Corporate Tax Systems and the Location of Industry

This paper analyzes the effects of different corporate tax systems on the location of industry within an economic geography model with regional size asymmetries. Both the North and the South gain industry by adopting a tax regime that produces the lowest tax level. As the share of expenditures in the North increases, the Nash equilibrium has this region setting regressive taxes, while the South introduces progressive taxation. The unilateral welfare-maximizing tax structure in the North (South) is the regressive (progressive) system when expenditures in the North increase. Welfare in the North (South) is however maximized if both regions set regressive (progressive) taxes, while regressive (progressive) taxation in both regions represents a joint welfare maximizing outcome if the economic size of the North is higher (lower) than a certain threshold value. As trade is liberalized, the equilibrium tax regime adopted depends on how pro ts respond to lower trade costs. Proportional taxation is never an equilibrium, neither as regional spending changes, nor as trade is liberalized.Economic Geography; Tax Systems; Corporate Taxation

Comparative Trade Policy

Current research has found ambiguous results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper proposes a solution to this indeterminacy. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared to proportional representation. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend on the number of voters in swing districts who own a factor specific to the exporting industry in relation to those who possess claims to the specific input employed by the import-competing sector. It is further argued that political rents are lower (higher) under majoritarian elections if there are more factor owners in the swing districts with stakes in the exporting (import-competing) industry.Endogenous Tariff Formation; Trade Policy; Electoral Rules

The Comparative Political Economy of Economic Geography

This paper examines how different electoral rules affect the location decisions of firms through the effect on regional policy. The equilibrium location of industry in the economically smaller (larger) region is higher under majoritarian (proportional) elections. The standard prediction in the economic geography literature, that the larger region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced, no longer holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the smaller region is increasing in the level of regional integration. As trade is in- creasingly liberalized, the economy features a reversed core-periphery equilibrium. This result holds under both electoral rules. However, firms locate to the smaller region at a relatively higher rate in the case of majoritarian voting, hence, the reversed equilibrium occurs for a relatively lower level of regional integration with majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence shows that the model is consistent with qualitative features of the data, and the results are robust to an instrumental variable strategy that accounts for the potential endogeneity of the electoral rule.Economic Geography; Regional Policy; Electoral Rules

Idler chirp optimization in a pulse-pumped parametric amplifier

A simple engineering rule for idler characteristic optimization in pulsed fiber optic parametric amplifiers operated in transparency is derived. The theoretical results are validated in both simulations and experiments

The UK Biobank imaging enhancement of 100,000 participants: rationale, data collection, management and future directions

UK Biobank is a population-based cohort of half a million participants aged 40–69 years recruited between 2006 and 2010. In 2014, UK Biobank started the world’s largest multi-modal imaging study, with the aim of re-inviting 100,000 participants to undergo brain, cardiac and abdominal magnetic resonance imaging, dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry and carotid ultrasound. The combination of large-scale multi-modal imaging with extensive phenotypic and genetic data offers an unprecedented resource for scientists to conduct health-related research. This article provides an in-depth overview of the imaging enhancement, including the data collected, how it is managed and processed, and future direction

Essays on the Political Economy of Protection and Industrial Location

This thesis consists of three essays in the fields of the political economy of international trade. Location Equilibrium with Endogenous Rent Seeking: This paper analyzes the location of manufacturing activities when regional policy is determined by endogenous rent seeking. Once lobbying for government transfers to regions is included in an economic geography framework with size asymmetries, the standard prediction that the larger region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced no longer holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the economically smaller region is increasing in the level of regional integration once trade becomes freer than a certain threshold value. When free trade prevails, the relocation of industry takes place up to the point where there are as many firms operating in the South as in the North. Furthermore, lobbying slows down the agglomeration process, whereas the home market magnification effect (Baldwin, 2000) becomes weaker. Endogenous Tariff Formation and the Political Economy of Trade Retaliation: This paper extends the notion of endogenous tariff formation under representative democracy by allowing for strategic interaction between governments. The model developed suggests that the ideological distribution in the electorate within a country affects the tariff setting behavior among its trading partners. The equilibrium tariffs in a country depend on the trade policy preferences of the ideologically neutral voters among such partners as well as on the distribution of their sector-specific factor ownership. Ideological shifts in the population which systematically alter the political power of different voter groups, or types of factor owners, in one country thus influence the tariff setting behavior in competing trading nations. On the Indeterminacy of Trade Policy under Different Electoral Rules: Current research has found ambiguous results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper proposes a solution to this indeterminacy. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared to proportional representation. The framework developed in this paper thus includes as special cases earlier models reported in the literature. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend on the number of voters in swing districts who own a factor specific to the exporting industry in relation to those who possess claims to the specific input employed by the import-competing sector. Using a cross section of countries, empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis

"Again!" : A qualitative study about the attitudes of the disability rights movement towards internet and online gaming

Syftet med denna studie är att ta reda på attityder inom intresseorganisationerna för personer med intellektuella funktionsnedsättningar beträffande synen på internet och onlinespel utifrån hinder och möjligheter för sina medlemsgrupper. Studien bygger på sju intervjuer med förtroendevalda och tjänstemän från organisationerna FUB, Autism- och Aspergerförbundet samt Attention. Semistrukturerade intervjuer har använts i enlighet med studiens syfte och karaktär. Materialet har transkriberats och tematiserats för att syvende sist tolkats utifrån socialkonstruktivismen i enlighet med Loseke (2003) och Spector och Kitsuse (2001). Analysen visar att förtroendevalda och tjänstemän ser både hinder och möjligheter med internet och onlinespel för sina medlemmar. Internet och onlinespel kan bidra till att öka graden av delaktighet och skapa möjligheter för självförverkligande men kan också leda till social isolering och olika former av social utsatthet.The purpose of this study is to find out the attitudes of interest groups that organize people with intellectual disabilities regarding the perception of the Internet and online games based on the obstacles and opportunities for their members. The study is based on seven interviews with elected representatives and officials from the organizations FUB, Autism and Aspergerförbundet, and Attention. Semi-structured interviews were used in accordance with the study's purpose and character. The material has been transcribed and thematized to be interpreted on the basis of social constructivism in accordance with Loseke (2003) and Spector and Kitsuse (2001). The analysis shows that the elected representatives and officials see both obstacles and opportunities with the Internet and online gaming for their members. Internet and online games can help to increase the level of participation and provide opportunities for self-fulfillment, but can also lead to social isolation and various forms of social vulnerability

Essays on the Political Economy of Protection and Industrial Location

This thesis consists of three essays in the fields of the political economy of international trade. Location Equilibrium with Endogenous Rent Seeking: This paper analyzes the location of manufacturing activities when regional policy is determined by endogenous rent seeking. Once lobbying for government transfers to regions is included in an economic geography framework with size asymmetries, the standard prediction that the larger region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced no longer holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the economically smaller region is increasing in the level of regional integration once trade becomes freer than a certain threshold value. When free trade prevails, the relocation of industry takes place up to the point where there are as many firms operating in the South as in the North. Furthermore, lobbying slows down the agglomeration process, whereas the home market magnification effect (Baldwin, 2000) becomes weaker. Endogenous Tariff Formation and the Political Economy of Trade Retaliation: This paper extends the notion of endogenous tariff formation under representative democracy by allowing for strategic interaction between governments. The model developed suggests that the ideological distribution in the electorate within a country affects the tariff setting behavior among its trading partners. The equilibrium tariffs in a country depend on the trade policy preferences of the ideologically neutral voters among such partners as well as on the distribution of their sector-specific factor ownership. Ideological shifts in the population which systematically alter the political power of different voter groups, or types of factor owners, in one country thus influence the tariff setting behavior in competing trading nations. On the Indeterminacy of Trade Policy under Different Electoral Rules: Current research has found ambiguous results with respect to the effects of the type of electoral regime on trade policy. The present paper proposes a solution to this indeterminacy. It is shown that the equilibrium level of trade protection can be relatively higher, as well as lower, under a majoritarian electoral rule compared to proportional representation. The framework developed in this paper thus includes as special cases earlier models reported in the literature. The equilibrium outcome is shown to depend on the number of voters in swing districts who own a factor specific to the exporting industry in relation to those who possess claims to the specific input employed by the import-competing sector. Using a cross section of countries, empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis

Political participation, regional policy and the location of industry

This paper analyzes the location of manufacturing activities when regional policy is determined by each region's relative propensity to vote. The level of subsidies distributed to a region and the location of manufacturing activities are increasing in the region's relative political participation rate. The standard prediction in the economic geography literature, that the larger region becomes the core when trade barriers are reduced, no longer holds. The establishment of manufacturing production in the economically smaller region is increasing in the level of regional integration. As trade is increasingly liberalized, the economy features a reversed core-periphery equilibrium. Empirical evidence shows that the model is consistent with qualitative features of the data, and the results are robust to an instrumental variable strategy that accounts for the potential endogeneity of voter turnout.Economic geography Regional policy Voter turnout