17 research outputs found
Impartial Decision Makers and other Third Parties in Moral and Social Dilemmas. An Experimental Analysis
The thesis answers several questions concerning how people behave in an economic context if behavioral norms and rules are not obvious. In particular, it is investigated how subjects behave if other people in the role of third parties are involved or if the subjects themselves have the role of third parties. The main findings are that people value fair and efficient processes and, if they have the chance to be responsible for the outcomes of the process, they are happy to contribute to it. People are willing to forego own earnings for âsavingâ, ârewardingâ, or âpunishingâ strangers even if this does not lead to potential future monetary gains for themselves. This behavior is correctly anticipated by others and prompts them to behave according to the desired norms. Whether in the role of impartial authorities or in the shoes of subordinates, people are happy to use communication to share their normative views with others even if they do not expect to meet again. And, apparently, this communication can influence the behavior of others in an efficient way
Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: a Gender Experiment
Leaders often weigh ethical against monetary consequences. We experimentally study such a dilemma where leaders can beneïŹt their groups at the expense of moral costs. First, we measure individual dishonesty preferences and, second, leaders' reporting decisions for a group by using payoïŹ-reporting games. We focus on an endogenous leadership setting, where subjects can apply for leadership. Women have less pronounced dishonesty preferences than men, but increase dishonesty as leaders. The increase disappears when leadership is randomly assigned. A follow-up study reveals that women leaders behave dishonestly when they believe their group members prefer dishonesty
Extended abstract: gender differences in leader's compliant behaviour: selection into leadership and dishonest behaviour of leaders: a gender experiment
Das erweiterte Abstract beinhaltet die Abschnitte 'Leaders and their incentives to behave non-compliantly', 'the relevance of gender for leader's compliance', die dazu durchgefĂŒhrte Studie sowie deren Auswertung.The extended abstract consists of two clauses 'leaders and their incentives to behave non-compliantly', 'the relevance of gender for leader's compliance', as well as the related experimental study and it's conclusion
Selection into Leadership and Dishonest Behavior of Leaders: A Gender Experiment
Leaders often weigh ethical against monetary consequences. We experimentally study such a dilemma where leaders can beneïŹt their groups at the expense of moral costs. First, we measure individual dishonesty preferences and, second, leadersâ reporting decisions for a group by using payoïŹ-reporting games. We focus on an endogenous leadership setting, where subjects can apply for leadership. Women have less pronounced dishonesty preferences than men, but increase dishonesty as leaders. The increase disappears when leadership is randomly assigned. A follow-up study reveals that women leaders behave dishonestly when they believe their group members prefer dishonesty
You Are in Charge: Experimentally Testing the Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Office
Apparently, judgesâ decisions are not motivated by maximizing profit. Two explanations compete: there are long-term monetary consequences; conscientious individuals self-select into the profession. In a lab experiment, we rule out both explanations. Nonetheless, authorities do a reliable job of overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities public officials or judges strengthens the effect. This suggests that the effect is not driven by anger or sympathy with the victims but follows from the office motive: the desire to fulfill the expectations that come with an assigned task. We test three extensions: When given an opportunity to announce an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach and more sensitive to their personal social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations. Experienced judges are more affected by their social value orientation
You Are in Charge: Experimentally Testing the Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Office
Apparently, judgesâ decisions are not motivated by maximizing profit. Two explanations compete: there are long-term monetary consequences; conscientious individuals self-select into the profession. In a lab experiment, we rule out both explanations. Nonetheless, authorities do a reliable job of overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities public officials or judges strengthens the effect. This suggests that the effect is not driven by anger or sympathy with the victims but follows from the office motive: the desire to fulfill the expectations that come with an assigned task. We test three extensions: When given an opportunity to announce an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach and more sensitive to their personal social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations. Experienced judges are more affected by their social value orientation
Conditional cooperation with negative externalities - An experiment
Empirically, the commons are not as tragic as standard theory predicts. The predominant explanation for this finding is conditional cooperation. Yet many real life situations involve insiders, who are directly affected by a dilemma, and outsiders, who may be harmed if the insiders overcome the dilemma. The quintessential illustration is oligopoly. If insiders overcome their dilemma and collude, this inflicts harm on the opposite market side. In our experiment, harm on outsiders significantly reduces conditional cooperation of insiders. We can exclude that this result is driven by inequity aversion, reciprocity or efficiency seeking. Only guilt aversion can rationalize our findings, with guilt being most pronounced if the active insiders not only inflict harm on the outsider, but increase their own payoff at the expense of the outsider. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved