Tests for Establishing Security Properties

Ensuring strong security properties in some cases requires participants to carry out tests during the execution of a protocol. A classical example is electronic voting: participants are required to verify the presence of their ballots on a bulletin board, and to verify the computation of the election outcome. The notion of certificate transparency is another example, in which participants in the protocol are required to perform tests to verify the integrity of a certificate log. We present a framework for modelling systems with such `testable properties', using the applied pi calculus. We model the tests that are made by participants in order to obtain the security properties. Underlying our work is an attacker model called ``malicious but cautious'', which lies in between the Dolev-Yao model and the ``honest but curious'' model. The malicious-but-cautious model is appropriate for cloud computing providers that are potentially malicious but are assumed to be cautious about launching attacks that might cause user tests to fail

When Can Limited Randomness Be Used in Repeated Games?

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at generating random-like sequences, and true random bits may be unavailable. Even if the players have access to enough random bits for a single instance of the game their randomness might be insufficient if the game is played many times. In this work, we ask whether randomness is necessary for equilibria to exist in finitely repeated games. We show that for a large class of games containing arbitrary two-player zero-sum games, approximate Nash equilibria of the $n$-stage repeated version of the game exist if and only if both players have $\Omega(n)$ random bits. In contrast, we show that there exists a class of games for which no equilibrium exists in pure strategies, yet the $n$-stage repeated version of the game has an exact Nash equilibrium in which each player uses only a constant number of random bits. When the players are assumed to be computationally bounded, if cryptographic pseudorandom generators (or, equivalently, one-way functions) exist, then the players can base their strategies on "random-like" sequences derived from only a small number of truly random bits. We show that, in contrast, in repeated two-player zero-sum games, if pseudorandom generators \emph{do not} exist, then $\Omega(n)$ random bits remain necessary for equilibria to exist

A parameterized halting problem, the linear time hierarchy, and the MRDP theorem

The complexity of the parameterized halting problem for nondeterministic Turing machines p-Halt is known to be related to the question of whether there are logics capturing various complexity classes [10]. Among others, if p-Halt is in para-AC0, the parameterized version of the circuit complexity class AC0, then AC0, or equivalently, (+, x)-invariant FO, has a logic. Although it is widely believed that p-Halt ∉. para-AC0, we show that the problem is hard to settle by establishing a connection to the question in classical complexity of whether NE ⊈ LINH. Here, LINH denotes the linear time hierarchy. On the other hand, we suggest an approach toward proving NE ⊈ LINH using bounded arithmetic. More specifically, we demonstrate that if the much celebrated MRDP (for Matiyasevich-Robinson-Davis-Putnam) theorem can be proved in a certain fragment of arithmetic, then NE ⊈ LINH. Interestingly, central to this result is a para-AC0 lower bound for the parameterized model-checking problem for FO on arithmetical structures.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

On the optimality of gluing over scales

We show that for every $\alpha > 0$, there exist $n$-point metric spaces (X,d) where every "scale" admits a Euclidean embedding with distortion at most $\alpha$, but the whole space requires distortion at least $\Omega(\sqrt{\alpha \log n})$. This shows that the scale-gluing lemma [Lee, SODA 2005] is tight, and disproves a conjecture stated there. This matching upper bound was known to be tight at both endpoints, i.e. when $\alpha = \Theta(1)$ and $\alpha = \Theta(\log n)$, but nowhere in between. More specifically, we exhibit $n$-point spaces with doubling constant $\lambda$ requiring Euclidean distortion $\Omega(\sqrt{\log \lambda \log n})$, which also shows that the technique of "measured descent" [Krauthgamer, et. al., Geometric and Functional Analysis] is optimal. We extend this to obtain a similar tight result for $L_p$ spaces with $p > 1$.Comment: minor revision

Efficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Games

We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study $\alpha$-approximate $k$-equilibria of these games, i.e., outcomes where no group of at most $k$ players can deviate such that each member increases his payoff by at least a factor $\alpha$. We prove that for $\alpha \ge 2$ these games have the finite coalitional improvement property (and thus $\alpha$-approximate $k$-equilibria exist), while for $\alpha < 2$ this property does not hold. Further, we derive an almost tight bound of $2\alpha(n-1)/(k-1)$ on the price of anarchy, where $n$ is the number of players; in particular, it scales from unbounded for pure Nash equilibria ($k = 1)$ to $2\alpha$ for strong equilibria ($k = n$). We also settle the complexity of several problems related to the verification and existence of these equilibria. Finally, we investigate natural means to reduce the inefficiency of Nash equilibria. Most promisingly, we show that by fixing the strategies of $k$ players the price of anarchy can be reduced to $n/k$ (and this bound is tight)

Fairly Allocating Contiguous Blocks of Indivisible Items

In this paper, we study the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible items with the extra feature that the items lie on a line. Our goal is to find a fair allocation that is contiguous, meaning that the bundle of each agent forms a contiguous block on the line. While allocations satisfying the classical fairness notions of proportionality, envy-freeness, and equitability are not guaranteed to exist even without the contiguity requirement, we show the existence of contiguous allocations satisfying approximate versions of these notions that do not degrade as the number of agents or items increases. We also study the efficiency loss of contiguous allocations due to fairness constraints.Comment: Appears in the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 201

Privacy-Preserving Trust Management Mechanisms from Private Matching Schemes

Cryptographic primitives are essential for constructing privacy-preserving communication mechanisms. There are situations in which two parties that do not know each other need to exchange sensitive information on the Internet. Trust management mechanisms make use of digital credentials and certificates in order to establish trust among these strangers. We address the problem of choosing which credentials are exchanged. During this process, each party should learn no information about the preferences of the other party other than strictly required for trust establishment. We present a method to reach an agreement on the credentials to be exchanged that preserves the privacy of the parties. Our method is based on secure two-party computation protocols for set intersection. Namely, it is constructed from private matching schemes.Comment: The material in this paper will be presented in part at the 8th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management (DPM 2013

FIRST experiment: Fragmentation of Ions Relevant for Space and Therapy

Nuclear fragmentation processes are relevant in different fields of basic research and applied physics and are of particular interest for tumor therapy and for space radiation protection applications. The FIRST (Fragmentation of Ions Relevant for Space and Therapy) experiment at SIS accelerator of GSI laboratory in Darmstadt, has been designed for the measurement of different ions fragmentation cross sections at different energies between 100 and 1000 MeV/nucleon. The experiment is performed by an international collaboration made of institutions from Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The experimental apparatus is partly based on an already existing setup made of the ALADIN magnet, the MUSIC IV TPC, the LAND2 neutron detector and the TOFWALL scintillator TOF system, integrated with newly designed detectors in the interaction Region (IR) around the carbon removable target: a scintillator Start Counter, a Beam Monitor drift chamber, a silicon Vertex Detector and a Proton Tagger for detection of light fragments emitted at large angles (KENTROS). The scientific program of the FIRST experiment started on summer 2011 with the study of the 400 MeV/nucleon 12C beam fragmentation on thin (8mm) carbon targe

Soft Dipole Modes in Neutron-rich Ni-isotopes in QRRPA

The soft dipole modes in neutron rich even-even Ni-isotopes are investigated in the quasiparticle relativistic random phase approximation. We study the evolution of strengths distribution, centroid energies of dipole excitation in low-lying and normal GDR regions with the increase of the neutron excess. It is found in the present study that the centroid energies of the soft dipole strengths strongly depend on the thickness of neutron skin along with the neutron rich even-even Ni-isotopes.Comment: 14 pages, 7 figure