of risk and uncertainty is particularly useful for measuring the differences between them: ambiguity. Compared to existing methods to measure ambiguity attitudes, our method is more efficient and it can accommodate violations of expected utility under risk. An experiment demonstrates the feasibility and tractability of our method, yielding plausible results such as ambiguity aversion for moderate and high likelihoods but ambiguity seeking for low likelihoods, as predicted by Ellsberg

The strength of sensitivity to ambiguity

We report an experiment where each subject’s ambiguity sensitivity is measured by an ambiguity premium, a concept analogous to and comparable with a risk premium. In our design, some tasks feature known objective risks and others uncertainty about which subjects have imperfect, heterogeneous, information (“ambiguous tasks”). We show how the smooth ambiguity model can be used to calculate ambiguity premia. A distinctive feature of our approach is estimation of each subject’s subjective beliefs about the uncertainty in ambiguous tasks. We find considerable heterogeneity among subjects in beliefs and ambiguity premia; and that, on average, ambiguity sensitivity is about as strong as risk sensitivity

Prudence, Emotional State, Personality, and Cognitive Ability

We report an experiment to consider the emotional correlates of prudent decision making. In the experiment, we present subjects with lotteries and measure their emotional response with facial recognition software. They then make binary choices between risky lotteries that distinguish prudent from imprudent individuals. They also perform tasks to measure their cognitive ability and a number of personality characteristics. We find that a more negative emotional state correlates with greater prudence. Higher cognitive ability and less conscientiousness is also associated with greater prudence

Social Class and (Un)ethical Behavior: Evidence from a Large Population Sample

We test whether and how membership in the upper class affects ethical behavior in a large representative population sample. Using objective measures of socioeconomic status to define class, we find no evidence of a general tendency for upper class to be less ethical, although we do replicate previous findings that higher status leads to less condemnation of infidelity. We also find evidence that higher class status leads to more self-focus and disengagement, as previously shown in laboratory studies with convenience samples

Social Class and (Un)ethical Behavior: Evidence from a Large Population Sample

We test whether and how membership in the upper class affects ethical behavior in a large representative population sample. Using objective measures of socioeconomic status to define class, we find no evidence of a general tendency for upper class to be less ethical, although we do replicate previous findings that higher status leads to less condemnation of infidelity. We also find evidence that higher class status leads to more self-focus and disengagement, as previously shown in laboratory studies with convenience samples

Discriminating between models of ambiguity attitude: a qualitative test

During recent decades, many new models have emerged in pure and applied economic theory according to which agents’ choices may be sensitive to ambiguity in the uncertainty that faces them. The exchange between Epstein (2010) and Klibanoff et al. (2012) identified a notable behavioral issue that distinguishes sharply between two classes of models of ambiguity sensitivity that are importantly different. The two classes are exemplified by th

Higher Order Risk Attitudes, Demographics, and Financial Decisions

We conduct an experiment to study the prevalence of the higher order risk attitudes of prudence and temperance, in a large demographically representative sample, as well as in a sample of undergraduate students. Participants make pairwise choices between lotteries of the form proposed b