Reading Instruction for Students with Emotional Disturbance: A Mixed-Methods Investigation.

Although there is a substantial body of observation research investigating the manner in which reading instruction is provided to students with learning disabilities, there is little research in this area involving students with and at risk for emotional disturbance. The purpose of this investigation was to contribute to the limited corpus of observation studies investigating school-based practice in reading for this student population. In this investigation, 11 teachers from two states were systematically observed while providing reading instruction over the course of the 2017-2018 school year. Participating students were also observed over the course of the year and completed two standardized reading assessments at the beginning and end of this investigation. Teachers were also interviewed to identify contextual factors that promote or impede the provision of high quality reading instruction to this student population. Study findings suggest that teachers are in need of additional training, support, and resources to maximize instructional time. Students in this sample tended to make no or minimal progress in reading and were frequently observed displaying low levels of academic engagement across settings. Implications for school practice and areas for future research are discussed

An Observation of the Two River\u27s Greenway

This piece offers a history of the the Two Rivers Greenway in downtown Binghamton, NY based on project plans and the author\u27s personal observations

Good/Bad, Right/Wrong, and their Analogues

This essay presents an experimental theory of values. An abstract schema is extracted from two pairs of concepts that are used in moral evaluation, good and bad, on the one hand, and right and wrong on the other. The schema is then used to explore the analogues of the moral concepts in aesthetic and epistemic evaluation.This essay presents an experimental theory of values. An abstract schema is extracted from two pairs of concepts that are used in moral evaluation, good and bad, on the one hand, and right and wrong on the other. The schema is then used to explore the analogues of the moral concepts in aesthetic and epistemic evaluation.Este ensayo presenta una teoría experimental de los valores. Se extrae un esquema de dos pares de conceptos que se utilizan en la evaluación moral: bueno y malo, por un lado, y correcto e incorrecto por el otro. El esquema se usa luego para explorar los análogos de los conceptos morales en la evaluación estética y epistémica

The Responsible Inclusion of Students Receiving Special Education Services for Emotional Disturbance: Unraveling the Practice to Research Gap.

The majority of students receiving special education services for emotional disturbance (ED) receive a significant amount of instruction in general education classrooms, which emphasizes curriculums based on college and career readiness standards. In turn, those teachers who provide instruction to students with ED in inclusive settings are responsible for using evidence-based practices (EBPs) for those teaching situations in which they exist to meet free appropriate public education (FAPE) mandates. However, the identification of EBPs is a necessary pre-condition to eventual school adoption and teacher use of such practices. In this investigation, we completed a synthesis of syntheses to (a) determine the degree to which academic intervention research has focused on students with ED in general education classrooms and (b) identify practices that are effective at improving the academic performance of students with ED in these settings. Overall, few studies were identified. Of those studies identified, half did not disaggregate outcomes for students with ED. A quality indicator coding based on the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) design standards revealed that no studies with disaggregated outcomes permitted causal inferences. Implications for school practice and areas for future research are discussed

Proposed plan for the organization and administration of a department of audio-visual education in the town of Cumberland, Rhode Island

Thesis (M.A.)--Boston University, 1946. This item was digitized by the Internet Archive

She Borrowed My Only Husband (And Forgot To Bring Him Back)

https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mmb-vp/6453/thumbnail.jp

Isn\u27t Love A Grand Old Thing

https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mmb-vp/1909/thumbnail.jp

Confusion Isn\u27t Everything

The typical shorthand justification for trademark rights centers on avoiding consumer confusion. But in truth, this encapsulation mistakes a method for a purpose: confusion merely serves as an indicator of the underlying problems that trademark law seeks to prevent. Other areas of law accept confusion or mistake of all kinds, intervening only when those errors lead to more serious harms. Likewise, every theory of trademark rights considers confusion troubling solely because it threatens more fundamental values such as fair competition or informative communication. In other words, when it comes to the deep purposes of trademark law, confusion isn’t everything. Yet trademark law’s structure now encourages courts to act otherwise, as if confusion itself were the ultimate evil with which trademark law is concerned and as if its optimal level were zero. Trademark adjudication increasingly fetishized confusion over the last half century while simultaneously expanding its scope to cover dramatically more situations. As a result, trademark rights conflicted more frequently with open markets and free speech. Even when special doctrines developed to protect those values, they tended to devolve back into confusion analysis. In many situations — often including examples such as trade dress, comparative advertising, or uses inexpressive works — competing values get short shrift from a framework preoccupied with eradicating confusion of any description. This Article analyzes causes of this phenomenon, problems that result, and possible cures. It begins with a historical analysis demonstrating how the growth of confusion reasoning overwhelmed inherent limits on trademark rights that once protected competition or communication values. It then explains the resulting damage. Sometimes courts penalize socially valuable but unlicensed uses of marks; even when they probably would not find the uses infringing, the high administrative costs imposed on defendants discourage such uses. Finally, the Article proposes a better alternative. Courts should identify categories of cases implicating competition or communication values at the outset of litigation and should handle them differently than ordinary cases. Sometimes courts should simply ignore confusion when enforcing trademark rights would cause too much damage to other values. In other cases, they should distinguish between types of confusion; when balanced against important competing values, minimal or temporary confusion need not be given the same weight as outright deception that diverts trade. Our recommended approach offers stronger and earlier protection for competition and communication. It also puts confusion detection back in its proper place — not as the ultimate purpose of trademark law, but its tool

Confusion Isn\u27t Everything

The typical shorthand justification for trademark rights centers on avoiding consumer confusion. But in truth, this encapsulation mistakes a method for a purpose: confusion merely serves as an indicator of the underlying problems that trademark law seeks to prevent. Other areas of law accept confusion or mistake of all kinds, intervening only when those errors lead to more serious harms. Likewise, every theory of trademark rights considers confusion troubling solely because it threatens more fundamental values such as fair competition or informative communication. In other words, when it comes to the deep purposes of trademark law, confusion isn’t everything. Yet trademark law’s structure now encourages courts to act otherwise, as if confusion itself were the ultimate evil with which trademark law is concerned and as if its optimal level were zero. Trademark adjudication increasingly fetishized confusion over the last half century while simultaneously expanding its scope to cover dramatically more situations. As a result, trademark rights conflicted more frequently with open markets and free speech. Even when special doctrines developed to protect those values, they tended to devolve back into confusion analysis. In many situations — often including examples such as trade dress, comparative advertising, or uses inexpressive works — competing values get short shrift from a framework preoccupied with eradicating confusion of any description. This Article analyzes causes of this phenomenon, problems that result, and possible cures. It begins with a historical analysis demonstrating how the growth of confusion reasoning overwhelmed inherent limits on trademark rights that once protected competition or communication values. It then explains the resulting damage. Sometimes courts penalize socially valuable but unlicensed uses of marks; even when they probably would not find the uses infringing, the high administrative costs imposed on defendants discourage such uses. Finally, the Article proposes a better alternative. Courts should identify categories of cases implicating competition or communication values at the outset of litigation and should handle them differently than ordinary cases. Sometimes courts should simply ignore confusion when enforcing trademark rights would cause too much damage to other values. In other cases, they should distinguish between types of confusion; when balanced against important competing values, minimal or temporary confusion need not be given the same weight as outright deception that diverts trade. Our recommended approach offers stronger and earlier protection for competition and communication. It also puts confusion detection back in its proper place — not as the ultimate purpose of trademark law, but its tool