Pairwise Kidney Exchange

In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, S”nmez, and šnver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely first step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be indifferent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival `robabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and dOnor (unless there is a rare perfect match). In the present paper we show that, although thd pairwise constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms 4hat are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 preferences. This class of meahanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accomodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, as well as stochastic mechanisms that allow considerations of distributive justice to be addressed.

Kidney Exchange

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone on the queue for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving the highest priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. We explore how such exchanges can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly. The problem resembles some of the housing' problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, the cadaver kidneys must be transplanted immediately upon becoming available. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the design we propose for a kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys.

Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the “double coincidence of wants,” and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients. Larger than 3- way exchanges have much smaller impact. Larger populations of patient- donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges.

Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of wants," and relatively few exchanges have been consummated by decentralized means. As the population of available patient-donor pairs grows, the frequency with which exchanges can be arranged will depend in part on how exchanges are organized. We study the potential frequency of exchanges as a function of the number of patient-donor pairs, and the size of the largest feasible exchange. Developing infrastructure to identify and perform 3-way as well as 2-way exchanges will have a substantial effect on the number of transplants, and will help the most vulnerable patients. Larger than 3-way exchanges have much smaller impact. Larger populations of patient-donor pairs increase the percentage of patients of all kinds who can find exchanges.

Kidney Exchange

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological incompatibility, but each patient can receive a kidney from the other donor. Exchanges are also made in which a donor- patient pair makes a donation to someone on the queue for a cadaver kidney, in return for the patient in the pair receiving the highest priority for a compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes available. We explore how such exchanges can be arranged efficiently and incentive compatibly. The problem resembles some of the "housing" problems studied in the mechanism design literature for indivisible goods, with the novel feature that while live donor kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, the cadaver kidneys must be transplanted immediately upon becoming available. In addition to studying the theoretical properties of the design we propose for a kidney exchange, we present simulation results suggesting that the welfare gains would be substantial, both in increased number of feasible live donation transplants, and in improved match quality of transplanted kidneys.

The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market

In September of 1998, the Judicial Conference of the United States abandoned as unsuccessful the attempt—the sixth since 1978—to regulate the dates at which law students are hired as clerks by Federal appellate judges. The market promptly resumed the unraveling of appointment dates that had been temporarily slowed by these efforts. In the academic year 1999-2000 many judges hired clerks in the fall of the second year of law school, almost two years before employment would begin, and before hardly any information about candidates other than first year grades was available. Hiring dates moved still earlier in the Fall of 2000 and 2001. The present paper explores proposed reforms of the market, experimentally in the laboratory, and computationally using genetic algorithms. Our results suggest that some of the special features of the judge/law-clerk market—in particular the feeling among many students and judges that students must accept offers when they are made--present obstacles to the success of the proposed reforms, including the latest reform proposed by the judges, in March 2002, which is a one year moratorium on clerkship hiring. Unlike many markets in which the inability to make binding contracts contributes to market failure, in the law clerk market it is the ease with which binding contracts are forged that harms efficiency.

Impact differences among the landing phases of a drop vertical jump in soccer players

The aim of this study was to examine the differences of landing phase biomechanics between the players who had anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) reconstruction and healthy participants during single leg drop vertical jump. In this study, 11 soccer players who had anterior cruciate ligament reconstruction (aged 23.0±3.6 years, height 177±5.0 cm, weight 83.8±11.7 kg) and 9 healthy soccer players( aged 22.2±2.4 years, height 178±3.0 cm, weight 74.3±6.1 kg) participated voluntarily. During the data collection phase three high speed cameras synchronized to each other and force plate were used. Visual analysis programme and MATLAB were used to calculate kinetic and kinematic variables. Landing techniques of the subjects' were examined by flexion angle of knee, ground reaction force and moment parameters. The statistical analyses of the measured results were performed by t-test and Pearson Correlation analysis. According to the results, it was determined that peak vertical ground reaction force exhibited significant phase differences (p=0.00, and p=0.00, respectively) between the groups. Obtained results can be explained with "quadriceps avoidance" motion pattern which is characterized by decreased quadriceps activity and lower external knee flexion moment in an effort to control anterior translation of the tibia in subjects with ACL reconstruction. A better understanding of the different phases during single-leg landings can shed a light on mechanism of non-contact anterior crucaite ligament injuries therefore future researches should assess how phase differences affect drop vertical jump performance. © 2018 Montenegrin Sports Academy. All rights reserved

Impacts of red pepper supplemented diets and different storage conditions on eggs obtained from free-range laying hens

Egg quality depends on many conditions, including diet and storage temperature. Consumers usually assess it by checking yolk colour. The aim of the study was to indicate the effects of storage periods (7, 14 and 21 days) and temperature (room and refrigerator) on egg quality parameters, especially yolk colour. The experiment was carried out with 150 eggs, which were collected from free-range Lohmann brown laying hens (42 weeks old) fed with or without 0.75% red pepper supplemented diets. The highest weight loss was observed in the eggs stored at room temperature (23 °C, 64% humidity) for 21 days. In addition, it was discovered that the highest air cell height (ACH) was detected in the eggs stored at room temperature for 14 and 21 days. Red pepper supplementation and storage time and temperature were found to have been effective on the Roche yolk colour fan values (RYCF), lightness (L*) and yellowness (b*). Additionally, red pepper supplementation had a significantly positive effect on the redness (a*) value of the yolk. However, no statistical difference in the a* value was determined between the fresh eggs and the stored eggs supplemented with red pepper. The supplementation of 0.75% red pepper as a natural colouring agent to the diets of free-range laying hens had a positive effect on the yolk colour, which is an important attribution for consumer perception. Furthermore, the colours of the yolks of eggs stored in the refrigerator for a week were not significantly different from the fresh ones. Consequently, the present study suggests feeding laying hens diets supplemented with 0.75% red pepper might be useful in improving yolk colour. The results indicate that the eggs stored in the refrigerator might be closer to the characteristics of fresh eggs. In contrast, eggs stored at room temperature showed more deterioration between treatments.Keywords: Colour evaluation methods, egg quality, free-range, yolk colou

Are traditional head size and shape measurements useful in modern medical design? A literature review

This literature review indicates that a more suitable method is needed to collect data to enable mass customisation of scalp cooling caps. Head data are more complex for design