Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe

T. M. Scanlon suggests that the binding nature of promises itself plays a role in allowing a promisee rationally to expect follow through even while that binding nature itself depends on the promisee’s rational expectation of follow through. Kolodny and Wallace object that this makes the account viciously circular. The chapter defends Scanlon’s theory from this objection. It argues that the basic complaint is a form of wrong kinds of reason objection. The thought is that the promisee’s reason to expect compliance are undermined if the promise is binding only when the promisee forms that very expectation. The chapter suggests that other uncontroversially rational processes of multi-person coordination involve beliefs with the very same feature. Focal point reasoning in the theory of games is one example. In coordination situations it can be rational to believe that another person will do something precisely because that person expects you to believe what one does about what they’ll do. An examination of the reasoning in such cases motivates a group reflection principle that vindicates the reasoning employed in Scanlon’s account

Normative Reference Magnets

The concept of moral wrongness, many think, has a distinctive kind of referential stability, brought out by moral twin earth cases. This article offers a new account of the source of this stability, deriving it from a metaphysics of content: “substantive” radical interpretation, and first-order normative assumptions. This story is distinguished from extant “reference magnetic” explanations of the phenomenon, and objections and replies are considered

Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics

Mark Schroeder’s expressivist program has made substantial progress in providing a compositional semantics for normative terms. This paper argues that it risks achieving this semantic progress at the cost of abandoning a key theoretical motivation for embracing expressivism in the first place. The problem can be summarized as a dilemma. Either Schroeder must allow that there are cases in which agents are in disagreement with one another, or can make valid inferences, but that these disagreements or inferences are not expressible in natural language; or his version of expressivism must abandon one of the key theoretical advantages expressivist theories seemed to possess over cognitivism, the ability to provide a very straightforward explanation of the action- and attitude-guiding role of normative judgments

Frames

Bingkai (frames) adalah sebuah tepi dekoratif yang dibuat untuk memasang, melindungi dan memajang gambar dengan bentuk persegi, bulat atau persegi panjang. Frame berfngsi untuk menonjolkan gambar dan mengendalikan ruang di antara gambar dan elemen lainnya. Frame digunakan untuk memberi kontras pada gambar dengan gambar dan tekstur latar belakang untuk menyempurnakan layout dan menarik perhatian. Berbagai desain frame dalam format digital semakin beragam. Buku ini memuat sekitar 500 gambar frame dalam berbagai bentuk dan gaya yang dapat digunakan untuk banyak aplikasi

Folding Patterns for Display & Publicity

Amsterdam423 p, fig, ilus; 18 cm