362 research outputs found
Model-based Cognitive Neuroscience: Multifield Mechanistic Integration in Practice
Autonomist accounts of cognitive science suggest that cognitive model building and theory construction (can or should) proceed independently of findings in neuroscience. Common functionalist justifications of autonomy rely on there being relatively few constraints between neural structure and cognitive function (e.g., Weiskopf, 2011). In contrast, an integrative mechanistic perspective stresses the mutual constraining of structure and function (e.g., Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Povich, 2015). In this paper, I show how model-based cognitive neuroscience (MBCN) epitomizes the integrative mechanistic perspective and concentrates the most revolutionary elements of the cognitive neuroscience revolution (Boone & Piccinini, 2016). I also show how the prominent subset account of functional realization supports the integrative mechanistic perspective I take on MBCN and use it to clarify the intralevel and interlevel components of integration
Long-range regressions to previously read words are guided by spatial and verbal memory
Temporal estimation with two moving objects: overt and covert pursuit
The current study examined temporal estimation in a prediction motion task where participants were cued to overtly pursue one of two moving objects, which could either arrive first, i.e., shortest [time to contact (TTC)] or second (i.e., longest TTC) after a period of occlusion. Participants were instructed to estimate TTC of the first-arriving object only, thus making it necessary to overtly pursue the cued object while at the same time covertly pursuing the other (non-cued) object. A control (baseline) condition was also included in which participants had to estimate TTC of a single, overtly pursued object. Results showed that participants were able to estimate the arrival order of the two objects with very high accuracy irrespective of whether they had overtly or covertly pursued the first-arriving object. However, compared to the single-object baseline, participants’ temporal estimation of the covert object was impaired when it arrived 500 ms before the overtly pursued object. In terms of eye movements, participants exhibited significantly more switches in gaze location during occlusion from the cued to the non-cued object but only when the latter arrived first. Still, comparison of trials with and without a switch in gaze location when the non-cued object arrived first indicated no advantage for temporal estimation. Taken together, our results indicate that overt pursuit is sufficient but not necessary for accurate temporal estimation. Covert pursuit can enable representation of a moving object’s trajectory and thereby accurate temporal estimation providing the object moves close to the overt attentional focus
Reinterpretation in visual imagery is possible without visual cues: a validation of previous research
Telephone conversation impairs sustained visual attention via a central bottleneck
Recent research has shown that holding telephone conversations disrupts one's driving ability. We asked whether this effect could be attributed to a visual attention impairment. In Experiment 1, participants conversed on a telephone or listened to a narrative while engaged in multiple object tracking (MOT), a task requiring sustained visual attention. We found that MOT was disrupted in the telephone conversation condition, relative to single-task MOT performance, but that listening to a narrative had no effect. In Experiment 2, we asked which component of conversation might be interfering with MOT performance. We replicated the conversation and single-task conditions of Experiment 1 and added two conditions in which participants heard a sequence of words over a telephone. In the shadowing condition, participants simply repeated each word in the sequence. In the generation condition, participants were asked to generate a new word based on each word in the sequence. Word generation interfered with MOT performance, but shadowing did not. The data indicate that telephone conversation disrupts attention at a central stage, the act of generating verbal stimuli, rather than at a peripheral stage, such as listening or speaking
Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem
The frame problem is the difficulty of explaining how non-magical systems think and act in ways that are adaptively sensitive to context-dependent relevance. Influenced centrally by Heideggerian phenomenology, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that the frame problem is, in part, a consequence of the assumption (made by mainstream cognitive science and artificial intelligence) that intelligent behaviour is representation-guided behaviour. Dreyfus’ Heideggerian analysis suggests that the frame problem dissolves if we reject representationalism about intelligence and recognize that human agents realize the property of thrownness (the property of being always already embedded in a context). I argue that this positive proposal is incomplete until we understand exactly how the properties in question may be instantiated in machines like us. So, working within a broadly Heideggerian conceptual framework, I pursue the character of a representationshunning thrown machine. As part of this analysis, I suggest that the frame problem is, in truth, a two-headed beast. The intra-context frame problem challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic system may achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action within a context. The inter-context frame problem challenges us to say how a purely mechanistic system may achieve appropriate, flexible and fluid action in worlds in which adaptation to new contexts is open-ended and in which the number of potential contexts is indeterminate. Drawing on the field of situated robotics, I suggest that the intra-context frame problem may be neutralized by systems of special purpose adaptive couplings, while the inter-context frame problem may be neutralized by systems that exhibit the phenomenon of continuous reciprocal causation. I also defend the view that while continuous reciprocal causation is in conflict with representational explanation, special-purpose adaptive coupling, as well as its associated agential phenomenology, may feature representations. My proposal has been criticized recently by Dreyfus, who accuses me of propagating a cognitivist misreading of Heidegger, one that, because it maintains a role for representation, leads me seriously astray in my handling of the frame problem. I close by responding to Dreyfus’ concerns
Probabilistic single function dual process theory and logic programming as approaches to non-monotonicity in human vs. artificial reasoning
In this paper, it is argued that single function dual process theory is a more credible psychological account of non-monotonicity in human conditional reasoning than recent attempts to apply logic programming (LP) approaches in artificial intelligence to these data. LP is introduced and among other critiques, it is argued that it is psychologically unrealistic in a similar way to hash coding in the classicism vs. connectionism debate. Second, it is argued that causal Bayes nets provide a framework for modelling probabilistic conditional inference in System 2 that can deal with patterns of inference LP cannot. Third, we offer some speculations on how the cognitive system may avoid problems for System 1 identified by Fodor in 1983. We conclude that while many problems remain, the probabilistic single function dual processing theory is to be preferred over LP as an account of the non-monotonicity of human reasoning
Sensorimotor supremacy: Investigating conscious and unconscious vision by masked priming
According to the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis, conscious perception draws on
motor action. In the present report, we will sketch two lines of potential
development in the field of masking research based on the sensorimotor supremacy
hypothesis. In the first part of the report, evidence is reviewed that masked,
invisible stimuli can affect motor responses, attention shifts, and semantic
processes. After the review of the corresponding evidence – so-called masked
priming effects – an approach based on the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis is
detailed as to how the question of a unitary mechanism of unconscious vision can
be pursued by masked priming studies. In the second part of the report,
different models and theories of backward masking and masked priming are
reviewed. Types of models based on the sensorimotor hypothesis are discussed
that can take into account ways in which sensorimotor processes (reflected in
masked priming effects) can affect conscious vision under backward masking
conditions
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