Children and poverty across Europe - The challenge of developing child centred policies

Although poor children are often the target of policy, policy itself is rarely informed by their subjective concerns. This article takes a child-centred approach to understanding the lives and experiences of children who are poor and explores how policy interventions aimed at reducing child poverty can have both, positive and negative impacts on children\u27s lives. It discusses one example drawn from recent UK welfare-to-work policies for lone mothers - a key element of the UK state\u27s anti-poverty programme - to explore the tensions that can exist between policies, which seek to alleviate child poverty and the lived experiences of poor children themselves. The key argument of this article is that it is essential to locate and understand children\u27s experiences of poverty in childhood through a direct engagement with low-income children themselves. (DIPF/Orig.)Obwohl arme Kinder oft Gegenstand von Politik sind, ist Politik nur selten über deren subjektive Belange informiert. Um die Lebensweisen und Erfahrungen von Kindern, die arm sind, zu verstehen, wird in diesem Artikel ein kindzentrierter Ansatz benutzt. Es wird herausgearbeitet, dass politische Interventionen, die Kinderarmut reduzieren sollen, sowohl positive wie negative Auswirkungen auf das Leben von Kindern haben können. Am Beispiel von Auswirkungen der aktuellen \u27welfare-to-work\u27 Politik für alleinerziehende Mütter - einem Kernelement des staatlichen Armutsbekämpfungsprogramms in Großbritannien - werden Spannungen untersucht, die zwischen einer Politik, die Kinderarmut verringern will, und den Lebenserfahrungen armer Kinder bestehen können. Das zentrale Argument dieses Artikels ist, dass die Erfahrungen, die Kinder mit Armut machen, nur dann genau bestimmt und verstanden werden können, wenn die Forscher sich mit diesen Kindern selbst befassen. (DIPF/Orig.

Introduction

This book brings together for the first time the collected wisdom of international leaders in the theory and practice in the emerging field of cultural heritage crowdsourcing. It features eight accessible case studies of groundbreaking projects from leading cultural heritage and academic institutions, and four thought-­‐provoking essays that reflect on the wider implications of this engagement for participants and on the institutions themselves

Application of Ion Cyclotron Resonance to the Study of Inelastic Excitation by Low-Energy Electrons

The geometry of the resonance cell employed for ion cyclotron resonance spectroscopy (1-3) is ideally suited for studying inelastic excitation by low-energy electrons. It has been shown that the electron beam traverses a parabolic potential well between the trapping electrodes, the depth of which is approximately half the applied trapping voltage (3,4). Low-energy electrons generated by impact excitation of an atomic or molecular energy level can be trapped in the resonance cell if their final translational energy is insufficient to escape the preset depth of the potential well. These electrons can be drifted from the source of the resonance region by applying the usual static drift field E normal to the primary magnetic field H (4). The electron drift velocity in this crossed field geometry, given by cE/H, is independent of both charge and mass. For typical values of E and H the drift velocity is in the range of 10^1-10^3 cm/sec. In the lower range of accessible drift velocities, the residence time of electrons in the resonance cell approaches 0.1 sec

On Quantum Integrable Systems

Many quantum integrable systems are obtained using an accelerator physics technique known as Ermakov (or normalized variables) transformation. This technique was used to create classical nonlinear integrable lattices for accelerators and nonlinear integrable plasma traps. Now, all classical results are carried over to a nonrelativistic quantum case

Normative Judgment and Rational Requirements: A Reply to Ridge

I examine and rebut Ridge’s two arguments for Capacity Judgment Internalism (simply qua their particular character and content, first person normative judgments are necessarily capable of motivating without the help of any independent desire). First, the rejection of the possibility of anormativism (sec. 2), second, an argument from the rational requirement to intend to do as one judges that one ought to do (sec. 3). I conclude with a few remarks about the nature of this requirement and about verdicts of akrasia. (sec. 4)