24 research outputs found
Demokratske vrednosti, emocije i emotivizam
The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson's ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum's concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents' emotional judgments.Cilj rada je da istraži odnos izmeÄu demokratskih vrednosti i emocija. Autor tvrdi da su demokratske vrednosti i emocije meÄusobno svodljivi: politiÄki akteri služe se emocionalnim sudovima kako bi refleksivno ocenili normativne paradigme politiÄkog života. U prvom delu rada, autor opisuje stanje u savremenoj politiÄkoj filozofiji u vezi sa emocijama i identifikuje etiÄku koncepciju emotivizma Äarlsa Stivensona kao prvi celoviti pokuÅ”aj neutralne konceptualizacije emocija u moralnom i politiÄkom miÅ”ljenju. Drugi deo rada istražuje nedostatke emotivizma i nalazi adekvatnu alternativu u konceptu emocionalnih sudova Marte Nusbaum, kao one koja ukljuÄuje verovanja o druÅ”tvenim objektima i njihove vrednosti. U zakljuÄnom delu rada, autor tvrdi da su moralni i politiÄki sporovi u demokratijama rezultat rangiranja politiÄkih objekata po važnosti. Kriterijum evaluacije takvog tipa rangiranja je izveden is demokratskih vrednosti koje su svodljive na emocionalne sudove aktera
Toward ideational collective action: the notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century social liberalism
The aim of this paper is to analyze notions of common good and of the state in late 19th century British social liberalism and their relation to collective action of the citizens. The author shows that British social liberals argued for a type of state that uses top down strategy to encourage collective action in order to transform individuals into a socially responsible groups, i.e. good citizens. The paper focuses on philosophical works of F. H. Bradley, ethics of T. H. Green and political philosophy of B. Bosanquet. analyzing their efforts to reconceptualize ideas of classical liberalism and utilitarian doctrine of the individual, society and the state in light of emerging influence of leftist social movements. The author argues that the works of British social liberals are a foundation of the state and society which will dominate liberalism in the second half of 20th century, i.e. the idea of the welfare state
Levi populizam - demokratizacija i klasna svest
This paper analyses the possibility of left populism to trigger class consciousness with what Laclau calls populist subjects. The author argues that populist subjects and class consciousness are not identical nor interchangeable concepts in respect to the classical Marx and Engels notion on the proletarian class. In the first part of the paper, the author sets a description of populism based on its three key features: reaction, the notion of the people, and the struggle. In the second part, the idea of class consciousness is analysed, showing that class consciousness is necessarily political. In the third part of the paper, the idea of left populism is explored by using the findings of the second part of the paper, showing structural inconsistencies in the idea of the populist subject.Rad analizira moguÄnosti levog populizma da proizvede klasnu svest kod onih koje Laklau naziva populistiÄkim subjektima. Autor pokazuje da populistiÄki subjekti nisu identiÄni niti meÄusobno zamenjivi pojmovi u svetlu Marksovih i Engelsovih ideja o proleterskoj klasi. U prvom delu rada, autor postavlja ideju populizma na osnovu tri osnovna elementa: reakcionarnosti, ideje naroda, i borbe. U drugom delu, analizira se ideja klasne svesti i pokazuje da je ona nužno politiÄka. U treÄem delu rada, ideja levog populizma se objaÅ”njava zakljuÄcima o klasnoj svesti, gde se pokazuje strukturalna nekonzistentnost ideje populistiÄkog subjekta
Od metafiziÄkog do politiÄkog - da li politiÄkom kulturom Rolsov princip tolerancije zapada u moralni relativizam?
The aim of this paper is to analyze Rawls's conception of political (public) culture, exploring whether his principle of tolerance (Political Liberalism) falls in moral relativism. The analysis consists of three sections. Firstly, the author introduces different critical accounts on Rawls's theory and identifies where they go wrong. Secondly, the author delineates the intellectual tradition of social liberalism from which sprang Rawls's conception, showing that he significantly alters the key ideas of dominant liberal justice of the Western world. In the final section of the paper it is argued that Rawls's idea of political culture is a cornerstone of just society and the spring of tolerance, providing arguments in favor of the idea that Rawls's conception of political liberalism is not morally relativistic but it is, however, in line with liberal pluralism.Cilj ovog rada je da analizira Rolsovu koncepciju politiÄke (javne) kulture, ispitujuÄi da li njegovo naÄelo tolerancije (PolitiÄki liberalizam) zapada u moralni relativizam. Analiza se sastoji iz tri dela. Prvo, autor analizira razliÄite kritiÄke pristupe Rolsovoj teoriji i pokazuje gde leži njihova greÅ”ka. Drugo, autor razluÄuje intelektualnu tradiciju socijalnog liberalizma iz koje je proizilazi Rolsova koncepcija, pokazujuÄi da je on znaÄajno primenio kljuÄne ideje dominantne liberalne pravde Zapadnog sveta. U poslednjem delu rada nude se argumenti u prilog tezi da je Rolsova ideja politiÄke kulture kamen temeljac pravednog druÅ”tva i izvor tolerancije, Äime se dodatno osnažuje ideja da Rolsova koncepcija politiÄkog liberalizma ne zapada u moralni relativizam veÄ je deo tradicije liberalnog pluralizma
Uticaj filozofije jezika na savremenu politiÄku filozofiju
Around the mid-1990s, political philosophy was pronounced dead due to the foray of logic positivism. The arguments for this were sufficiently strong to the extent that classical political philosophy could not anymore be considered a relevant framework for research. The goal of this paper is to analyze the changes which occurred in the field of studying of political philosophy around the mid-20th century (from the 1940s to the 1970s). The author here controverts the attitude that contemporary political philosophy although abandoning metaphysical frames, still preserved the normative dimension of studying the reality. The key agent through which contemporary political philosophy emerged originates from the works of philosophers of language, particularly from later works of Ludwig Wittgenstein.Sredinom pedesetih godina XX veka politiÄka filozofija je usled naleta logiÄkog pozitivizma proglaÅ”ena mrtvom. Argumenti za ovo su bili dovoljno jaki, toliko da se klasiÄna politiÄka filozofija viÅ”e nije mogla smatrati relevantnim okvirom istraživanja. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da analizira promene koje su se dogodile na polju predmeta prouÄavanja politiÄke filozofije sredinom XX veka (od Äetrdesetih do sedamdesetih godina). Autor u ovom polemiÅ”e sa stavom da savremena politiÄka filozofija, iako je odustala od metafiziÄkih okvira, i dalje zadržala normativnu dimenziju prouÄavanja stvarnosti. KljuÄni agens kroz iz koga je proiziÅ”la savremena politiÄka filozofija potekao je iz radova filozofa jezika, naroÄito iz kasnijih radova Ludviga VitgenÅ”tajna
SuÅ”tinska spornost i politiÄki pojmovi
This paper explores one part of the changes that political theory underwent in the second half of the 20th century. The topic of the paper is the somewhat neglected, yet epistemologically very significant, essential contestability thesis. The author's basic assumption is that the thesis reflects the view of the ontological relativism of politics, from which it follows that political concepts are essentially contestable, i.e. that it is impossible to select one adequate general approach that could serve as a basis for determining which of the possible understandings of a particular concept is uncontestably the best. The dominant thesis in the middle decades of the 20th century was the thesis of the eath of political philosophy. It was believed that the subject of the classical political philosophy was a delusive (re)shaping of the mental objects, which usually does not correspond to the state of affairs in the world. Set in the context of the Second World War mass destruction and the outset of the Cold War, this argument was detrimental to the vitality of political philosophy. The thesis of essential contestability of political concepts created in such context was considered to be one more attempt to discredit the basic vales of normative theories. This text challenges this belief by claiming that it was the essential contestability that offered a different understanding of the ontological status of politics, placing it into the sphere of ontological relativism and pluralism of values. Only after these ontological and epistemological conditions were met was the basis set for what we now call modern political theory. The aim of this paper is to present a draft for the possible argumentation for the ontological relativity of politics. To achieve this aim, using analytic approach, the author follows the argumentation for ontological relativity presented by W.O.Quine. After the author defines the theoretical framework, he gives an overview and the analysis of the dominant theories of the essential contestability of political concepts.Ovaj rad se bavi delom promena koje je politiÄka teorija doživela u drugoj polovini XX veka. Predmet rada je pomalo zapostavljena, ali u epistemoloÅ”kom smislu izuzetno znaÄajna, teza o suÅ”tinskoj spornosti pojmova. Autor polazi od pretpostavke da je teza utemeljena u shvatanju ontoloÅ”ke relativnosti politike, na osnovu koje se izvodi zakljuÄak da su politiÄki pojmovi suÅ”tinski sporni, odnosno da se ne može izabrati adekvatan generalni pristup na osnovu kojeg bi se moglo odrediti da je neko moguÄih od shvatanja pojma zaista najbolje. Sredinom XX veka dominirala je teza o smrti politiÄke filozofije. Smatralo se da je predmet klasiÄne politiÄke filozofije isprazno (pre)oblikovanje mentalnih objekata, koje uglavnom nekorespondira stanju stvari u svetu. U kontekstu masovnih razaranja u II svetskom ratu i zahuktavanju Hladnog rata, ovaj argument je delovao pogubno na vitalnost politiÄke filozofije. Teza o suÅ”tinskoj spornosti politiÄkih pojmova koja je nastala upravo u takvom kontekstu, smatrana je za joÅ” jedan pokuÅ”aj diskreditacije osnovnih vrednosti normativnih teorija. Ovaj tekst polemiÅ”e sa ovom tezom, zastupajuÄi stav da je suÅ”tinska spornost upravo pružila drugaÄije shvatanje ontoloÅ”kog statusa politike, smeÅ”tajuÄi je u ravan ontoloÅ”ke relativnosti i pluralizma vrednosti. Tek kada su ovi ontoloÅ”koepistemoloÅ”ki uslovi bili ispunjeni, postavljena je osnova za dalju izgradnju onoga Å”to nazivamo savremenom politiÄkom teorijom. Ovaj rad ima za cilj da skicira moguÄu argumentaciju za ontoloÅ”ku relativnost politike. U izvoÄenju postavljenog cilja, kroz analitiÄki pristup, autor prati argumentaciju za ontoloÅ”ku relativnost koju pruža V.O. Kvajn. Nakon postavljenog teorijskog okvira, autor daje pregled ali i analizu dominantnih teorija o suÅ”tinskoj spornosti politiÄkih pojmova
IzmeÄu levice i 'Carinskog rata' - kakva bi bila politiÄka filozofija logiÄkih pozitivista?
This paper is an attempt to explain the relation between philosophy of logical positivism, on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other. The author's starting point is the assumption that logical positivists did not get involved in political philosophy and that one can only indirectly draw conclusions about this relation. On the example of political activities of logical positivists in Austria between the two world wars, this paper explores whether logical positivists were leftist and egalitarian political philosophers. The second part of the paper investigates Neurath's view of the success of Serbia in the 'Customs War' and the 'Balkan Wars.' On the basis of Neurath's analysis the author demonstrates that the political philosophy of logical positivism would embrace theoretical and value pluralism. .Rad pokuÅ”ava da objasni odnos izmeÄu filozofije logiÄkog pozitivizma i politiÄke filozofije. Autor polazi od pretpostavke da se logiÄki pozitivisti nisu bavili politiÄkom filozofijom i da se o tom odnosu može zakljuÄivati samo posredno. Na primeru politiÄkog angažmana logiÄkih pozitivista u Austriji izmeÄu dva svetska rata, rad Äe ispitati da li bi logiÄki pozitivisti bili levo orijentisani i egalitaristiÄki politiÄki filozofi. U drugom delu rada istražiÄe se Nojratovo viÄenje uspeha Srbije u 'Carinskom ratu' i balkanskim ratovima. Na osnovu Nojratove analize, autor Äe pokazati da bi politiÄka filozofija logiÄkog pozitivizma težila teorijskom i vrednosnom pluralizmu.
Populism to the left: Democratisation and class consciousness
This paper analyses the possibility of left populism to trigger class consciousness with what Laclau calls populist subjects. The author argues that populist subjects and class consciousness are not identical nor interchangeable concepts in respect to the classical Marx and Engels notion on the proletarian class. In the first part of the paper, the author sets a description of populism based on its three key features: reaction, the notion of the people, and the struggle. In the second part, the idea of class consciousness is analysed, showing that class consciousness is necessarily political. In the third part of the paper, the idea of left populism is explored by using the findings of the second part of the paper, showing structural inconsistencies in the idea of the populist subject
PolitiÄke ideologije i moÄ kod Majkla Fridena - da li ideologije ukidaju suÅ”tinski sporne pojmove?
This paper analyses Michael Freeden's thesis that essentially contested concepts become decontested in the field of ideology. Freeden claims that ideologies are the bridge between determinacy and indeterminacy of concepts. He relates decontested concepts to determinacy by introducing the concept of power, arguing that power wielders can make concepts decontested. The first part of this paper analyses the relationship between ideologies and essentially contested concepts. In the second part, the author questions the conditions of the decontested concept of power. The author argues that even if ideologies could serve as decontesting fields, the concept of power cannot make other concepts decontested.Tekst analizira tezu Majkl Fridena da suÅ”tinski sporni pojmovi, kada su u polju ideologije, postaju izvan-sporni. Fridenova teza jeste da su ideologije most izmeÄu determinisanosti znaÄenja pojmova i njihove neodreÄenosti. Proces izvan-sporenja, kojim se pojmovi vraÄaju u okvire determinisanosti, Friden vezuje za pojam moÄi, odnosno, daje argument u prilog teze da onaj ko poseduje moÄ ima sposobnost da uÄini pojmove izvan-spornim. U prvom delu rada, analizira se odnos ideologija i suÅ”tinski spornih pojmova. U drugom delu rada, autor ispituje uslove pod kojima pojam moÄi nije suÅ”tinski sporan. Autor daje argument da iako ideologije pružaju odreÄene moguÄnosti za izvan-spornost, sam pojam moÄi nema moguÄnost da Äini druge pojmove izvan-spornim
Da li su politiÄke institucije otporne na promene?
To what extent is the New institutionalism capable of explaining why implementations of public policies in political institutions may engender resistance? The author believes that political institutions are endogenous and not exogenous entities. The author first tries to demonstrate what constitutes the autonomy of a political institution by recognizing the elements of a specific political culture which becomes source of formation of political identities to political actors. Subsequently, the author examines the assumption that a political institution and actors are not tolerant to public policies authoritatively imposed from the exterior. The result of this collision is the resistance of a political institution. In the end, the author analyzes certain possible forms of resistance and their effect on preventing the implementation of public policy.Kolike su moguÄnosti novog institucionalizma da objasni zbog Äega se u politiÄkim institucijama pri implementaciji javnih politika mogujaviti otpori? Autor polazi od pretpostavke da su politiÄke institucije endogeni, a ne egzogeni entiteti. Najpre, autor pokuÅ”ava da pokaže u Äemu se sastoji autonomija politiÄke institucije, prepoznajuÄi elemente specifiÄne politiÄke kulture koja politiÄkim akterima postaje izvor formiranja politiÄkih identiteta. Zatim, autor ispituje pretpostavku da politiÄka institucija i akteri ne trpe javne politike koje su autoritativno nametnute spolja. Rezultat ove kolizije je otpor politiÄke institucije. Na kraju, autor analizira neke od moguÄih formi otpora i njihov uÄinak u spreÄavanju realizacije javne politike