91 research outputs found
Specialisation, Interdisciplinarity, and Incommensurability
Incommensurability may be regarded as driving specialisation, on the one hand, and as posing some problems to interdisciplinarity, on the other hand. It may be argued, however, that incommensurability plays no role in either specialisation or interdisciplinarity. Scientific specialties could be defined as simply 'different' (that is, about different things), rather than 'incommensurable' (that is, competing for the explanation of the same phenomena). Interdisciplinarity could be viewed as the co- ordinated effort of scientists possessing complemetary and interlocking skills, and not as the overcoming of some sort of incommensurable divide. This article provides a comprehensive evaluative examination of the relations between specialisation, interdisciplinarity, and incommensurability. Its aim is to defend the relevance of incommensurability to both specialisation and interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it aims at correcting the tendency, common among many philosophers, to regard incommensurability in a restrictive manner - such as, for example, as an almost purely semantic issu
Scientific revolutions, specialization and the discovery of the structure of DNA: toward a new picture of the development of the sciences
In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn’s insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of scientists involved in such a transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn—namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn’s ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change
The interdisciplinarity revolution
Contemporary interdisciplinary research is often described as bringing some important changes in the structure and aims of the scientific enterprise. Sometimes, it is even characterized as a sort of Kuhnian scientific revolution. In this paper, the analogy between interdisciplinarity and scientific revolutions will be analysed. It will be suggested that the way in which interdisciplinarity is promoted looks similar to how new paradigms were described and defended in some episodes of revolutionary scientific change. However, contrary to what happens during some scientific revolutions, the rhetoric with which interdisciplinarity is promoted does not seem to be accompanied by a strong agreement about what interdisciplinarity actually is. In the end, contemporary interdisciplinarity could be defined as being in a ‘pre-paradigmatic’ phase, with the very talk promoting interdisciplinarity being a possible obstacle to its maturity.; La investigación contemporánea sobre la interdisciplinariedad es descrita a menudo como si implicara cambios importantes en la estructura y fines de la empresa cientÃfica. A veces es incluso caracterizada como una forma de revolución cientÃfica kuhniana. En este artÃculo se analizará la analogÃa entre la interdisciplinariedad y las revoluciones cientÃficas. Se sugerirá que el modo en que se promueve la interdisciplinariedad es similar al modo en que se describe y defiende un nuevo paradigma en algunos episodios de cambio cientÃfico revolucionario. Sin embargo, al contrario de lo que sucede durante las revoluciones cientÃficas, la retórica con la que se promueve la interdisciplinariedad no parece venir acompañada por un fuerte acuerdo acerca de lo que es realmente dicha interdisciplinariedad. En definitiva, la interdisciplinariedad contemporánea se encuentra en una fase pre-paradigmática, siendo un posible obstáculo para su madurez el discurso mismo que promueve la interdisciplinariedad
Guest editor’s introduction
Guest editor's introduction to the special issue on "Questions about science"
The interdisciplinarity revolution
Contemporary interdisciplinary research is often described as bringing some important changes in the structure and aims of the scientific enterprise. Sometimes, it is even characterized as a sort of Kuhnian scientific revolution. In this paper, the analogy between interdisciplinarity and scientific revolutions will be analysed. It will be suggested that the way in which interdisciplinarity is promoted looks similar to how new paradigms were described and defended in some episodes of revolutionary scientific change. However, contrary to what happens during some scientific revolutions, the rhetoric with which interdisciplinarity is promoted does not seem to be accompanied by a strong agreement about what interdisciplinarity actually is. In the end, contemporary interdisciplinarity could be defined as being in a 'pre-paradigmatic' phase, with the very talk promoting interdisciplinarity being a possible obstacle to its maturity
Formal models of the scientific community and the value-ladenness of science
In the past few years, several formal models of the social organisation of science have been developed. While their robustness and representational adequacy has been analysed at length, the function of these models has begun to be discussed in more general terms only recently. This paper is a contribution to the general philosophical debate on the formal models of the social organisation of science. Its aim is to understand which view of science these models end up supporting as a consequence of their philosophical presuppositions, which are also in need to be explicated. It will be argued that, because of some of their philosophical underpinnings, current formal models of the scientific community do not explain the internal role that moral and societal values play in scientific research. It will also be discussed whether formal models of the social organization of science can actually capture the value-ladenness of science. At the same time, it will be shown that the discussion on the formal models of the scientific community may contribute in fruitful ways to the ongoing discussions about value judgements in science
The Value-Free Ideal, the Autonomy Thesis, and Cognitive Diversity
Some debates about the role of non-epistemic values in science discuss the so-called Value-Free Ideal together with the autonomy thesis, to the point that they may be assumed to be intertwined. As I will argue in this article, the two are independent from one another, are supported by different arguments, and ought to be disentangled. I will also show that the arguments against value-freedom and supporting a value-laden conception of science, are different from the arguments against autonomy and supporting democratized science. Moreover, while some of the arguments against autonomy and for democratized science may actually be consistent with value-freedom, they conflict with some philosophical views about the internal diversity of well-designed epistemic communities. This article distinguishes the Value-Free Ideal and the autonomy thesis, as well as their antitheses, and investigates their relations to some of the socio-epistemological models of the social organization of scientific research. Its aim is to make explicit some incompatibilities between different normative frameworks developed in philosophy of science
The collective responsibilities of science: towards a normative framework
Scientists have the epistemic responsibility of producing knowledge. They also have the social responsibility of aligning their research with the needs and values of various societal stakeholders. Individual scientists may be left with no guidance on how to prioritise and carry these different responsibilities. As I will argue, however, the responsibilities of science can be harmonised at the collective level. Drawing from debates in moral philosophy, I will propose a theory of the collective responsibilities of science that accounts for the internal diversity of research groups and for their different responsibilities
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